U.S. v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers

42 Citing cases

  1. Holland v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections

    246 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001)   Cited 89 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court possesses the power to extend consent decrees based on a party's noncompliance

    It is also clear that this broad remedial power can be used to extend the effective time period of a consent decree. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942) (consent decree extended via exercise of modification power); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (parts of consent decree extended via exercise of compliance enforcement power). However, a court must make specific findings that support its use of these inherent powers.

  2. W. Alton Jones Foundation v. Chevron U.S.A

    97 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1996)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that trial court's findings regarding parties' intentions in entering into settlement agreement will be respected on appeal unless clearly erroneous

    Moreover, we note that, "`[f]ew persons are in a better position to understand the meaning of a [settlement] than the district judge who oversaw and approved it.'" United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1995)(quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n. 32 (2d Cir. 1985)). We do not consider Judge Mukasey's finding to be "clearly erroneous"; indeed, in our view, he was entirely correct.

  3. United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands

    Civil Action No. 1986-265 (D.V.I. Jun. 6, 2014)

    As a court order, a consent decree, "by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing EEOC v. Local 580, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 925 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Though a court cannot randomly expand or contract the terms agreed upon in a consent decree, judicial discretion in flexing its supervisory and enforcement muscles is broad."); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1567-68 (2d Cir. 1985) (consent decrees are "hybrid" in the sense that, though construed as contracts, "they are . . . enforced as orders")). District courts have "the inherent power to enforce a consent decree in response to a party's non-compliance, and to modify a consent decree in response to changed conditions." Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections, 246 F.3d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 2001).

  4. Doe v. Pataki

    481 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2007)   Cited 53 times
    Finding that all the procedural safeguards suggested by the district judge were implemented in the settlement and subsequent amendment to SORA, and finding the settlement to be binding and valid

    Often deference is given to the interpretation made by the district judge who approves the decree, a precept especially appropriate in circumstances where the judge has played a role in supervising the negotiation of the terms of the decree. See, e.g., Audiovisual Publishers, Inc. v. Cenco Inc., 185 F.3d 93, 95-96 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1995). In this case, there is no indication that the District Judge participated in developing any of the terms of the Stipulation that resulted in the decree.

  5. Audiovisual Publishers v. Cenco Incorporated

    185 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1999)   Cited 4 times

    Although "[w]e review de novo a district court's interpretation of a consent decree," United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 141 F.3d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1998), we have noted that "[f]ew persons are in a better position to understand the meaning of a consent decree than the district judge who oversaw and approved it." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n.32 (2d Cir. 1985)). Any findings of fact made by the district court shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.

  6. Montalvan v. Neville's Mobile Home Court, LLC

    3:11-CV-850 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 15, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    compliance.'" Id. at 283 (quoting United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995)).3.

  7. United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp.

    854 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    “[A] consent decree is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties.” United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1995); see also Bergmann v. Michigan State Transportation Commission, 665 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir.2011); Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, J.) (“From the standpoint of interpretation a consent decree is a contract, but from the standpoint of remedy it is an equitable decree.”); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1566–67 (2d Cir.1985) (“Consent decrees are a hybrid in the sense that they are at once both contracts and orders; they are construed largely as contracts, but are enforced as orders.”) (citation omitted). “Until parties to such an instrument have fulfilled their express obligations, the court has continuing authority and discretion—pursuant to its independent, juridical interests—to ensure compliance.”

  8. Contel Global Marketing, Inc. v. Cortera

    Civil Action No. 01-238 (SRC) (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2010)

    As Judge Shipp correctly concluded, although a consent decree is to be construed akin to a contract, and a court "should not impose terms when the parties did not agree to those terms," Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2001), such is not the case here. Despite Defendants' protestations to the contrary, uncontested evidence demonstrates that both parties agreed to the modified procedure and arbitrated under it. This Court indeed has "equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties," United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995), especially when the enforcement rather than merely satisfying the "purposes of one of the parties to it," United States v. Armour Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971), actually reflects "the parties' practice under it." Local 359, 55 F.3d at 69.

  9. Contel Global Marketing, Inc. v. Cotera

    Civil Action No. 01-238 (SRC) (MAS) (D.N.J. Jul. 15, 2010)

    A consent order "is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Gov't of the V. I., 363 F.3d 276, 290 (3d Cir. 2004). In addition, "[u]ntil parties to such an instrument have fulfilled their express obligations, the court has continuing authority and discretion — pursuant to its independent, juridical interests — to ensure compliance."

  10. Handschu v. Special Services Division

    71 Civ. 2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Summarizing history of consent decree governing NYPD investigations of political activity

    This duty arises where the performance of one party threatens to frustrate the purpose of the decree." Berger, 771 F.2d at 1568 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] consent decree is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties."). Berger involved a consent decree regarding the eligibility of certain aliens for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiffs had been denied SSI benefits, available to those "permanently residing in the United States under color of law," even when they were not permitted to leave the country due to the processing of deportation papers and other circumstances.