A divided panel of this court considered and rejected Appellants's contentions, thereby affirming their convictions. United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1996). Thereafter, however, a majority of the judges of this circuit voted to vacate the panel opinion and rehear the case en banc.
We also review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 896 (4th Cir. 1996). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), has significantly changed our standard of review for district court sentences.
Because the Government was wholly uninvolved in the partial destruction of Ferguson's letters, and did not act in bad faith, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the remaining pieces of the letters into evidence. See United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 896 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion."). II. Ferguson's Coram Nobis Petition
We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 896 (4th Cir. 1996). McRae's argument is unpersuasive.
Rainey v. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 806-09 (4th Cir. 1990). But cf. United States v. Lancaster, No. 95-5012 (4th Cir. March 20, 1996). To refuse to ask such a question denies the defendant "the benefit of a voir dire that will provide essential information so as to allow the intelligent exercise of jury challenges," whether for cause or peremptory. Rainey, 973 F.2d at 325 (quoting Evans, 917 F.2d at 809).
To be sure, it is well settled that "[d]ecisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion." United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 896 (4th Cir. 1996). Accord United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995).