U.S. v. McGrath

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel, ROBERT LEE WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. JOE…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Aug 18, 2004

No. 01 C 949 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2004)

Opinion

No. 01 C 949.

August 18, 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Petitioner Robert Lee Washington's ("Washington") motion for a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). For the reasons stated below we deny the motion.

BACKGROUND

On April 24, 1996, following a jury trial, Washington was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to a term of sixty years imprisonment. Washington appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District. On April 14, 1998, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Washington's conviction. Washington did not file a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

On April 2, 1999, Washington filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On April 16, 1999, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. On May 26, 1999, Washington filed a notice of appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court. On August 15, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of Washington's post-conviction petition. On September 16, 2000, Washington filed a petition for a rehearing with the Illinois Appellate Court. On September 22, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court denied the petition for rehearing. On October 31, 2000, Washington filed a petition for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. On January 29, 2001, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois denied Washington's leave to appeal. Washington filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On May 15, 2004, we denied Washington's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Washington now seeks a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

LEGAL STANDARD

If a court denies a petition for writ of habeas and the petitioner wishes to appeal, challenging the decisions made by the state trial courts, the petitioner must seek a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Montgomery v. Davis, 362 F.3d 956, 957 (7^th Cir. 2004). A district court should only issue a certificate of appealability "if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must also show that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Slack v. McDonnell, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

DISCUSSION

In our prior ruling we found that the claims included in Washington's habeas petition were procedurally defaulted. A federal court will not address a question of federal law presented in a habeas corpus petition brought to contest a state court ruling if "the state decision rests on a state procedural ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 905 (7^th Cir. 2003). In order to avoid a procedural default on a claim presented in a habeas corpus petition the petitioner must "give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Howard v. O'Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721, 725 (7^th Cir. 1999) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). A federal court can review defaulted claims if the petitioner "shows cause for failure to raise them at the appropriate time and actual prejudice which resulted from such failure" or, "[a]bsent such a showing, a defaulted claim is reviewable only if refusal to consider it would result in a `fundamental miscarriage of justice. . . .'" Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 917 (7^th Cir. 1999).

Washington argues that it is debatable whether or not his claims are procedurally defaulted. We do not agree. Washington also puts forth arguments concerning his counsel's failure to follow state court rules, such as his counsel's failure to present arguments, caselaw, and analysis in his brief. Such arguments only serve to reaffirm that the state courts in this case ruled on an independent and adequate state basis. Washington also makes some arguments regarding exhaustion that are not pertinent. In addition, Washington argues that we should not apply the procedural default doctrine because the conduct of his prior counsel cannot be attributed to him. We disagree and are not convinced that procedural default should not be applied in this action. Washington also argues that it is debatable whether or not prejudice exists that would excuse procedural default and argues that it is debatable as to whether the application of procedural default would result in a miscarriage of justice. We cannot agree with either contention. Washington failed to follow the Illinois state appellate procedures and therefore, his claims are deemed procedurally defaulted. Washington has not provided sufficient reasons that would indicate that any of the exceptions to the doctrine of procedural default are applicable. Washington offers various other arguments, some of which are not included in his habeas petition. The briefs filed by Washington in this action are insufficient to even create a suspicion that his habeas petition should have been granted. None of the arguments offered by Washington show that it is debatable whether or not his constitutional rights were violated or that habeas relief should be granted. Nor have any of the arguments presented indicate that the habeas issue deserves "encouragement to proceed further." Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Therefore, we deny the motion for certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, we deny Washington's motion for a certificate of appealability