Opinion
No. SA-04-CR-0191 (1)-RF.
May 9, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed on September 8, 2004, and the Government's Response, filed on July 26, 2004. The Court held suppression hearings on December 20, 2004 and January 6, 2005, at which time the Court heard testimony from the arresting officers regarding the factual circumstances surrounding Defendant's arrest. Based on evidence heard at the hearing, the Court also allowed supplemental briefing on the issues raised by the instant motion. Supplemental briefs were filed by Defendant on April 8, 2005 and by the Government on April 21, 2005. After carefully considering the arguments of the parties, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion (Docket No. 29) is meritorious and should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Rickey Garnet Mackey is charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defendant claims that the evidence obtained by the officers should be suppressed because the evidence was obtained without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or consent of an authorized person. He also argues that his arrest was invalid because police officers entered the hotel room of a third person in order to arrest him and contends that any admissions he made in the course of his arrest were involuntary and obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. He moves on these grounds to suppress the weapons and statements police obtained pursuant to his arrest. The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
San Antonio Police Department ("SAPD") officers were searching for Defendant Mackey because of at least two outstanding state arrest warrants, including one for state parole violations and another for an active Driving While License Suspended case. Officer Nick Stromboe received information from a confidential informant ("CI"), regarding a "wanted person," Defendant Mackey. The CI had provided Officer Stromboe with reliable information in the past, apparently on numerous occasions. Officer Stromboe knew Mackey by sight from past dealings with him. The CI told Officer Stromboe that the Defendant was in a room at the Days Inn Hotel, 3443 IH-35 North, in San Antonio, Texas. This was the only information provided by the CI. Officer Stromboe did not obtain a search warrant for the Days Inn room. Officer Stromboe testified at the hearing that he did not need a search warrant to execute an arrest warrant on Defendant at the hotel room of a third party. Indeed, Officer Stromboe testified that it was SAPD policy to arrest suspects with felony warrants in the home or motel room of a third party without obtaining a search warrant.
Special Agent Benavides's report misstates the address as "3342" IH-35 North.
Officer Stromboe arrived at the Days Inn and identified a vehicle parked in the parking lot as Defendant's car. He then went to the front desk to speak to the manger, who recognized Mackey from a photograph. While there is a minor dispute as to exactly what the manager said, the manger indicated that Mackey could be found in Room 204 of the hotel. However, Officer Stromboe was unable to identify to whom Room 204 was registered. Later, testimony from Days Inn Manager Melvin Paes revealed that the room was registered to a Ms. Johnice Moore. This registry was verified by the motel's computer records and driver's license identification. Mr. Paes stated that these records are kept in compliance with Days Inn procedures and a requirement imposed by the SAPD.
Defendant insists that the manager identified Mackey as someone he had seen going into Room 204, while the Government characterizes the manager's statement as: "Yes, he's in room #204."
Officer Stromboe then knocked on the door to Room 204, which was answered by a woman later identified as Evelyn Williams. The officers waited approximately thirty seconds and saw a female occupant push the curtains to one side and look out at the officers. Officer Stromboe directed the occupant to open the door. At the hearing, a Ms. Evelyn Williams testified that she opened the motel room door so that the officer would not break down the door, after the officers threatened to force entry if the door was not opened. As Ms. Williams opened the door, the officers claimed to see other individuals inside the room.
Defendant claims that Officer Stromboe's knock was accompanied by a command to "open the door or the officers would bust down the door." The Government responds that there is no such description in the official reports or in Defendant's own statement.
The testimony on this point was markedly divergent. Officer Stromboe testified that when Ms. Williams opened the door, he could see Defendant standing behind her. However, Officer Olivares testified that Defendant was asleep in one of the beds toward the rear of the room when Ms. Williams opened the door. Ms. Williams (aka Cynthia White aka "Zoom") testified that Defendant was asleep in the bed nearest the bath room, with his back to the door as it opened. Based upon the weight of the evidence, the Court concludes that Defendant was in bed when Ms. Williams answered the door.
Officer Stromboe testified that he then asked Defendant if he could search the hotel room. Defendant Mackey allegedly gave his consent, although the testimony on his consent also differed considerably. One of the officers then discovered atop a dresser in plain view some loose, off-white powder that appeared to be cocaine. Officer Stromboe also observed that the room had a wall-mounted safe, which was locked. Officer Stromboe asked Mackey for the to key the safe and Mackey either handed over the key or allowed Stromboe to retrieve it from his pocket. Opening the safe, Officer Stromboe discovered two loaded handguns. Officers then questioned Mackey about the weapons and drugs, asking him if they were his, to which Mackey allegedly responded in the affirmative.
Only Officer Stromboe testified that Defendant admitted that the guns and the drugs were his; no other officers could verify that Defendant made this utterance. Further, other testimony before the Court indicates that the drugs did not belong to Defendant but the weapons did.
