Opinion
No. SA-04-CR-163-RF.
November 9, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 35), filed on July 29, 2004, and the Government's Response to Defendant's Motion, filed on August 5, 2004. Defendants seek to suppress narcotics seized by the Government at the time of arrest. After reviewing the arguments of the parties and having held a hearing on the matter, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion (Docket No. 35) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Defendants are charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Defendants were pulled over during a traffic stop on the highway, during which their vehicle was searched by Texas Department of Public Safety Troopers ("Troopers"). Although nothing was found at the initial detention, the Troopers suspected that Defendants' vehicle might contain concealed contraband. Defendants were handcuffed and taken with their vehicle to an automotive repair shop, where Troopers and employees of the repair shop discovered narcotics concealed in the vehicle's oil pan. Defendants were subsequently arrested and charged in the instant case. Defendants object to the admission of drugs discovered in their vehicle, on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. A hearing was held on this matter on September 27, 2004. The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are discussed below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At approximately 11:12 a.m. on March 3, 2004, Troopers Castillo and Gonzales were patrolling a section of westbound highway IH-10 when they observed an eastbound red Ford pickup that appeared to be driving above the posted speed limit. Troopers engaged their radar and verified a speed violation. The Troopers turned their cruiser around, activated their overhead lights, and pulled over the red Ford pickup. Once the lights on the patrol car were activated, a video camera inside the vehicle began recording, capturing the view from the patrol car. The resulting video contains the date and time of the incident. A microphone carried by the Troopers records the audio portion of the videotaped recording.
Trooper Castillo stepped out of the patrol car and approached the driver of the stopped pickup, asking him to exit the vehicle. The driver of the red Ford was Juan Gilberto Garcia Medina ("Medina"). Trooper Castillo identified himself as a highway patrol officer and requested the Medina step to the rear of the truck with his license and insurance. Medina stepped to the rear of the truck and handed Castillo his Mexican driver's license. The truck also had Mexican license plates. Trooper Castillo told Medina that the reason he was stopped was because of the truck's speed, which Castillo informed Medina was 75 miles per hour (m.p.h.), in excess of the posted 70 m.p.h. speed limit. Medina replied that he did not speak English and that he was from Mexico. Trooper Castillo then began addressing Medina in Spanish, although his command of Spanish was somewhat limited.
For example, when addressing Medina in Spanish, Trooper Castillo mistakenly stated that the reason Medina was pulled over was because the truck was going 65 m.p.h. in a 60 m.p.h. zone. Castillo also confused the terms for "pickup" and "van," generally spoke Spanish haltingly and occasionally responded in English to Medina's statements. Castillo also repeatedly asked questions that Medina had already answered, displaying a clear lack of comprehension to Medina's responses.
First, Trooper Castillo informed Medina that he had been pulled over for speeding. Castillo then asked for Medina's license and insurance. Medina responded that the insurance documents were in the vehicle, and moved as if to retrieve them from the truck. Castillo replied "OK" and gestured for Medina not to retrieve the insurance documents.
This request is similarly confusing, since Castillo was already holding Medina's driver's license.
Castillo then began questioning Medina in Spanish about where he was going. Medina explained that he and the other passenger — later identified as Juan Manuel Garcia Escalera ("Escalera"), Medina's father — were going to a relative's house to have a transmission repaired. Castillo asked if they were coming from Laredo. Medina replied that, indeed, he was coming from Nuevo Laredo with his father. Castillo then asked a number of questions related to Defendants' trip, including where they were going, who they were to visit, and how Defendants were supposed to find the people they were to visit. Medina replied that they were going to Houston to visit relatives, that he did not where the relatives exactly, but that he and his father were to call them and be picked up.
