[¶ 11] Before police may enter a motel room and arrest a person without a warrant, there must be probable cause for the arrest and exigent circumstances present. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1106 (1991); United States v. Davis, 785 F.2d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1986). Probable cause exists when, at the time of the arrest, the available facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was being or had been committed by another.

[¶ 11] Before police may enter a motel room and arrest a person without a warrant, there must be probable cause for the arrest and exigent circumstances present. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1106 (1991); United States v. Davis, 785 F.2d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1986). Probable cause exists when, at the time of the arrest, the available facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was being or had been committed by another.

A district court's denial of a severance motion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that the court abused its discretion, causing clear or real prejudice to a defendant's right to a fair trial. United States v. Oakie, 12 F.3d at 1440-41; United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1040 (8th Cir. 1992); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2447, 124 L.Ed.2d 664 (1993); United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1106, 111 S.Ct. 1011, 112 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1991) ( quoting United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990)). The question of whether the denial of a severance motion results in "clear or real prejudice" turns in large part on "whether the jury could compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant."

Therefore, the gun would have been admissible even without Williams' statements under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that evidence is admissible if government demonstrates by preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means and (2) the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation); United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1990) (inevitable discovery doctrine applies to evidence seized from a briefcase when police had a search warrant entitling them to search all of the baggage in defendant's room). Williams owned the apartment and appeared to be the only person who lived in it. From this evidence, the jury could have drawn the same inference that Williams owned the gun and was aware of its location as they could have from his statement indicating the location of the gun.

This court has held that a federal district court may refuse to follow a state court's suppression decision. See United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570-71 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 1393, 113 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991) (citing Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977)) (administration of criminal justice would suffer if Constitution required one sovereign to accept findings of another sovereign solely because one was the first to prosecute). As discussed above, the district court properly found the searches lawful, and it did not err in admitting the evidence obtained.

Officers may be justified in entering a hotel room when there is a "reasonable belief that it was necessary to protect the [officers] and the public from a possible violent action from [the occupant of the room]." United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1990).

There are situations when the circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a hotel room. In United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938 (1991), the Court held that the police officer's entry of hotel room was not illegal where the hotel guest had registered under a false name and left a loaded revolver behind in his room when he moved to another room at the hotel. The Court concluded the entry of the room was warranted because the use of false identification is a crime under Florida law and because the officer entered the room based upon fear of harm to himself, hotel personnel and hotel guests.

But we do not think this situation was so much less threatening than those in our prior cases such that the officers' concern for their safety was unreasonable here. See , e.g. , Kuenstler , 325 F.3d at 1021–22 (upholding the search of a house for additional threats after one occupant tried to flee, another yelled and charged at police, and a third watched from the doorway); United States v. Vance , 53 F.3d 220, 221–22 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding officers could follow someone into his house, where the individual said he was getting his identification, when the officers had been told there were other people and weapons inside); United States v. McConnell , 903 F.2d 566, 569–70 (8th Cir. 1990) (accepting an officer's entry into a hotel room when the occupant was staying at the hotel despite living locally, had moved from a different room at the same hotel, left a handgun in the first room, and lied about his name and whether someone was with him); United States v. Hill , 730 F.2d 1163, 1169–70 (8th Cir. 1984) (permitting officers' entry into a house to locate an occupant when the officers were going to execute a search warrant outside and saw through a glass door a gun inside the house); see also United States v. Ball , 90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1996) (suggesting a reasonable officer would think an armed suspect who ran into a house when the police approached “presented a threat to the lives of the officers outside”).In short, on the facts of this case, when the apartment door unexpectedly opened, the officers reasonably felt in danger and faced a split-second choice between entry and retreat.

We therefore have no way of determining whether an "appreciable chance" existed "that [she] would have not been convicted in a separate trial." O'Meara, 895 F.2d at 1219; see United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 571 (8th Cir.) (co-defendant seeking severance must show that testimony adduced at separate trial would have been "substantially exculpatory"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 1393, 113 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). Dana also suggests she was severely prejudiced because the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence against her and Chester.

United States v. Williams, 633 F.2d 742, 744 (8th Cir. 1980). Accord United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 1393, 113 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991); Antwine, 873 F.2d at 1147; United States v. Hill, 730 F.2d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Frazier v. United States, 469 U.S. 884, 105 S.Ct. 255, 83 L.Ed.2d 192 (1984). The record supports the conclusion that Officer Birrenbach's warrantless entry is justifiable on safety grounds.