ial traffic stop to his place of residence, leaving it only feet from the house, with the door closed, and his dog still inside.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Dkt. 62 at 3 (“The yard in which the Yukon parked is private property. ... The Yukon was left running, with the doors closed, headlights on, and keys in the ignition.”), and Dkt. 64 at 2 (“The suspect returned to the original dispatched address hitting open a closed gate and parking in the front yard.... The suspect . . . went into the residence while leaving the [Yukon] running with the keys in the ignition and its lights on.”). See Chavez, 985 F.3d at 1241 (car not abandoned when left on private property outside driver's residence); see also United States v. Moody, No. 16-00115-01-CR-W-HFS, 2017 WL 2313387, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2017) (assuming, without deciding, car not abandoned when left on private property where driver resided), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2312926 (W.D. Mo. May 26, 2017); United States v. Mathis, 653 F.Supp.2d. 806, 813, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) (car not abandoned when left, locked, in private driveway of home under renovation-not the driver's residence); United States v. Scrivner, 680 F.2d 1099, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982) (trucks not abandoned when left, unlocked, on or in warehouse premises leased by defendant). See Dkt. 65 at 4-5.
Moreover, given the passage of time, any minor inconsistencies that may have existed between these accounts did not render the witnesses' testimony incredible. See United States v. Jones, 364 Fed.Appx. 205, 208 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding district court's denial of a suppression motion despite minor discrepancies between officer accounts); see, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 653 F.Supp.2d 806, 816 (E.D. Tenn. 2009) (adopting the report and recommendation recommending the denial of a motion to suppress and finding minor potential inconsistences and memory lapses did not render a witness' testimony incredible).