U.S. v. Lujan

18 Citing cases

  1. U. S. v. Duran

    162 F. App'x 8 (1st Cir. 2006)

    Likewise, appellant waived his argument that the district court erred in allowing him to plead guilty to an indictment that was not supported by sufficient evidence and which was based on perjured statements. See United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2003) (a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a criminal conviction); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-631 (U.S. 2002) (concluding claim that indictment was defective because it failed to include drug quantity was not jurisdictional). Though related, appellant's claim that his plea was involuntary is not waived, however.

  2. Lujan v. U.S.

    Civil No. 04-247-SM, Opinion No. 2004 DNH 135 (D.N.H. Sep. 14, 2004)

    After negotiating an agreement with the government, petitioner, Alberto Lujan, pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 292 months, followed by five years of supervised release. He was also fined in the amount of $1,000,000.00. That sentence was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). He now seeks habeas corpus relief, asserting that his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation at sentencing.

  3. U.S. v. Gaffney

    469 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2006)   Cited 19 times
    Holding under similar circumstances that a district court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance of his change of plea hearing to explore the possibility of hiring a new attorney did not implicate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice

    Cordero, 42 F.3d at 699. Although not all of these cases expressly apply the Tollett holding, we have ruled that a guilty plea waives an appeal based on: claims of insufficient evidence of an interstate commerce nexus, United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.2004); a Rule 16 discovery violation claim, United States v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 350 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2003); a Kastigar claim based on the Fifth Amendment, United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir.2003); a claim based on a so-called "jurisdictional" element of a criminal statute, United States v. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d 440, 442-44 (1st Cir.2002); a suppression claim based on a federal statute, United States v. Valdez-Santana, 279 F.3d 143, 145-46 (1st Cir.2002); a Speedy Trial Act claim, United States v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8, 11-13 (1st Cir.2001); an extradition claim, United States v. Torres-Gonzales, 240 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir.2001); a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute, United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1224 (1st Cir. 1995); a Fourth Amendment suppression claim, Cordero, 42 F.3d at 699; a statute of limitations claim, Acevedo-Ramos v. United States, 961 F.2d 305, 307-09 (1st Cir.1992); and a challenge to the voluntariness of a confession, United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 1989). The Court reasoned in Tollett that a guilty plea "represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process," 411 U.S. at 267

  4. U.S. v. Yeje-Cabrera

    430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005)   Cited 113 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that there was no abuse of discretion where the district court questioned the jury as a group regarding improper discussions with an errant juror and invited individual jurors to contact it later if they found the need to do so

    The court quite reasonably determined that Pérez might be or become in possession of some of the illgotten gains of the conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that "the district court must consider, among other things . . . the need to deprive the defendant of ill-gotten gains"). 2. Government's Appeal from Olivero's Sentence

  5. U. S. v. Gambaro

    No. 02-1859 (1st Cir. Sep. 22, 2005)

    Those arguments are foreclosed by our prior decisions holding that express consideration of and findings concerning a defendant's ability to pay and other relevant factors are not required. See United States v. Rowe, 268 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2003). Here, moreover, the district court did expressly consider Gambaro's ability to pay and other relevant factors and made express findings that the fine imposed was warranted in light of those factors.

  6. U.S. v. Kornegay

    410 F.3d 89 (1st Cir. 2005)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that if "the defendant's claim is only that the district court unreasonably declined to exercise its discretion to grant a departure, we may not review it"

    In such circumstances, absent information in the record suggesting otherwise, we assume that the court understood that it could depart but decided not to do so as a matter of discretion. See United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Scott, 387 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Williams, 355 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Heredia-Cruz, 328 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Chase, 174 F.3d 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1999). Kornegay asserts that the district court believed that it did not have the authority to grant the departure based on its statement that "if I look at all the relevant material, I cannot find that this departure is authorized."

  7. U.S. v. Derbes

    369 F.3d 579 (1st Cir. 2004)   Cited 29 times
    Finding that the "BOP is by no means required to tailor a perfect plan for every inmate; while it is constitutionally obligated to provide medical services to inmates, these services need only be on a level reasonably commensurate with modem medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards."

    Dr. Chartock noted that these substances might not be available in prison, and he said that altering the treatment regime "may result in destabilizing Mr. Derbes, causing him to revert to a deep depression and significant panic and anxiety." The PROTECT Act changed the standard of review applied to departures from the guidelines, eliminating the deference previously accorded to a district court's application of the guidelines to the facts of the case, see, e.g., United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing deference); instead Congress requires us to review sentencing departures de novo, giving deference only to the district court's observation of witnesses and raw factual findings. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (2004); United States v. Thurston, 358 F.3d 51, 70 (1st Cir. 2004).

  8. U.S. v. Mikutowicz

    365 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that acceptance of responsibility reduction was improper where the defendant contested the willfulness of his conduct, an "essential factual element of guilt" (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2)

    Prior to the enactment of the PROTECT Act, we reviewed the determination that the facts of a case justified a departure only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2003). The Guidelines, in their current form, recognize "aberrant behavior" as a legitimate ground for a downward departure.

  9. U.S. v. Thurston

    358 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004)   Cited 46 times
    Holding that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11 states that courts should impose lower sentences only for "extraordinary" good works

    Under Koon, our review under the remaining two parts was for abuse of discretion only. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100, 116 S.Ct. 2035; United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2000).

  10. U.S. v. Rosa-Ortiz

    348 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2003)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that guilty plea could not serve as waiver of claim on appeal that defendant had been imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not proscribe in the crime charged

    In its brief, the United States contended that Rosa-Ortiz waived his right to challenge the indictment when he entered an unconditional plea of guilty. See United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2003) (a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to a criminal conviction). At oral argument, however, the government correctly acknowledged that Rosa-Ortiz's guilty plea does not preclude him from arguing on appeal that the statute of conviction does not actually proscribe the conduct charged in the indictment.