In 2003, Cordell Nichols was found guilty by a jury of one count of possession with intent to distribute approximately 4.6 kilograms of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and one count of conspiracy to distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) The district court sentenced Mr. Nichols to 360 months' imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release. Id.
In light of these cases, we reject Davis's argument that a broad conspiracy charge involving both named and unnamed conspirators must be narrowed to include only activities involving the named conspirators. See id. ; United States v. Nichols , 374 F.3d 959, 968–69 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. granted and opinion vacated to allow resentencing under United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), opinion reinstated , 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2005). Davis further argues that the indictment cannot be read to reach any drug-trafficking agreements or activities outside of the November 13 traffic stop, despite the broad language of Count 1, because the grand jury separately indicted her for other drug-trafficking conspiracies occurring in the same timeframe.
Evidence showing Gallegos received methamphetamine from Resendiz on credit and paid Resendiz for methamphetamine he fronted Juarez provided further evidence of an agreement to distribute. See United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1184 (10th Cir.2005) (explaining that fronting arrangement strongly suggests expectation individual who receives drugs on credit will redistribute them for profit); United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 961, 969 (10th Cir.2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 543 U.S. 1113, 125 S.Ct. 1082, 160 L.Ed.2d 1054, opinion reinstated, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir.2005) (hypothesizing that evidence of fronting arrangement would have allowed reasonable jury to find existence of agreement to distribute between defendant and supplier).The same evidence also was sufficient to prove Gallegos knew of the conspiracy's objectives and knowingly and voluntary involved herself in the conspiracy.
Moreover, this evidence was sufficient to prove all four elements of the conspiracy charge. See Small, 423 F.3d at 1183, 1185 (noting multiple purchases for resale permit inference buyer was aware of and "shared common goals with" conspiracy, and reasoning fronting arrangement creates situation of mutual dependence because seller's ability to front drugs depends on receipt of money due); United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 961, 969 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 543 U.S. 1113, opinion reinstated, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (hypothesizing that evidence of fronting arrangement would have allowed reasonable jury to find existence of agreement to distribute between defendant and supplier); United States v. Bell, 154 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating jury may presume defendant who acts in furtherance of conspiracy's goal is knowing participant). Because we conclude the government presented ample evidence establishing Juarez was not a mere purchaser of methamphetamine, but rather a knowing, voluntary, and integral part of a conspiracy to distribute that drug, we affirm his conspiracy conviction.
See United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 964 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The scope of this stop was . . . permissibly expanded when police smelled . . . marijuana in the vehicle."), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005), reinstated, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilson, 96 F. App'x 640, 644 (10th Cir. 2004) (detection of alcohol on driver's breath gives rise to reasonable suspicion). Mr. Brown protests that he has a "medical marijuana" card.
Second, and more directly to the point, we have specifically approved the two-second rule as supporting reasonable suspicion to effect a traffic stop under § 8–1523(a). United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.2004), cert. granted and opinion vacated to allow resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); opinion reinstated, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir.2005). As we stated in Nichols:
On remand, our court reinstated its opinion affirming Nichols' conviction and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186 (2005) ("Nichols II"). Following our remand to the district court, Nichols filed a second motion for a new trial, this time pursuant to Rule 33(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On remand, our court reinstated its opinion affirming Nichols' conviction and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186 (2005) (" Nichols II"). Following that remand, Nichols again filed a motion for a new trial, this time pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1), again arguing he had newly discovered evidence.
Other circuits that have considered the propriety of police stops predicated on the two-second rule have generally agreed. See United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959, 965 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1113, 125 S.Ct. 1082, 160 L.Ed.2d 1054 (2005), opinion affirming conviction reinstated and case remanded for resentencing, 410 F.3d 1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005). We think that when one car trails another by less than two seconds, an officer will generally have probable cause to believe that the trailing car is closer than what is reasonable and prudent.
See Nichols v. United States, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). See United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005). Doc. 200.