Castillo posed a number of other questions related to Defendants' trip, asking if Medina was employed and how much money he was carrying. Castillo also inquired whether Medina was carrying any weapons. Medina answered these questions, denied having any weapons, and allowed Trooper Castillo to frisk him. Castillo then told Medina to wait by the Troopers' vehicle and walked to the rear of the truck to confer with Trooper Gonzales, who had been questioning Defendant Escalera. Gonzales related the results of his questioning of Escalera, describing responses that coincided exactly with Medina's responses. At this point, the detention had taken five minutes from initial verbal contact with Medina.
Castillo then returned to the patrol car, informed Medina that there was a problem along the highway with drugs and firearms and asked if there was any contraband in the truck. Medina replied in the negative and consented to a search of the truck. The Troopers then approached Escalera, still seated in the passenger seat of the truck, and asked him if there was contraband in the truck. Apparently having trouble understanding the Trooper's Spanish, Escalera replied that the truck was his, and that he had all the appropriate documents, which he offered to Castillo. Trooper Medina asked whether he could check the truck, and Escalera indicated his consent. By then, Defendants had been detained for six and a half minutes. During this time, Troopers had not initiated a NCIC/TCIC/computer check or issued a citation or warning for the speed violation.
It is not clear from the video whether the Trooper questioning Escalera was Castillo or Gonzales. However, the outcome of the analysis does not depend on which officer asked the question.
While the government characterizes Escalera's response as consent, it is not clear whether Escalera was agreeing to the Troopers' verification of the truck's records or a search of the vehicle.
The government contends that Troopers had not run records checks because Defendants had Mexican driver's licenses and license plates and the officers were thus unable to do so. Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court assumes that this was the case, and accepts this as fact.
The Troopers then began searching the vehicle, which lasted for several more minutes before Troopers began examining the oil pan underneath the pickup. Soon thereafter, Troopers became suspicious that the oil pan had been altered to transport contraband and examined it further. Troopers then placed Defendants in handcuffs, but indicated that they were not under arrest, but were only being "detained." Trooper Castillo placed Medina in the patrol car, while Gonzales handcuffed Escalera and returned him to the passenger seat of the truck. Before leaving, Troopers conferred with one another, wondering if Defendants should be arrested and "Mirandized;" they decided against reading Defendants their rights, concluding that Defendants were simply being "detained." With an officer in each vehicle, Troopers drove Defendants and the truck to a repair shop, where the oil pan was examined for over an hour. The search of the engine compartment revealed approximately twenty-six pounds of cocaine, hidden in the oil pan and cylinders of the truck.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress Evidence
Defendants seek to suppress the cocaine discovered in the truck, arguing that the stop was illegal and that their detention and the subsequent search of their vehicle were unreasonable because they exceeded the scope of a permissible traffic stop. Defendants argue that Troopers' extension of the detention through the use of questions unrelated to their traffic infraction amounts to an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the ensuing search was unconstitutional as a result.
The government argues in response that Trooper Castillo had articulable reasons for initially stopping Defendants and that they consented to the search of their vehicle. The government further argues that Troopers were justified in prolonging the brief investigatory detention of Medina and Escalera because the altered oil pan provided them with articulable reasonable suspicion that Defendants were carrying contraband.
A. Traffic Stops Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. Traffic stops are considered seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, traffic stops are more like investigative detentions than formal arrests. As a result, courts analyze the legality of traffic stops under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, which set out a two-tiered "reasonable suspicion" inquiry. Under the Terry standard, a court asks first whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and second whether the search or seizure was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. During the stop, "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." "At that point, continuation of the detention is no longer supported by the facts that justified its initiation."
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001).
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
Valadez, 267 U.S. at 398 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1993).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; Valadez, 267 U.S. at 398 (citing Terry v. Ohio and several Fifth Circuit cases applying the two-part Terry test).
Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
B. Standing to Contest Government Action
Defendants first argue that they have standing to contest the government action complained of here because both individuals were in the pickup truck that was searched and in which contraband was later found. The government does not challenge the assertion that both Defendants have standing to challenge the government's contested actions here, so the Court will treat this argument as stipulated by the government, and find that Defendants had standing to object to the government's actions and consequently, to the admission of narcotics discovered in their vehicle.