Subsequently, Officer Stromboe contacted Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") Special Agent Chris Benavides. Mackey was taken to the ATF offices, dressed only in sandals and a pair of shorts. Officer Stromboe testified that he informed Defendant of his Miranda rights for the first time while on the drive over to the ATF offices in San Antonio. While at the ATF offices, Special Agent Benavides advised Defendant of his rights, which Mackey acknowledged and waived. Mackey then signed a written statement admitting that the guns and drugs were his.
Defendant made this statement by filling out a standard SAPD witness form admitting the ownership of the firearms and narcotics found in the hotel room. ATF Agent Benavides testified that this was his first case in San Antonio and that they did not use the standard ATF confession form. It is uncontested that the SAPD form does not state that the confession is being given voluntarily or that the Defendant was administered the Miranda warnings.
DISCUSSION
I. Entry Into the Days Inn Motel RoomThe Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes the arrest of suspects. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Steagald v. United States, the law of the Fifth Circuit was that police officers could enter a third party's residence to make an arrest if they had a valid arrest warrant and reasonable belief that a suspect was in a particular location. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Steagald implicitly overruled this line of cases. Now, if police believe that the person sought is in a third party's home, the officers must obtain a search warrant to lawfully enter that home, absent exigent circumstances.
451 U.S. 204 (1981).
United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1017 (5th Cir. 1976); Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1972).
United States v. Congote, 656 F.2d 971, 973 (5th Cir. 1981).
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222.
In order to challenge a search or seizure, an individual must prove at the outset that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. This rule is derived from the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights; one whose privacy has not been invaded simply has not suffered a constitutional deprivation. Without a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises, an individual lacks standing to contest a search. A defendant's legitimate presence on the searched premises, without more, is insufficient to establish standing.
See United States v. Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d 417, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1982); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n. 1 (1978).
Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d at 420; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34.
United States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1306 (5th Cir. 1985); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128.
Antone, 753 F.2d at 1306; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43.
Thus, the Court must determine whether Mackey had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Days Inn hotel room, which he claims belonged to a third party. If he had such an expectation, and the room truly did belong to another individual, then the officers' entry and their arrest of Mackey could violate the Fourth Amendment. However, if Mackey had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the other individual's hotel room, then he has no standing and may not challenge his arrest on these grounds. Additionally, if the hotel room was Mackey's and thus his temporary "residence," then his arrest is justified, since an officer may enter a suspect's own residence with a valid arrest warrant to effectuate his arrest.
Briones-Garza, 680 F.2d at 420; Antone, 753 F.2d at 1307; United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1992).
See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 221.
In assessing whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, the Fifth Circuit has set forth a number of factors to be considered:
Whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.
Ibarra, 948 F.2d at 906 (citing United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981)).
In most cases, the situation before the Court would require an examination of these factors in order to make a determination of whether Defendant Mackey enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. However, the Government concedes that Defendant's status in the motel room provides the Defendant with a legitimate expectation of privacy in the room. (Docket No. 55, at 8-9) Thus, the Court need not undertake the analysis outlined above and will proceed to resolving the other issues before it.
Had it reached this issue, the Court notes that its determination would have been controlled by the decisions in, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), in which the United States Supreme Court recognized that an overnight guest has a Fourth Amendment privacy right and thus a reasonable expectation of privacy in a residence in which he is an overnight guest.
Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Steagald, the Court must next determine whether the officers had a search warrant or relied on exigent circumstances in entering the Days Inn motel room in which Defendant was staying prior to his arrest. Defendant argues that the officers lacked either a search warrant or exigent circumstances and that their entry into the Days Inn room violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In response, the Government concedes that the officers did not have a search warrant for the motel room. (Docket No. 55, at 4) The Government also concedes that exigent circumstances were not present. ( Id. at 4, 13) However, the Government argues that the officers needed neither a search warrant nor exigent circumstances to arrest Mackey in the motel room of a third person.
Instead, the Government seeks to justify its conclusion by citing the "rule" in Payton v. New York, in which the Supreme Court held that police may enter a suspect's residence to make an arrest armed with only an arrest warrant if they have reason to believe that the suspect is in the home. The Government contends that Payton applies, arguing by implication that Defendant was in residence at the Days Inn motel room where he was found. The Government argues that the motel room was Defendant's residence for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and that Officer Stromboe had "reason to believe" that Defendant was present in motel room. The Government asserts that the Court should apply Payton and uphold the constitutionality of the officers' entry into the room.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
If the Court found that the Defendant had been residing in the motel room, it would be appropriate to apply Payton and hold that the officers' entry was valid. However, this conclusion is against the weight of the evidence before the Court. All testimony indicates that the motel room was registered to a Ms. Johnice Moore, not to Defendant. Officer Stromboe himself testified that the motel management stated that the room was registered to Ms. Moore. While the motel manager also indicated that he recognized Defendant as an individual he had seen entering the motel room, this statement does not provide support for the Government's apparent position that Defendant was residing at the Days Inn. On the evidence before it, the Court determines that the motel room was not Defendant's residence, although he was staying there as an apparent guest of Ms. Moore.
