Considering the length of time Barraza avoided the consequences of his criminal conduct, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Barraza's was not the "extraordinary case" in which both the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction apply. See id. (both adjustments may apply in "extraordinary cases"); United States v. Kugmeh, 932 F.3d 1195, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 2019) (not an "extraordinary case" when defendant had absconded from pretrial release and provided a false name when apprehended months later); United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (not an "extraordinary case" when defendant absconded from pretrial release, fled from Nebraska to California, and was apprehended months later). Barraza argues that the district court erred in denying a downward departure based on his physical condition under Guidelines ยง 5H1.4, which states that "[a]n extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward." The district court considered Barraza's complicated medical issues and his ongoing medical treatment, recognizing that the Bureau of Prisons had provided life-saving care to Barraza after he surrendered.
โ Id.ยง 3E1.1 application n.2. There may be โrareโ exceptions to these rules in โextraordinary cases,โ id.ยง 3E1.1 application nn.2, 4, but Morales has not convinced us it was a clear error for the district court not to recognize his as such a special case. See, e.g., United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (standard of review). Morales's cooperation with the police both times he was caught does not outweigh the years of obstruction he caused in between.
Given that it is uncontested that Amponsah fled to Ghana, we conclude that the enhancement was entirely reasonable. See e.g., United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Although the district court found credible [defendant's] claim of fear for his safety, it reasonably concluded that [defendant] willfully chose the course of conduct that obstructed justice instead of choosing other options, such as contacting [the government] to report the threat."). Likewise, we do not think it was clearly erroneous for the District Court to conclude that the record evidence did not establish "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
" U.S.S.G. ยง 3C1.1. Application note 4 to section 3C1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of obstructive conduct, including "willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding." Id. at note 4, cmt. n. 1; see United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming finding defendant had obstructed justice when, fearing for his life, he fled to California before sentencing); United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming finding defendant had obstructed justice when he fled the jurisdiction before his plea and sentencing); United States v. Eagle, 133 F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming application of obstruction of justice enhancement in light of evidence establishing defendant "willfully" failed to appear for hearing). The government bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to support the imposition of this enhancement.
We have previously considered obstruction of justice enhancements based on willful failure to appear for a judicial proceeding, most often in cases in which the defendant fled but was later apprehended. See United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Eagle, 133 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Crow Dog, 149 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 72 F.3d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 64-65 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shinder, 8 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1993). This case is distinct from past cases in two material ways. First, the magistrate judge continued the revocation hearing that Peters failed to attend.