C. Whether Initial Stop Was Reasonable
Defendants next assert that their initial stop was unreasonable because of the confusion already referenced related to how fast the Defendants' truck was going. The government replies that a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based upon an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred. It is also true that the fact that an officer may have been primarily motivated to make the stop to search for drugs does not render the stop for a traffic violation invalid.
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995) ( en banc), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 (1996).
United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
In spite of Defendants' assertion in a single sentence that the stop was unreasonable, it is clear that the legality of the initial traffic stop here is not a truly contested issue. The government testified that Troopers' radar verified a speeding violation of 75 m.p.h., and Defendants submit no arguments in support of their brief assertion that the stop was unreasonable, other than referring to Trooper Castillo's mistaken statement about Defendants' speed. Defendants do not dispute that their vehicle was traveling at 75 m.p.h. or that their rate of speed was within the posted speed limit on I-10. Further, Defendants do not argue that, even if they were speeding, the Troopers' stop of their vehicle was improper because it was based upon improper motive or improper grounds. Even if they did so argue, the Court would be required to find that the stop was permissible, since it was based upon an observed traffic violation. On these facts, the Court finds that this issue is most like the one reviewed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit in Dortch:
Id. See also United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) ( en banc).
Although Dortch initially argues in his brief that the stop was unreasonable, he does not expand upon that argument. Moreover, he later argues that the illegality occurred when the justification for the stop ended and the officers lacked authority for the continued detention and additional search. Thus, he seems to concede the legality of the initial traffic stop, and there can be no serious question as to that conclusion.
United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Causey, 834 F.2d at 1184).
Even if some showing of "pretext" could render an otherwise lawful stop invalid, where there is a valid, non-pretext reason for the traffic stop — such as speeding — a court's finding that the first prong in Terry has been satisfied is appropriate. For this reason, the Court finds that the initial stop of Defendants was reasonable under the first prong of the Terry test, and thus constitutional within the Fourth Amendment and cases decided thereunder.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 435 n. 3.
D. Whether Detention Exceeded Its Proper Scope
In applying the second prong of Terry, the Fifth Circuit requires that "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." The Supreme Court requires that the investigative methods employed be "the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." The least intrusive means must be balanced against the law enforcement purposes of the stop and the time reasonably required to carry out those purposes.
United States v. Brigham, 343 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200 and Royer, 460 U.S. at 500).
Brigham, 343 F.3d at 498; Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
Brigham, 343 F.3d at 498 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)).
Defendants argue that they were detained unlawfully because the Troopers extended the duration of their stop by questioning them about issues unrelated to the speeding violation. Defendants argue that they were questioned for eight minutes and that they responded to the questions calmly and consistently. Defendants also point out that Trooper Castillo's Spanish was "suspect" and confusing, and that this fact should be considered in weighing Defendants' responses to Troopers' questions. Defendants further submit that no computer check was completed and argue that the obvious conclusion to be drawn from this fact is that Troopers were merely interested in obtaining consent to search Defendants' vehicle without regard to issuing a citation for speeding.
The government counters this point, arguing that Troopers were unable to run computer checks on the Mexican driver's license and license plates. There is no testimony regarding whether Troopers could perform other types of computer checks, such as running Defendants' names to identify outstanding U.S. or Mexican warrants or querying immigration officials to determine whether Defendants were wanted. Thus, the Court is unable to determine whether Troopers failed to pursue computer checks that were possible. However, resolution of this issue is not critical to the ultimate issue here: whether detention of Defendants amounted to an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Defendants argue that under the circumstances of the stop, the burden shifts to the government to justify a search and seizure. Defendants point to the questioning unrelated to their speeding infraction and the difficulties in communication created by the language gap and argue that their apparent consent to search of their vehicle was not voluntary, contrasting the situation with the facts of United States v. Sanchez-Pena, where the Fifth Circuit discussed the possibility of a consensual interrogation following a valid traffic stop. Defendants assert that, since they were handcuffed and offered no real choice as to whether they would allow Troopers to search their vehicle, their consent was not effective and they could not have waived Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure.
