Thus, the Legislature made what had been a permissive application mandatory and set a statutory time limit within which the County Treasurer or Director of Finance must apply for forfeiture, thereby dispelling any doubt as to who had interest in the money at what time. Cf. United States v. Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977) (the permissive features of the pre-1974 enactment were heavily relied upon by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to opine that until a judicial order of forfeiture was made the money was still the property of those from whom it was seized). The 1974 Legislature also modified subsection (d) of § 264, relating to disposition of the money in the event of acquittal or other final determination in favor of the person arrested.
(Emphasis added.) The amendment was enacted to prevent an interpretation of § 297 similar to the holding regarding § 264 in United States v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 416 F. Supp. 380 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977). In that case, the United States brought an action to enforce tax levies served upon agents of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore who had custody of monies seized in connection with gambling arrests.
This lack of notice may have procedural and due process implications but it is unnecessary to consider these issues given the disposition of these motions. See United States v. Winterburn, 749 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mayor Council of City of Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977). On December 4, 2006, Revenue Officers Rosemary Basile and Jackie Sena drove to Plaintiff Shafer's residence in Edgewood, New Mexico.
For determining the United States' interest in the money the determinative fact is the extent of Acosta's ownership of the money. See, United States v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Burgo, 175 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1949); Central Surety Insurance Corp. v. Martin Infante Co., 272 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1959). Florida's law determines Acosta's interest in the money.
Failure to join the United States under a foreclosure cause of action would allow the federal liens to remain undisturbed. 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a)(1) (1988); United States v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066, 1068 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1977). Further, failure to properly notify the United States upon foreclosure of property attached with a federal tax lien could have the effect of merging the tax lien with the title and thereby elevating the federal tax lien to first priority. Title Guaranty Co. of Wyoming v. Commissioner, 667 F. Supp. 767, 772 (D.Wyo. 1987).
The reasoning of these decisions reaffirms our conclusion that upon the final adjudication of forfeiture under the Public Nuisance statute, the forfeiture relates back at least to the date of seizure. In so deciding we choose not to follow the reasoning of United States v. Currency Totalling $48,318.08, 609 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Mayor City Council of Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977), in which the courts ruled that title is not divested until a final ruling of forfeiture is entered. The Maryland forfeiture statute at issue in Baltimore was subsequently amended so that all title and property rights vest immediately upon seizure to the seizing authority. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 264(a) — (d) (1957).