Opinion
No. 1:01-cr-083.
September 26, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Facts
A confidential informant made five purchases of cocaine from the defendant at different locations during the period January through March 2001. These were "controlled buys" monitored by police officers. On April 30, 2001, the confidential informant told Chattanooga Police Department Detective Randy Noorbergen ("Noorbergen") that within the last 72 hours the informant had been in Room 221 of the Main Stay Suites in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The informant also told Detective Noorbergen that he had observed the defendant in possession of four ounces of cocaine base ("crack"), a large amount of cash, and a 9-mm pistol. Noorbergen had known this informant for approximately a year, and knew the informant to be reliable. The informant had provided information leading to arrests of narcotics dealers on more than five occasions. Noorbergen also had information from another Chattanooga Narcotics Detective, Randy Dunn ("Dunn"), that defendant had engaged in heavy drug trafficking during the past month. This information had been obtained by Dunn through several interviews. Detective Noorbergen took this information to Judicial Commissioner Robert Meeks, who issued a search warrant for defendant's motel room, No. 221 at Main Stay Suites.
Meeks and other Judicial Commissioners are on duty during the evening and at other times when state judges are not ordinarily available. Local law enforcement officers as a common practice obtain warrants from Judicial Commissioners rather than wake up the state judges at odd hours. In this case, Detective Noorbergen went before Commissioner Meeks late in the evening; and the warrant was issued at 10:09 p.m. on April 30, 2001.
After obtaining the warrant, Detective Noorbergen and other law enforcement officers rented a room at Main Stay Suites and surveilled the defendant's room. The officers had information by that time that the defendant had recently robbed someone of approximately $15,000. After the officers observed someone enter and exit the defendant's room, they detained that person, who they discovered had just purchased cocaine from the defendant. At the behest of the officers, this person knocked on the defendant's door and when the defendant opened the door, the officers entered to execute the warrant. Inside the room they found approximately two ounces of cocaine base ("crack"), a loaded handgun, and a large amount of cash. This is what the defendant's motion seeks to suppress.
Analysis
There is no question that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant in this case. The sole issue raised by the defendant is that under Tennessee law, Judicial Commissioner Robert Meeks lacked authority to issue the warrant. Meeks lacked authority, says the defendant, because the Tennessee Legislature's Private Act No. 192 of the Acts of 1996 conflicts with the provisions of TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1-111, and is thus unconstitutional in violation of Article 11, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Section 40-1-111 authorizes the statute specifies that the issuance of search warrants is among the duties of these Judicial Commissioners. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1-111(a)(1)(A)(i). After enacting § 40-1-111, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a Private Act, which specifically authorized the County Commission of Hamilton County, Tennessee to appoint one or more Judicial Commissioners. 1996 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 192 § 3. The Private Act was ratified by the voters of Hamilton County. The Hamilton County Commission then, by resolution, appointed Judicial Commissioners. In particular, by resolution dated November 3, 1999, this legislative body appointed Robert Meeks to serve, along with several others, as a Judicial Commissioner. For this, Commissioner Meeks is paid a salary of $42,500 per year. Hamilton County Board of Commissioners Resolution No. 119-25 (Nov. 3, 1999).
In essence, the defendant contends the Tennessee Legislature was not authorized by its earlier enacted statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1-111, to enact the Private Act for Hamilton County, because TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1-111 authorizes Judicial Commissioners to be appointed only in counties with certain populations; and Hamilton County did not fit within those specified populations. Therefore, under the authority of United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001), the defendant argues that the evidence seized in this case should be suppressed because the Judicial Commissioner lacked the "requisite legal authority." Id. at 515.
This Court need not undertake an extensive analysis of Tennessee constitutional law to determine whether the Tennessee Legislature acted within its authority, except to say that there is a strong presumption that an Act promulgated by the Legislature is valid. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools v. Shelby County, 339 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Tenn. 1960); see also LensCrafters, Inc. v. Sundquist, 33 S.W.2d 772, 775 n. 4 (Tenn. 2000). Even if Tennessee Private Act No. 192 is invalid, this case is very different from Scott; and this Court concludes that the evidence seized from the defendant's motel room will not be suppressed because the law enforcement officers executed the warrant in good faith under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by its terms, does not itself preclude the use of evidence obtained in unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of such evidence, is a judicial remedy to deter officers from violating the Fourth Amendment. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. As with any judicially created doctrine, the exclusionary rule is subject to judicial modification. In Leon, the Supreme Court adopted what is now a well-established exception to the exclusionary rule. When an officer acts with subjective good faith, in reliance on a search warrant obtained from a judge or magistrate, and the officer acts within the warrant's scope, the exclusionary rule does not bar the prosecution from using evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. Id. at 919-20. The rationale of Leon is, of course, that to exclude evidence under these circumstances would not serve the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose.
In Scott, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that when a deputy sheriff obtained a warrant from a retired state sessions judge who was "wholly without legal authority to issue a warrant," the evidence seized by the officer pursuant to the warrant was subject to exclusion. 260 F.3d at 515. In essence, the deputy sheriff's conduct in obtaining the warrant from the retired judge, especially when an active judge was available, was not "objectively reasonable." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
In this case, however, Detective Noorbergen obtained a search warrant from a Judicial Commissioner who by state legislation was specifically authorized to issue warrants. Until this case, there is no indication that anyone has ever challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee Private Act No. 192. The Sixth Circuit in Scott, citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987), noted that a police officer is entitled to rely on the constitutionality of the statute. Scott, 260 F.3d at 514. Thus, even in Scott the Court of Appeals made a distinction between the facts faced by it in that case and the facts of this case. The Supreme Court in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), has said that:
The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.
Id. at 38.
Clearly, it cannot be said here that Detective Noorbergen acted in any but an "objectively reasonable" manner. Police officers cannot be expected to be sophisticated constitutional law experts. The purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served by granting the defendant's motion to suppress. The motion is, therefore, DENIED.