Opinion
S1 06 Cr. 1064 (JFK).
January 14, 2008
For the Government: MICHAEL J. GARCIA, United States Attorney, New York, New York, Of Counsel: AUSA Randall W. Jackson.
For the Defendant: PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON GARRISON LLP, New York, New York, Of Counsel: Alex Young K. Oh, Esq., James L. Brochin, Esq., Farrah R. Berse, Esq.
OPINION ORDER
BACKGROUND
Defendant Tyrone Laster ("Laster" or "Defendant") moves for (i) a judgement of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and, in the alternative, (ii) a new trial, pursuant to Rule 33.
Laster was arrested by officers of the New York City Police Department (the "NYPD") on September 26, 2006, at an apartment at 1471 Watson Avenue in the Bronx, in possession of a semiautomatic handgun. On November 2, 2006, Laster was taken into federal custody. On November 16, 2006, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging Laster with the sole count of possessing a firearm after having been convicted previously of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On January 25, 2007, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment (the "Superseding Indictment") charging Laster with violating section 922(g)(1) and, in addition, providing notice that Laster's three prior, violent felony convictions subjected him to an increased penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (the "ACCA"), which provides for a sentencing enhancement for violations of section 922(g)(1) "[i]n the case of a person who . . . has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense." Laster's three prior violent felonies that served as the ACCA predicates were: a 1998 Class C felony; a 1995 Class E felony (the "1995 Felony"); and a 1982 Class D felony (the "1982 Felony").
Trial against Laster began on October 22, 2007. On October 24, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Laster currently awaits sentencing.
Laster now moves for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that he was previously convicted of a felony, as required under section 922(g)(1).
Evidence of Laster's Previous Felony Conviction
Under section 922(g)(1), the government was required to prove that (i) Laster knowingly possessed a firearm; (ii) he possessed the firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony; and (iii) the possession of the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. At trial, the Government presented overwhelming evidence to show that Laster unlawfully possessed a firearm on September 26, 2006, in the Bronx. The Government also presented conclusive evidence to show that the firearm that Laster possessed had traveled in interstate commerce. The defense does not challenge the sufficiency of the Government's evidence establishing that Laster knowingly possessed the firearm and that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. The sole challenge raised by the defense on this motion relates to the sufficiency of the Government's proof of the second element of section 922(g)(1), namely that Laster was previously convicted of a felony.
At trial, the defendant declined to stipulate to the fact that he was previously convicted of a felony. By Order dated September 28, 2007, the Court permitted the Government to offer proof of the fact of up to three of Laster's prior convictions. To prove that Laster had been convicted previously of a felony, the Government offered proof relating to Laster's convictions for the 1982, 1995, and 1998 Felonies. Specifically, the Government presented the testimony of Officer Keith Hickey ("Hickey"), a fingerprint technician in the Identification Section of the NYPD. After discussing his training and experience in fingerprint analysis, Hickey testified regarding his analysis of the fingerprint cards and Certificates of Disposition Indictment (the "Certificates") that he had examined in connection with this case. Specifically, Hickey inspected fingerprint cards associated with the 1982, 1994, and 1996 New York state arrests of an individual named "Tyrone Laster" (the "state fingerprint cards"). The state fingerprint cards were introduced into evidence. Hickey also examined three Certificates associated with convictions of an individual named "Tyrone Laster" in 1982, 1995, and 1998. These Certificates also were introduced into evidence. The state fingerprint cards and the Certificates all contained the name "Tyrone Laster" and all listed "Tyrone Laster"'s date of birth as June 13, 1964. Hickey testified that the arrest numbers for each of the three state fingerprint cards corresponded with the arrest numbers listed on each of the three Certificates. Hickey concluded that the state fingerprint cards for the 1982, 1994, and 1996 arrests were associated with the Certificates for, respectively, the 1982, 1995, and 1998 convictions.
Hickey further testified that he examined the fingerprint card associated with Laster's arrest in the instant case (the "federal fingerprint card"). This card was introduced into evidence without objection. When asked, "Is Exhibit Number 8 [the federal fingerprint card] the marshal's fingerprint card associated with the defendant in this case?", Officer Hickey responded, "Yes, it is." (Tr. 152.) The federal fingerprint card identified the individual who was fingerprinted as "Tyrone Laster" and listed Laster's date of birth as June 13, 1964. Hickey testified that, based on his comparison of the state fingerprint cards associated with the 1982, 1995, and 1998 Felonies and the federal fingerprint card, he concluded that the fingerprints taken from Laster in this case were identical to the fingerprints made by the individual listed as "Tyrone Laster" who was fingerprinted in connection with the 1982, 1995, and 1998 Felonies. Hickey also testified that, based on his examination of the Certificates, the term of imprisonment imposed for each of Laster's prior convictions was greater than one year.
"Tr." refers to the transcript of the trial in this case.
The Government also offered the testimony of Lisette Ortiz-Garcia, the Support Supervisor at the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC"). Ortiz-Garcia testified, among other things, that the defendant was the only person with the name "Tyrone Laster" in custody at the MCC.
DISCUSSION
(i) Rule 29
When a defendant moves pursuant to Rule 29 for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the evidence against him at trial was insufficient, the district court must determine, based on all of the relevant evidence, whether a rational juror "might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence "bears a very heavy burden." United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 821 (2d Cir. 1990) (motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction "rarely carry the day"). The district court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Government. See Mariani, 725 F.2d at 865. To succeed on a Rule 29 motion, a defendant must persuade the court that, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, . . . no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997) (McLaughlin, J.) (internal quotations omitted). When evaluating a claim under Rule 29, a court must analyze the evidence from trial in its totality. United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999) (the sufficiency test should be applied "to the totality of the government's case and not to each element, as each fact may gain color from others"). Moreover, the district court should not "substitute [its] own determinations of credibility or relative weight of the evidence for that of the jury." United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 124 ("[T]he credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury.").