United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977) ("If the defendant produces evidence that he was searched and evidence was seized without a warrant, the burden shifts to the government to justify the warrantless search and seizure.").
United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 440-42 (5th Cir. 2003).
The government responds that Defendants consented to search of their vehicle after only a few minutes of questioning. The government also notes several factors that it contends support officers' suspicion that Defendants were carrying contraband, including Trooper Castillo's many drug seizures during his six years patrolling I-10, alleged signs of nervousness in Medina, local knowledge that Nuevo Laredo and Houston were known drug "source cities" and destinations for narcotics, and Medina's ignorance of his relative's Houston address. The government argues that based on these factors, the officers developed reasonable suspicion to prolong the initial detention when they discovered irregularities in the factory oil pan in Defendants' vehicle.
In weighing the parties' arguments on the issue of Defendants' consent to be searched, the Court is mindful of the facts in Sanchez-Pena, which was a similar case tried to this same Court. In that case, the defendant was pulled over under suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Highway patrol officers stopped the vehicle, questioned the defendant for a few minutes, and ran a computer check of the defendant's vehicle. After the check did not reveal any outstanding warrants or violations, the officer returned the defendant's driver's license and insurance documents and did not question the defendant further about his activities. Rather, the officer asked the defendant to follow him to an inspection station and consent to a canine search of the vehicle there. Reviewing this Court's determination in Sanchez-Pena that the officer's conduct could not be seen as coercive, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the consensual nature of the encounter. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in that case emphasized that the defendant had received his documentation back from the officer, that he felt free to go, and that as a result, "the consensual encounter did not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns." The Fifth Circuit's opinion also noted that the officer "had not accused them of criminal activity such that they would regard the request [to follow the officer to the inspection station] as a continuation of the investigative detention."
Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d at 443.
Id. (citing United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A statement by a law enforcement officer that an individual is suspected of illegal activity is persuasive evidence that the fourth amendment has been violated.")).
Thus, the nature of the consent to search is an important issue that must be addressed in the context of deciding whether the stop exceeded the appropriate scope of a Terry stop. Because the Court finds that the initial stop was valid, it need not consider the genuineness of Defendants' consent in terms of the two-part test recognized and employed in this Circuit to determine whether consent following a Fourth Amendment violation is valid. The Court notes that the situation is also analogous to that in Santiago, where the consent to search was "contemporaneous with the constitutional violation," with no intervening circumstance. In both situations, the consent was not an independent act of free will, but rather a product of the unlawfully extended detention.
Santiago, 310 F.3d at 342-43; United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993).
Santiago, 310 F.3d at 343. See also, e.g., Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 128.
The burden is on the government to prove that the consent was voluntary. However, the evidence before the Court — the transcript and video recording of the encounter — does not support the government's assertions that the consent to search was voluntary. Indeed, close review of the evidence suggests the opposite: that Defendants did not clearly understand the Troopers' questions and did not submit to a search of their vehicle knowing their rights and understanding that they could decline the request. Given the difficulties created by Trooper Castillo's lack of proficiency with Spanish, confusion on the part of Defendants who do not understand English is not surprising. Defendants could reasonably have felt as though they were already being detained and were under interrogation by the detaining officers. The fact that Troopers had neglected to return Defendants' documents supports this conclusion. Further, the officers' questions about whether they were carrying contraband could easily support a perception on the part of Defendants that they were being detained as part of an investigation. Therefore, the facts in this case are far different from the facts in Sanchez-Pena.
Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127-28; Santiago, 310 F.3d at 343 n. 4.
