See also Dickie, 775 F.2d at 609.See United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1399 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he transfer [requested by the government] may be granted within the trial court's discretion unless the defendant shows that a transfer would be prejudicial."). Osum cited only Duncan for this proposition, but Duncan actually involved a transfer motion made by the defendant.

Further, a valid conviction can be based "on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face." Shoemaker , 746 F.3d at 623 (quoting United States v. Osum , 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir. 1991) ). Testimony is not incredible as a matter of law "unless it pertains to matters ‘that the witness physically could not have observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.’ " Id. (quoting Osum , 943 F.2d at 1405 ).

Finally, Maguina says this case must be remanded because the district court failed to address the prejudicial nature of the extrinsic evidence. In assessing this argument, we must confirm that the district court "engage[d] in the proper Beechum analysis and that this analysis is sufficiently apparent for purposes of appellate review." United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1401 (5th Cir. 1991). The district court "must articulate on the record its findings as to the Beechum probative value/prejudice evaluation" when formally requested by a party.

Furthermore, “a conviction may be based even on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face.” United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir.1991). Additionally, “the jury is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of a witness,” and “testimony generally should not be declared incredible as a matter of law” unless it pertains to matters “that the witness physically could not have observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.”

"[A] conviction may be based even on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or of someone making a plea bargain with the government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face." United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir. 1991). Testimony will not be "declared incredible as a matter of law unless it asserts facts that the witness physically could not have observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature."

Rather, we have stated that we will "sustain the verdict if a rational trier of fact could have found all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1404 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The standard of review in assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1310, 127 L.Ed.2d 660 (1994).

Scott is a recovering drug addict and suffers from an emotional disorder which requires her to continually take medication to prevent mood swings. It is well established that a conspiracy conviction may be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, even when that testimony is from one who has made a plea bargain with the government, provided that the testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face. United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir. 1991). Because the jury is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility, "[t]he test for `incredibility' of a witness is an extremely stringent one."

The reasoning is that because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.'" United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1404 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Beechum at 911). Rule 404(b) states:

The court's long-standing practice of random assignment, using the CM/ECF system and making adjustments for various reasons including relationship to an earlier case, under the auspices of the chief judge, is permissible under the statute. See, United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1400-01 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the absence of a local rule for random assignment but remarking that any local rule would serve internal housekeeping purposes and would not create rights enforceable by litigants).

The Fifth Circuit has held that when the government is the party seeking an intradistrict transfer of a trial, it must state a "legitimate" reason for the requested transfer. See United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1400 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may consider the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses, the prompt administration of justice, docket management, logistics, whether a courthouse meets a trial's security requirements or other facilities needs, the amount of jail space, and the adequacy of security arrangements available for defendants or witnesses.