Since the motel room could not properly be considered Defendant's residence, Payton does not apply on these facts. Countering Defendant's arguments that the Court should apply Steagald, the Government responds that the Supreme Court's holding in Steagald was limited to the narrow situation in which police, searching for the subject of an arrest warrant, enter the residence of a third party and subsequently discover evidence incriminating the third party homeowner. As a result, the Government claims that Steagald does not apply here and should not guide the Court's determination.
The Court notes that there is some confusion concerning whether Steagald applies to the precise situation before it: where the subject of an arrest warrant challenges the officers' warrantless entry into the motel room of a third party, for which the police do not have a search warrant. However, the Court finds that it need not rely on the decision in Steagald to determine whether the officers' entry into the Days Inn motel room was justified. The Supreme Court has since held that an individual subject to an arrest warrant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence of a third person. Arresting such an individual in the home of the third person without a search warrant is unconstitutional, absent truly exigent circumstances. Since the Government concedes here that the officers did not have a search warrant and there were no exigent circumstances, the Court determines that the officers' entry into the motel room violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1092 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluding that where subject of arrest warrant is arrested after warrantless entry into third party's home, Steagald does not apply) and United States v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The case now before us is not directly on point with either Payton or Steagald. The Payton rule does not directly apply because the defendant was not arrested in his own home. Steagald is also not on point because the person prosecuted in this case was the person named in the arrest warrant.").
Olson, 495 U.S. at 96-97.
Id. at 93.
Defendant argues that the violation of his rights was not mitigated by Ms. Williams's actions in opening the motel room door upon Officer Stromboe's order. If the officers had obtained consent to search the room from someone with authority to authorize a search, Defendant's rights would not have been violated. However, the testimony before the Court is that as soon as Ms. Williams opened the door, the officers went past her into the room and roused Defendant from the bed in which he was sleeping. Ms. Williams testified that she was not asked for permission to enter the room and that she did not give such permission.
Further, no other testimony contradicts this account. Officer Stromboe testified that Defendant walked up behind Ms. Williams as she was answering the door. However, as noted above, this testimony was contradicted both by Ms. Williams's testimony and Officer Ovalle's testimony: both testified that Defendant was in bed when Ms. Williams opened the door. In any event, no testimony before the Court indicates that the officers asked permission of Ms. Williams for entry. In this circumstance, the Court concludes that the officers did not ask her for permission to enter and she did not give such permission.
The Court also finds that Ms. Williams did not consent to a search of the motel room. Conducting such a search without a warrant is per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional unless it falls into a carefully defined set of exceptions, which include consent. As the Fifth Circuit described the consent exception in United States v. Jenkins:
United States v. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.").
The government's ability to rely upon the consent exception depends on two factors. First, the government must show that the consent was given voluntarily. When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. Second, the prosecution must show that either the defendant himself consented to the search or that consent was obtained from a third party that had the ability to furnish valid consent.
Id. (quoting Bumper v. State of North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 544-45 (1968) and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Thus, it is the Government's burden to show that consent to enter and search was given freely and voluntarily. The Government cannot meet this burden by showing that an individual merely acquiesced and complied with law enforcement demands. Here, the Government has not met its burden of showing that Ms. Williams allowed the officers to enter 'freely and voluntarily.' By her own account, she let the officers in so they would not break down the door. Thus, the Court finds that Ms. Williams was merely acquiescing to the officers' claim of lawful authority and did not furnish valid consent for the officers to search the room for Defendant Mackey. Since the Government has failed to show that Ms. Williams consented to a search of the motel room, it cannot rely on the consent exception to justify the officers' entry into the motel room.
The initial Fourth Amendment violation is compounded by numerous other violations. Testimony before the Court reveals that, upon entering the room, Officer Stromboe went directly to where Defendant Mackey was sleeping and roused him from bed. Ms. Williams testified that Officer Stromboe immediately placed Defendant in handcuffs without informing him that he was under arrest. He then questioned Defendant about what was in the room and asked Defendant for consent to search the room. Officer Stromboe also failed to inform Defendant of his Miranda rights, despite placing him under de facto arrest. Indeed, it was not until long after the weapons and drugs were discovered and the officers were transporting Defendant to the ATF offices for additional questioning that Officer Stromboe read Defendant his Miranda rights. This was also after Defendant allegedly consented to the search of the motel room and confessed that the weapons and drugs were his.
The Court finds the factual situation before it requires it to grant the motion to suppress. In particular, the Court notes the officers' testimony that SAPD policy allows officers to arrest the subject of arrest warrants in the home (or motel room) of a third person without first either obtaining a search warrant for the premises or obtaining voluntary consent. The Court finds that this erroneous understanding of the law has led to constitutional violations and impermissibly tainted the evidence obtained and statements taken by the officers here. The Court finds on this record that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were therefore violated.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Docket No. 29) be GRANTED.