The defense argues that the Certificates offered by the Government were insufficient for the jury reasonably to find that Laster was previously convicted of a felony because the Certificates "provide no comfort that the `Tyrone Laster' named in the Certificates is the same Tyrone Laster currently on trial." (Def. Mem. at 4.) In support of its argument, the defense relies primarily on United States v. Jackson, 368 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2004). In Jackson, the sole evidence offered by the government at trial to establish that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony was "a certified copy of a judgment of the New York Supreme Court for New York County (Manhattan) showing that on January 11, 1984, a person named Aaron Jackson was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon and of a controlled substance." Id. at 62. The Second Circuit held that the mere matching of a defendant's name to the name on a record of a prior conviction was, without more, insufficient for a jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony.
This case is amply distinguishable from Jackson, however, because, in addition to showing that the name ("Tyrone Laster") and date of birth ("June 13, 1964") listed on each of the Certificates matched Laster's name and date of birth on the federal fingerprint card, the Government offered evidence to show that the fingerprints associated with the Certificates of the prior felonies were identical to the fingerprints that were taken from Laster in connection with this case and imprinted on the federal fingerprint card. As the Second Circuit noted in Jackson, "[W]here two separately observed individuals share a highly distinctive feature in common, such as . . . identical fingerprints, we can conclude beyond reasonable doubt that they must be the same person because of well-established scientific information that a particular . . . fingerprint configuration occur[s] in only one individual." Id. at 64. Here, in sum, the Government not only showed that Laster's name matched the name on the Certificates, the Government also showed that the date of birth listed on the Certificates and state fingerprint cards matched the defendant's date of birth and, most important, that the fingerprints taken from "Tyrone Laster" in connection with the prior felony convictions were identical to the fingerprints of the Tyrone Laster who was the defendant on trial in this case.
The defense's insufficiency argument centers on discrepancies between the heights listed for Laster in each of the state fingerprint cards and the height listed for Laster in the federal fingerprint card. As the defense notes, the heights listed for Laster on the state fingerprint cards were 56, 57, and 510. The height listed on the federal fingerprint card was 58. The discrepancy between the listed heights is immaterial. First, as the government notes, the "heights in the cards associated with the prior arrests were all within two inches of the height identified" on the federal fingerprint card. (Gov't Br. at 9.) Second, as the Government also points out, Hickey testified at trial that, according to the practice of the NYPD, the height of a subject is determined not by actually measuring the arrestee but by asking the arrestee verbally to provide his height. The fact that Laster may have stated a different height each time he was arrested does not controvert the substantial evidence, consisting of matching names, dates of birth, and fingerprints, offered by the Government to establish that the "Tyrone Laster" who was convicted of the 1982, 1995, and 1998 Felonies is the same Tyrone Laster who is the defendant in this case.
As another purported deficiency in the Government's proof, the defense points to the fact that the "date of arrest" and the "date of offense" listed on the federal fingerprint card was "November 2, 2006", rather than September 26, 2006, the date of Laster's arrest in the Bronx by the NYPD. The fact that the federal fingerprint card listed the date on which Laster was transferred into federal custody, rather than the date of Laster's state arrest, is irrelevant to the jury's determination that the defendant's name, date of birth, and fingerprints matched the name, date of birth and fingerprints of the individual who was arrested and convicted for the 1982, 1995, and 1998 Felonies.
The defense also argues that there was insufficient proof presented that the fingerprints on the federal fingerprint card were actually those of Laster. However, Laster's federal fingerprint card was introduced into evidence without objection and Officer Hickey testified that the federal fingerprint card for "Tyrone Laster" was, in fact, the fingerprint card associated with Laster, the defendant in this case. In addition, as the Government's witness Ortiz-Garcia testified, the defendant was the only person with the name "Tyrone Laster" to be held in custody at the MCC. Thus, the jury could have concluded reasonably that the fingerprints on the federal fingerprint card associated with the "Tyrone Laster" in federal custody were from Tyrone Laster, the defendant in this case.
In sum, the defense has failed to show that no reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Laster was convicted previously of a felony. Accordingly, Laster's Rule 29 motion is denied.
(ii) Rule 33
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). Under Rule 33, a trial court has broad discretion to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial in order to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992). A defendant seeking a new trial bears the heavy burden of demonstrating the "essential unfairness of the [original] trial."United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956). In making this determination, a Court must "examine the totality of the case. . . . There must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted." Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414. Although a court, in deciding a Rule 33 motion, may evaluate the weight of the government's evidence and the credibility of witnesses, "[i]t is only where exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated that the trial judge may intrude upon the jury function of credibility assessment." Id. at 1413-14. For example, "exceptional circumstances" may be found where, "testimony is `patently incredible or defies physical realities.'" United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414). Thus, courts should exercise their discretion under Rule 33 sparingly. See Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414. Indeed, "motions for a new trial are disfavored in this Circuit." United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995).
The defense has shown no exceptional circumstances that warrant the granting of a new trial under Rule 33. The defense simply reiterates the arguments asserted in its Rule 29 motion, namely that the Government introduced insufficient evidence to prove that Laster was previously convicted of a felony. The defense has raised no other factor, such as the existence of newly discovered or newly available evidence, that indicates that Laster was innocent of the section 922(g)(1) charge or that otherwise suggests that a new trial is required in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Court declines to overturn the jury's verdict. Defendant's Rule 33 motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29, and Defendant's alternative motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 33, are denied. Defendant will be sentenced, as scheduled, on May 20, 2008, at 10:00 am.