We review the District Court's imposition of the enhancement for clear error. United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000). Section 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) provides for a two-level increase in a defendant's offense level where "the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded; or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense."
It follows that absconding from a halfway house and remaining a fugitive for two-and-a-half months counts as "escaping . . . from custody." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(E); see Hayes v. United States, 281 F.3d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming an obstruction-of-justice enhancement when a defendant absconded from a halfway house before sentencing); United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (same). Nichols recognizes that this line of authority exists, but she argues that the district court should have disagreed with the Sentencing Guidelines on policy grounds.
In determining whether a defendant qualifies for an acceptance of responsibility reduction, the district court may consider aspects of the defendant's conduct beyond the mere fact of his guilty plea. See id. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 1, n. 3, n. 4; United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding that the denial of a § 3E1.1 reduction was proper where the defendant failed alcohol and drug tests while under the supervision of a halfway house and absconded from the halfway house prior to a bond revocation hearing). Given that Long Soldier violated his bond, failed to seek treatment for his alcoholism, remained unemployed, and made no effort to pay restitution to the SDDSS, the district court did not clearly err in refusing to grant Long Soldier a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
We have previously considered obstruction of justice enhancements based on willful failure to appear for a judicial proceeding, most often in cases in which the defendant fled but was later apprehended. See United States v. Muro, 357 F.3d 743, 744 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bell, 183 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Eagle, 133 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Crow Dog, 149 F.3d 847, 848 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 72 F.3d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 64-65 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Shinder, 8 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1993). This case is distinct from past cases in two material ways. First, the magistrate judge continued the revocation hearing that Peters failed to attend.
Muro was sentenced at an offense level of 32 and given 135 months' imprisonment, a sentence at the low end of the new guideline range. We review for clear error the district court's findings with respect to sentencing enhancements and reductions. United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). We extend great deference to the district court in determining whether to grant or deny these adjustments.
A similarly situated adult would have started out at the same place K.R.A. did when her original presentence investigation report was done in 1998, i.e., at an offense level of 17. However, the hypothetical similarly situated adult defendant who had committed violations of pretrial or presentencing release conditions identical to those K.R.A. committed of her probation conditions, would not have received a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility (as K.R.A. initially did to end up at Level 14) and also would have received a 2-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, resulting in an offense level of 19 and a Guidelines sentencing range of 30-37 months. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 2003) (absconding while on pretrial release justifies denial of reduction and imposition of enhancement), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2108, 155 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2003); United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 2000) (absconding from halfway house and using drugs and alcohol while on pretrial release justifies denial of reduction and imposition of enhancement); United States v. Shinder, 8 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1993) (absconding while on presentencing release justifies denial of reduction and imposition of enhancement). Because K.R.A.'s detention sentence of 37 months does not exceed the sentence a similarly situated adult defendant could have received pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines without a departure, there is no violation of § 5037's upper limit on juvenile sentences with respect to her. Accordingly, we need not delve into the district court's departure-based analysis and reasoning because any error was harmless.
Sent. Hr'g Tr. 13. She tested positive for controlled substances then fled her approved residence, effectively absconding until she was arrested six weeks later. Her conduct unquestionably satisfies the criteria of § 3C1.1. See, e.g., United States v. Figuried, 571 F. App'x 181, 183 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (upholding obstruction enhancement where the defendant "removed his ankle monitor and absconded from house arrest while awaiting sentencing"); United States v. Manning, 704 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("Manning both fled to Mexico while on pretrial release and failed to appear at his revocation hearing, each of which qualifies as obstruction of justice."); Lara, 472 F. App'x at 249; Hess, 402 F. App'x at 753 (upholding obstruction enhancement based on Hess's "numerous pretrial release violations," including "drug use, failing to report for drug testing, and most seriously, failing to appear at a pretrial release violation hearing"); United States v. Martinez, 234 F.3d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (upholding obstruction enhancement where defendant failed alcohol and drug tests while under court-ordered supervision at a halfway house, absconded from the halfway house before his bond-revocation hearing, and did not appear for that hearing); United States v. Thomas, 72 F.3d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (upholding obstruction enhancement where defendant tested positive for controlled substances then absconded). Furthermore, the facts of this case do not present an "extraordinary" situation where the obstruction enhancement and the acceptance of responsibility reduction would both apply.