Opinion
No. 06-1141-cr.
October 5, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.)
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREEDthat the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
Appearing for Appellee: Elie Honig, Assistant United States Attorney, for Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: Colleen P. Cassidy, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, NY.
Present: JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
Mora, who stands convicted upon a guilty plea of one count of illegal entry into the United States, after deportation subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony (18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (b)(2)), appeals from the part of the judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) that sentenced him to sixty-two months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years supervised release. Mora submits that he is entitled to resentencing on the ground that the sentence was unreasonable. He was sentenced at the low end of the range proposed by the Sentencing Guidelines. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of appellate issues, which we refer to only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
Mora first argues that the sentence was greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In making this argument, Mora offers a generalized critique of the Sentencing Guidelines' proposed range of sentences for illegal entry offenses, arguing that lower sentences are sufficient under the Guidelines to punish a wide range of crimes allegedly more serious than illegal entry. However, this Court recently has made clear that sentencing judges are not authorized to base sentencing decisions on their assessment of the relative seriousness of broad categories of crime. See United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 355 (2d Cir. 2006). Mora next argues that the sentence was unreasonable because it did not compensate for the alleged fact that prosecutors in New York, unlike those in other districts, do not use a "fast-track" program for illegal entry offenses. This Court recently has rejected a very similar argument, holding that "a district court's refusal to adjust a sentence to compensate for the absence of a fast-track program does not make a sentence unreasonable." United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2006). Mora argues, finally, that the District Court placed undue weight on Mora's criminal history and thus failed properly to weigh and consider all the relevant Section 3553(a) factors. However, we do not impose strict requirements on the amount of explication a district court must engage in when considering the Section 3553(a) factors, and we presume, in the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2006). No such evidence is apparent on the face of this record.