It is also clear that this broad remedial power can be used to extend the effective time period of a consent decree. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146, 86 L.Ed. 1668 (1942) (consent decree extended via exercise of modification power); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (parts of consent decree extended via exercise of compliance enforcement power). However, a court must make specific findings that support its use of these inherent powers.
Moreover, we note that, "`[f]ew persons are in a better position to understand the meaning of a [settlement] than the district judge who oversaw and approved it.'" United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1995)(quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n. 32 (2d Cir. 1985)). We do not consider Judge Mukasey's finding to be "clearly erroneous"; indeed, in our view, he was entirely correct.
As a court order, a consent decree, "by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing EEOC v. Local 580, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 925 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Though a court cannot randomly expand or contract the terms agreed upon in a consent decree, judicial discretion in flexing its supervisory and enforcement muscles is broad."); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1567-68 (2d Cir. 1985) (consent decrees are "hybrid" in the sense that, though construed as contracts, "they are . . . enforced as orders")). District courts have "the inherent power to enforce a consent decree in response to a party's non-compliance, and to modify a consent decree in response to changed conditions." Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections, 246 F.3d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 2001).
Often deference is given to the interpretation made by the district judge who approves the decree, a precept especially appropriate in circumstances where the judge has played a role in supervising the negotiation of the terms of the decree. See, e.g., Audiovisual Publishers, Inc. v. Cenco Inc., 185 F.3d 93, 95-96 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1995). In this case, there is no indication that the District Judge participated in developing any of the terms of the Stipulation that resulted in the decree.
Although "[w]e review de novo a district court's interpretation of a consent decree," United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 141 F.3d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1998), we have noted that "[f]ew persons are in a better position to understand the meaning of a consent decree than the district judge who oversaw and approved it." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1576 n.32 (2d Cir. 1985)). Any findings of fact made by the district court shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
compliance.'" Id. at 283 (quoting United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995)).3.
“[A] consent decree is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties.” United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1995); see also Bergmann v. Michigan State Transportation Commission, 665 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir.2011); Cook v. City of Chicago, 192 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, J.) (“From the standpoint of interpretation a consent decree is a contract, but from the standpoint of remedy it is an equitable decree.”); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1566–67 (2d Cir.1985) (“Consent decrees are a hybrid in the sense that they are at once both contracts and orders; they are construed largely as contracts, but are enforced as orders.”) (citation omitted). “Until parties to such an instrument have fulfilled their express obligations, the court has continuing authority and discretion—pursuant to its independent, juridical interests—to ensure compliance.”
As Judge Shipp correctly concluded, although a consent decree is to be construed akin to a contract, and a court "should not impose terms when the parties did not agree to those terms," Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 281 (3d Cir. 2001), such is not the case here. Despite Defendants' protestations to the contrary, uncontested evidence demonstrates that both parties agreed to the modified procedure and arbitrated under it. This Court indeed has "equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties," United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995), especially when the enforcement rather than merely satisfying the "purposes of one of the parties to it," United States v. Armour Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971), actually reflects "the parties' practice under it." Local 359, 55 F.3d at 69.
A consent order "is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties." United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Gov't of the V. I., 363 F.3d 276, 290 (3d Cir. 2004). In addition, "[u]ntil parties to such an instrument have fulfilled their express obligations, the court has continuing authority and discretion — pursuant to its independent, juridical interests — to ensure compliance."
This duty arises where the performance of one party threatens to frustrate the purpose of the decree." Berger, 771 F.2d at 1568 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] consent decree is an order of the court and thus, by its very nature, vests the court with equitable discretion to enforce the obligations imposed on the parties."). Berger involved a consent decree regarding the eligibility of certain aliens for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiffs had been denied SSI benefits, available to those "permanently residing in the United States under color of law," even when they were not permitted to leave the country due to the processing of deportation papers and other circumstances.