II. BACKGROUNDThe background of this case is set forth in detail in prior opinions of this Court and the Third Circuit. See United States v. Law, 384 F. App'x 121 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Law, No. 08-77, 2008 WL 1776422 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2008); United States v. Law, 526 F. Supp. 2d 513 (E.D. Pa. 2007); United States v. Law, No. 05-78, 2005 WL 3464449 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2005). The background will be repeated in this Memorandum only as necessary to explain the Court's ruling on the instant motion.

However, other considerations, especially the reasons for the delay, may overcome even the weight of a grave offense. Cf. U.S. v. Law, 526 F.Supp.2d 513 (E.D.Pa. 2007), DuBois, J.; (discussing seriousness of similar drug offenses and dismissing without prejudice); U.S.v. Watkins, 200 F.Supp.2d 489 (E.D.Pa. 2002), Schiller, J. (holding that a forty day delay in indictment was reason to dismiss with prejudice charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine) partially reversed on other grounds by U.S. v. Watkins, 339 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2003), cert denied Watkins v. U.S., 540 U.S. 1221 (2004). Both parties state that Mr. Berberena's alleged offense is considered serious.

Consistent with these concerns, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that “whether or not a case is ‘unusual' or ‘complex,' an ‘ends of justice' continuance may in appropriate circumstances be granted.” United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 444 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. L., 526 F.Supp.2d 513, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that “the Court properly excluded time based on the unavailability of an essential witness, § 3161(h)(3)(A)”); United States v. Stallings, 701 Fed.Appx. 164, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming the court's ends of justice continuance where “the prosecutor had a sudden family emergency in late November, requiring out-of-state travel with no certain return date, and another multi-defendant trial scheduled for mid-January”).

Not only is there still a risk of a later dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, but the reality of the matter is that reprosecution can be costly even where the court allows the Government to retry the case. See United States v. Law, 526 F.Supp.2d 513, 521 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Thus, the mere fact that reprosecution is possible even after a significant delay is not enough for the third statutory factor to weigh in favor of either Alexander or Francis in these circumstances.

Id. at 234. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Blackmun wrote that “when an indictment is dismissed on motion of the Government, and the defendant is thereafter reindicted, both the 30-day and 70-day periods continue to run from the first indictment” because otherwise, “[t]o permit a new 30-day period, but not a new 70-day period, could lead to a result surely not intended by Congress, namely, that there is no day on which a defendant could be brought to trial.” Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. at 239; see also United States v. Horton, 676 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding defendant not entitled to a new 30-day period following a reindictment where the government obtains the dismissal of the initial indictment); United States v. Law, 526 F.Supp.2d 513, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (same). This does not mean, however, that Johnson must be compelled to go to trial within 30 days of her reindictment.

"The Third Circuit has also noted that 'we would anticipate that no criminal proceeding would be dismissed with prejudice without the court having considered and balanced the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice from the delay to defendant.'" United States v. Law, 526 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Bryan, 818 F.2d 1069, 1076 (3d Cir. 1987)). III.

Even ignoring the above, delay alone, without evidence of bad faith on the part of the government, is not enough to dismiss an indictment with prejudice. See United States v. Law, 526 F. Supp. 2d 513, 520-21 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Here, Petitioner has adduced no evidence of bad faith on the part of the government.

Both of these crimes are serious. See United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding charges of six robberies involving a firearm to be "quite serious," justifying dismissal without prejudice); United States v. Law, 526 F. Supp. 513, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding a gun charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to be a serious charge); United States v. Freeman, No. CRIM. 2001-044, 2001 WL 1739133, at *3 (D.V.I. Nov. 30, 2001) (finding a gun charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to be a "very serious offense[]"). A conviction for one of the Hobbs Act robberies carries a possible term of imprisonment of up to twenty years and a fine of up to $250,000.