Opinion
S17 96 Cr. 126 (JFK)
June 1, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the issue of whether to suppress the remaining evidence seized from the Defendant Irving Mason's ("Mason") home by law-enforcement agents led by Detective Billy Ralat ("Ralat"). This evidence includes a letter from the Government to the Court in the case of United States v. Velasquez, S9 96 Cr. 126 (JFK) (the "Velasquez letter"), a gold Rolex watch, a Breitling watch, a warranty to another Rolex watch, and the title to a Ford Expedition automobile.
The Court conducted an initial hearing into this issue on April 12, 2000, and supplemental hearings on May 24, 2000 and May 30, 2000. At the initial hearing, the Court found that certain items that Ralat seized from Mason's home during the course of his search, a gun, ammunition, and the stool they were hidden in, are admissible. The Court now finds that the remaining evidence seized in that search is also admissible. The Court found at the April 27, 2000 hearing that Mason had consented to a search of his home for the purpose of locating "guns and drugs." The scope of a warrantless search made pursuant to the consent of a defendant is limited to the terms of that consent. See United States v. Lopez, 1994 WL 649154 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1994). Therefore, the lawful scope of Ralat's search of Mason's home was limited to places where he could reasonably anticipate finding guns or drugs.
Pursuant to this consent, Ralat searched Mason's home and found a gun and ammunition in a hidden compartment under the seat of a stool. Those items were clearly within the lawful scope of the search, and have already been ruled admissible. Ralat, however, also seized the other evidence in the course of his search not related to guns or drugs: the Velasquez letter, a gold Rolex watch, a Breitling watch, the warranty to another Rolex, and the title to a Ford Expedition.
Ralat could permissibly seize evidence of criminal activity beyond the defined scope of his search if that evidence was in "plain view." See Horton v. California, 466 U.S. 128, 133-42 (1990). The plain-view doctrine exists under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore requires more than the mere fact that the evidence is in plain view to the seizing officer. In order to protect a defendant's privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment, the plain-view doctrine requires that (1) the seizing officer view the evidence while conducting a lawful search, and that (2) the officer have lawful access to that evidence. See id. at 136-37.
In addition, the plain-view doctrine protects a defendant's Fourth Amendment possessory interest in the seized evidence by further requiring that the connection between the evidence and criminal activity be "immediately apparent" to the officer, thereby giving probable cause for its seizure. See id.; United States v. Escobar, 805 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez, 1994 WL 649154. Based on these principles, the Court now rules on the admissibility of the remaining evidence that Ralat seized in the course of his search of Mason's home.
I The Letter
While searching Mason's home, Ralat found and seized theVelasquez letter. Ralat testified that he found the Velasquez letter on top of a dresser in Mason's bedroom. Ralat stated that the letter was at eye-level. It was not in an envelope, and was folded in such a way that the letterhead of the United States Attorney's Office was visible to him. Upon a closer look, he noticed that the letter was addressed to the Court. He removed the letter from the dresser and recognized that its heading indicated its connection to the Velasquez case.
The Court finds that Ralat's seizure of the Velasquez letter was lawful under the plain-view doctrine, and therefore theVelasquez letter is admissible. Ralat saw the letter in plain view while conducting a lawful search. Mason had consented to a search of his home for guns and drugs. Guns or drugs could potentially be found virtually anywhere in Mason's home, including in Mason's bedroom and on top of a dresser in Mason's bedroom.
Ralat noticed the letter and immediately understood its significance as it lay opened and visible upon Mason's dresser. Ralat's further examination of the letter never progressed beyond a mere surface inspection. Therefore, his access to the letter was also lawful.
Ralat immediately understood the connection between the letter and criminal activity upon first noticing the letter, and particularly after his surface inspection of it, thereby creating probable cause for its seizure. Ralat had investigated the circumstances surrounding the underlying Velasquez case and had been present during the trial proceedings in that case. He was aware of the fact that Mason was connected to the charges in that case. In fact, Ralat himself had arranged for the letter in question to be passed to Mason through a cooperator after having learned of Mason's desire for the information contained in it.
II The Additional Remaining Evidence
Ralat found the additional remaining evidence, the gold Rolex watch, the Breitling watch, the warranty to the other Rolex, and the title to a Ford Expedition, hidden with the gun and ammunition in the compartment underneath the seat of the stool in Mason's home. That this evidence was found in a place where guns or drugs could be found and that Ralat had lawful access to it is without question. The issue, therefore, is whether the connection of each item to criminal activity was immediately apparent to Ralat, thereby giving probable cause for its seizure.
Ralat had probable cause to seize the gold Rolex watch. Ralat testified that he had learned in the course of his investigation that Mason purportedly received the watch from David Rosario and used it to bait robbery victims. Moreover, Ralat testified that he expected to find the watch in Mason's home and intended to seize it. Its connection to criminal activity, therefore, was immediately apparent to him upon finding it.
The Court finds that Ralat's failure to request Mason's permission to search for the watch is immaterial under these circumstances because he seized it in accordance with the requirements of the plain-view doctrine. See Horton v. California, 466 U.S. at 136-142. Ralat's search never exceeded the scope of Mason's consent, i.e., a search of anyplace where Ralat reasonably believed guns and drugs could be found, and thus Mason's privacy was not unlawfully violated. Ralat seized the gold Rolex with probable cause while conducting that lawful search. That seizure, therefore, was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Ralat had probable cause to seize the Breitling watch. Ralat testified that he once had sold watches. From that experience, he could immediately recognize that the watch cost in excess of $1000. Knowing that Mason's only legitimate source of income was his salary as a social worker, he immediately, and reasonably, concluded that the watch evidenced illegitimate sources of income in addition to that salary. The connection of the Breitling watch to criminal activity, therefore, was immediately apparent to Ralat upon finding the watch.
Ralat, for the same reasons, had probable cause to seize the warranty to an additional Rolex watch. Even to one who has not previously sold watches, a Rolex watch is clearly a luxury item whose ownership is beyond the means of many people, particularly to those on salaries such as Mason's. The connection of that warranty, therefore, to illegitimate sources of income was immediately apparent to Ralat.
Similarly. Ralat had probable cause to seize the title to the Ford Expedition. Ralat knew that a Ford Expedition is a luxury sport-utility vehicle that carries a price tag into the tens of thousands of dollars. Moreover, Ralat testified that he knew that any debt on the vehicle was fully paid off. He concluded, reasonably, that Mason's ownership and possession of the title to that vehicle indicated illegitimate sources of income beyond his salary. The connection between that title and criminal activity, therefore, was immediately apparent to Ralat upon finding it.
CONCLUSION
The motion to suppress the evidence that Ralat seized from Mason's home is therefore denied in all respects.
SO ORDERED.