Accord Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198 (quoting United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995) ("what began as a consensual encounter quickly became an investigative detention once the agents received [defendant's] driver's license and did not return it to him.")).
On the facts here, it would be difficult to find that Defendants' consent to search the truck by the roadside was given voluntarily. Certainly, the evidence before the Court makes it difficult to support such a finding. After close review of the videotaped evidence, Defendants did not seem to clearly understand the Troopers's questions, and may well not have understood the implications of the Troopers' request to search the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not support a finding that the consent was voluntary.
However, even if the Court were to find that the initial consent was voluntary, there can be no argument that Defendants consented to being taken away by the Troopers and have their vehicle dissembled at the repair shop. At the time, Defendants had been placed in handcuffs and were at the very least being "detained" by the Troopers. They were placed in separate vehicles and the Troopers addressed them very little or not at all. Whether they were essentially under arrest at the time is a determination the Court need not make with certainty, although a court could also certainly find that the Defendants were under arrest at that time, as Defendants argue. In any event, in these circumstances, it would be impossible to find that Defendants voluntarily consented to being taken away by the officers for the purpose of having their vehicle's engine dissembled at a repair shop miles away.
Moreover, the situation is distinguishable from the one that faced the court in Sanchez-Pena, in which defendants followed the officer to a distant inspection station thirty miles away in order to continue the search at that location. In that case, defendants had received their documentation back from the officer and had been told that they were free to go on their way. The circumstances of the request for the Sanchez defendants to follow the officer to the inspection station were fundamentally different from those before the Court here. Based on the parties' arguments and a careful review of the facts of this case, the Court finds that Defendants' consent was not voluntary, and was not elicited freely out of individuals who could have reasonably concluded that they were no longer being detained.
In deciding whether Defendants' detention violated the second prong of Terry, the Court is mindful of the guidance articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Shabazz:
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by the police for additional questioning.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 435 (quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)).
The government argues that since it was not possible to run a computer check on Defendants because of their Mexican driver's licenses and vehicle registration, the officers nonetheless had a window of time equal to that of a computer check in which to question Defendants. Citing the conclusion in Shabazz that any questioning of defendants while awaiting the results of computer checks was valid, the government argues that questioning of Defendants unrelated to the traffic violation was permissible since the computer check would have been ongoing during the period of time in which Defendants were being questioned. While such a rule would certainly aid the government's position in this case, the Court is aware of no case holding as much.
Generally, the cases decided along these lines hold that while mere questioning alone is not sufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment, where the unrelated questioning extends the duration of a stop, the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Here, there is no argument that the questioning of Defendants was unrelated to the initial reason that the officers pulled them over. While Trooper Castillo did inform Medina initially that the reason Defendants were pulled over was due to the speed violation, neither officer appears to have mentioned or even referenced the excessive speed in any of the questions posed to Defendants. Ultimately, whether or not the Troopers were able to run computer checks on Defendants is a side issue. The main problem is that the Troopers unconstitutionally prolonged the otherwise lawful stop of Defendants by continued questioning.
See, e.g., United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432-33 n. 21 (5th Cir. 2001).
Brigham, 343 F.3d at 501 (discussing the Dortch and Jones decisions holding that unrelated questioning unconstitutionally prolonged traffic stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
As the Fifth Circuit concluded in Brigham, there is ample evidence here that the officers' questioning served drug interdiction purposes rather than the purpose of effectuating the appropriate resolution of the violation for which Defendants were initially pulled over. Because the unrelated questioning impermissibly prolonged the detention of Defendants, the Court finds that the stop became unconstitutional in violation of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unlawful searches and seizures. Since the stop extended past the outer bounds of a permissible detention for a traffic stop, the evidence obtained as a result is also tainted. Under the controlling cases, the evidence seized by the Troopers thus constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be suppressed.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 505; Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436; Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 432; Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200.
Accord Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200-01; Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 35) be GRANTED.