Opinion
No. 98 CR 54.
January 11, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
On December 22, 2004 this Court summarily denied the effort by Darwin Montana ("Montana") to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c) (2) ("Section 3582(c) (2)") to bootstrap himself into a revision of his sentence based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), as presumably applicable to the federal sentencing guidelines as well (something that is yet to be seen, because the Supreme Court has not yet decided that issue). Now Montana submits a handwritten Motion for Reconsideration, pointing to a brief statement in United States v. Cabrera-Polo, 376 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) as supposedly supporting his position.
It is quite true that the always careful Judge Bruce Selya, speaking for the Court of Appeals there, listed as one ground for possible relief under Section 3582(c) that "certain extraordinary and compelling reasons exist that warrant a modification." But because Cabrera-Polo admittedly did not implicate that possibility ( 376 F.3d at 31), the quoted statement contained no elaboration as to what such "extraordinary and compelling reasons" might involve.
If Montana were correct in his present contention, every pre-Blakely sentence that did not meet the standards stated in that opinion would be vulnerable, irrespective of its age. That would obviously prove too much, for there is nothing in Blakely (which the Supreme Court has not declared to be retroactive) or in the generalized language in Cabrera-Polo that would suggest an opening of the floodgates in a way that would subject the federal courts to a massive and unjustified burden. And this Court is certainly not going to countenance such a result even if it were empowered (as Montana contends) to decree Blakely's retroactivity. Hence Montana's motion for reconsideration is also denied.