U.S. v. Liberman

3 Citing cases

  1. Cameron v. United States

    231 U.S. 710 (1914)   Cited 81 times
    In Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710, 720-24, 34 S.Ct. 244, 58 L.Ed. 448 (1914), the Supreme Court, in holding that truthful immunized testimony by the defendant in one proceeding was protected by a statutory grant of immunity from use to prove perjury in another proceeding, indicated that the testimony might be used "for any legitimate purpose in establishing" the perjury in the same proceeding, 231 U.S. at 721, 34 S.Ct. at 247.

    The examination by the commissioner as special examiner was duly authorized, and the false testimony there was perjury. The decision of the Court of Appeals below is supported by the undisputed rulings under the acts of 1841 and 1867 and by the uniform practice under the present act until the contrary decision rendered in 1909, by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Skubinsky v. Bodek, 172 F. 332, but see Judge Buffington's dissent, and see also Ex parte Bick, 155 F. 908; Ex parte Lee, 15 Fed. Cas. 8,178; In re Fixen, 96 F. 749; In re Fleischer, 151 F. 81; In re Salkey, 21 Fed. Cas. 12, 252; United States v. Wechsler, 16 Am. B.R. 1; United States v. Liberman, 176 F. 161; 10 Columbia Law Rev. 70; 23 Harvard Law Rev. 221; Loveland, Bankruptcy (3d ed.), § 204. Even under § 21a the examination was authorized, because the estate was in process of "administration" within the meaning of the section as soon as it came into the jurisdiction of the court by the filing of the petition, and certainly as soon as the receiver was appointed.

  2. In re Grand Jury Investigation B-15-1

    No. 16-mc-4 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2015)

    See Gov't Br. at 4. In each cited case, however, the parties seeking the documents either had an independent statutory basis for requesting the documents, see, e.g., United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1960) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935); United States v. Lartey, 716 F.2d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1983) (government expert exception applied and target of grand jury had already been publicly arrested), or an independent basis for knowledge of the existence and relevance of the documents, see, e.g., Ferreira v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (person requesting documents was involved in creating them and/or turning them over to the prosecutors); DiLeo v. C.I.R., 959 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1992) (existence of documents was disclosed in publicly-filed indictments); United States v. Manko, No. 89 CR. 91 KMW, 1997 WL 107440, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1997) (existence of documents was disclosed in jury trial); United States v. Liberman, 687 F. Supp. 775, 776 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (existence of documents was disclosed when defendant pleaded guilty). Cf. United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 110-11 (holding that a prosecutor may personally consider the civil implications of materials he encountered during a grand jury investigation without court authorization).

  3. U.S. v. Hatorah

    No. CV 91-0694 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1992)

    The Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc. case has not been questioned in this circuit. See, e.g., United States v.Lartey, 716 F.2d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 627 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Liberman, 687 F. Supp. 775, 776-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). While the mere presentation of documents to a grand jury does not cloak them in secrecy, they should be kept secret if their disclosure would convey otherwise unavailable information about the nature of the grand jury proceedings.