U.S. v. Niemi

25 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Ortiz-Islas

    829 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2016)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming admission of evidence of post-indictment sting-drug transaction because evidence " ‘was closely linked in time to the alleged conspiracy and proved the identities and relationships of the conspirators' " and "evidence of the final, faux deal merely illuminated what had been going on among the relevant parties for over a year, a course of conduct that was firmly shown through overwhelming evidence including coconspirators' testimony" (quoting United Statesv. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 2009) )

    But this was not a “hub-and-spoke conspiracy,” where “one core figure supplies drugs to multiple participants.” United States v. Niemi , 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009). This, rather, was a chain conspiracy:

  2. United States v. Belanger

    890 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2018)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that "individual defendants in a joint criminal trial are required to raise their own objections unless the district court 'specifically states that an objection from one defendant will be considered an objection for all defendants'" (quoting United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 113 (1st Cir. 2000))

    To begin, "[w]hether evidence shows one or many conspiracies is a question of fact for the jury and is reviewed only for sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 732 (1st Cir. 1991) ). And a motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency grounds is, of course, subject to de novo review.

  3. United States v. Walker-Couvertier

    860 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017)   Cited 29 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding prosecutor's argument in drug conspiracy trial that defendant obtained a second weapon after another weapon had been seized was a reasonable inference from the evidence

    Because each coconspirator's success "depend[ed] on the continued existence and health of the drug distribution organization as a whole," the jury safely could conclude that coconspirators across projects were interdependent. United States v. Niemi , 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009). Last—but not least—the evidence supported a finding that the participants overlapped.

  4. United States v. Taylor

    848 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 2017)   Cited 120 times
    Holding that simple assault under 18 U.S.C. § 111 is not a violent felony under the ACCA because it can be committed "by spitting in a mail carrier's face"

    Indeed, "the prosecution may comment on the lack of evidence for a defense theory." United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 730 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation where prosecutor noted there was "no evidence at all" to support defense theory), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2743, 189 L.Ed.2d 777 (2014) ; accord United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 128–29 (1st Cir. 2009) (no error where prosecutor posited that defense counsel could not offer alternate explanation for use of code words in recorded conversation); United States v. Sánchez–Berríos, 424 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The prosecutor's description of the defense as a ‘self serving absurdity,’ while not flattering, was fair argument" (citation omitted)); United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 46–47 (1st Cir. 1996) (no error in calling defense theory a "diversion" that "doesn't pass the laugh test"). Upon review of the statements, we cannot find Taylor's view—that the prosecutor was commenting on Taylor's failure to testify or produce evidence—is the only, or even a natural reading of the prosecutor's statements.

  5. United States v. Alejandro-Montañez

    778 F.3d 352 (1st Cir. 2015)   Cited 33 times
    Remanding administration of sentencing to district court to determine applicability of amendment 782

    Whether the evidence evinces one or multiple conspiracies “is a question of fact for the jury and is reviewed only for the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir.2009). With the jury properly instructed, as here, on the need to determine whether the defendants were guilty of the charged conspiracy, the guilty verdict “can be seen as an effective rejection of the multiple conspiracy theory.”

  6. United States v. Alejandro-Montanez

    No. 12-2035 (1st Cir. Feb. 18, 2015)

    Whether the evidence evinces one or multiple conspiracies "is a question of fact for the jury and is reviewed only for the sufficiency of the evidence." United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir. 2009). With the jury properly instructed, as here, on the need to determine whether the defendants were guilty of the charged conspiracy, the guilty verdict "can be seen as an effective rejection of the multiple conspiracy theory."

  7. United States v. Mullins

    778 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that a district court need not make an exact finding as to drug quantity but rather may base its calculation on “approximations,” so long as those approximations “represent reasoned estimates of drug quantity.”

    An instruction like this has survived similar challenges. See United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 126–27 (1st Cir.2009); United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 316 (1st Cir.2004). The instruction, as given, conveyed the substance of Mullins's defense.

  8. United States v. Monserrate-Valentín

    729 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2013)   Cited 28 times
    Finding no common goal between alleged coconspirators who aimed to commit one robbery and others who sought to commit a series of robberies, and noting that the former group was motivated by a desire to seek revenge against the victim while the latter's objective was "purely pecuniary"

    The question of whether the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated the existence of one or multiple conspiracies “is a question of fact for the jury and is reviewed only for sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir.2009). In conducting our inquiry, we must look at the evidence presented at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict.

  9. United States v. Franco–Santiago

    681 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)   Cited 15 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Contrasting goal of committing one robbery with goal of committing a series of robberies

    Whether the evidence in this case shows that Franco–Santiago joined a broader conspiracy to commit a series of robberies is a question of fact reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir.2009). He preserved the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for the charged Hobbs Act conspiracy, so we review the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, “view[ing] the evidence, both direct and circumstantial—and including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

  10. United States v. Jones

    674 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2012)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that a trial judge "was not required to define reasonable doubt" where the defendant objected that the judge's instructions to the jury were ambiguous

    Here, to find the single conspiracy charged, the jury had to infer from the acts and statements of the witnesses a single ongoing “agreement” that embraced Jones and other co-conspirators. It would be enough, under the criteria developed by the courts, United States v. Niemi, 579 F.3d 123, 127 (1st Cir.2009), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1912, 176 L.Ed.2d 385 (2010), for the jury to find that the local co-conspirators were aware generally that a common, large scale conspiracy existed with Jones at the center, that its operation depended on the co-operation of all, and that the co-conspirators knowingly associated with and adhered to it. Some of the evidence pointed to by the government—for example, that the modus operandi for the various transactions was similar—is as consistent with a multiple conspiracy story as with a single conspiracy; and Jones' brief ably argues that in a small community the fact that the alleged co-conspirators tended to know each other does not prove a single conspiracy.