"This plainly broad language suggests that any and all information that the defendant possesses concerning the offense must be provided to the Government." United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Ponce, 358 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[The fifth criterion of § 3553(f)] requires a defendant to make a good-faith attempt to cooperate with the authorities and volunteer all the relevant information he has concerning his offense." (citations omitted)); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Section] 3553(f) states that a defendant must disclose `all information' concerning the course of conduct-not simply the facts that form the basis for the criminal charge").

We review the district court’s interpretation of the safety-valve provision under the statute and the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Montes , 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Ramirez , 94 F.3d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1996) ). We review the district court’s factual findings about a defendant’s eligibility for the safety valve, as well as its ultimate conclusion, for clear error.

Therefore, he argues, his submission was timely and satisfied the requirements for safety-valve relief. Acevedo–Fitz bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence “that he provided a full and honest disclosure.” United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir.2004); see United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir.1996) (same). We review a district court's refusal to apply the safety valve for clear error.

To qualify, a defendant must (among other things) make a good-faith effort to provide the government "all information and evidence" about the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 814 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 635-37 (7th Cir. 2004). Before sentencing Cruz vaguely described the man who hired him only as "Superman," and at sentencing he explained that he "can't say anything because they'll do something" to his family.

Counsel first considers whether Lucena could challenge the district court's determination that the defendant did not satisfy the criteria for relief under the safety valve. Lucena had the burden of proving those elements by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004), and we would review the court's factual findings for clear error, see United States v. Harrison, 431 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (7th Cir. 2005). Assertions by defense counsel that Lucena had been truthful during a debriefing were not enough to satisfy the defendant's burden, and counsel did not call Lucena to testify or present other evidence.

A defendant's “bare assertion that he was truthful,” however, is insufficient to “satisfy his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he provided a full and honest disclosure.” United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir.2004). The defendant's burden under the safety valve is a true burden of proof that rests, at all times, on the defendant.

Here the court was entitled to credit Sergeant Hawkins's testimony that Blount and Johnson both were members of Young Money, that Young Money was a street gang involved in selling drugs, and that it would be "ridiculous" to believe that Blount did not know about the pervasive drug dealing at 65th and Maryland. Olivas-Ramirez, 487 F.3d at 517; United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, despite Blount's contrary contention, Sergeant Hawkins's testimony was corroborated by Williams, who testified that Blount sold heroin for Johnson and that Blount himself handed out heroin for Williams in the area of 65th and Maryland.

The court believed Urbina's statements that Arredondo told him that the drugs belonged to the conspiracy. It was entitled to do so. United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Alvarado, 326 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2003). And, in light of that determination, Arredondo's assertion that he was not responsible for those drugs was a lie.

Here, also, our review is for clear error. See United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004). Rojas' lawyer asserted that his client's truthfulness had been obscured by faulty translation and this was adequate to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he provided a full and honest disclosure on behalf of the government to the court.

The statutory language of § 3553(f) is duplicated in Guideline § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5). "The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of [the] evidence his eligibility for the safety valve." United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004). "To carry his burden, the defendant must persuade the district court that he has made full, truthful disclosure of information required by the safety valve," United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 607 (4th Cir. 2012), which includes information about offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5).