These were followed by a fourteen day hearing on appellants' combined motions to suppress. When these motions were denied in substantial part, see United States v. Lace, 502 F.Supp. 1021 (D.Vt. 1980), each defendant pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment, reserving, pursuant to stipulation, his or her right to appeal the district court's suppression rulings. Appellants have now filed over 200 pages of briefs in our Court in which the word "innocent" is conspicuous only by its absence.

Accordingly, they conclude, the government's failure to inform the Chief Judge that the "bid" in the conversations was not directly on the Aladdin mandates suppression. We acknowledge that the rationale of Franks applies to omissions and that several courts have permitted litigants to challenge affidavits on the ground that facts were omitted.See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 27 (1980); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 27 (1980); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979); United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1141 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 1320, 63 L.Ed.2d 764 (1980); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1046 (D.Vt. 1980). These courts recognize, however, that the omitted fact must be material — that is, if the fact were included, the affidavit would not support a finding of probable cause.

Plaintiff does have standing to assert his Fourth Amendment claim, even if he is not the owner of the property, because a lessee has a proprietary interest in a leasehold. See United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (D. Vt. 1980), aff'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982) ("As lessee of the house and grounds, he had a property interest and the ability to exclude others. Hence, [plaintiff] can challenge a physical search of the property.").

Courts have applied the good faith exception to excuse a deficiency in the submission of evidence to the judicial officer who issued the warrant. See Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d at 1522-23 (magistrate failed to make record of officers' affirmations in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(d)(2)©); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1045-46 (D.Vt. 1980) (same), aff'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982); 27 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 641.21[3][a], at 641-64 n. 16 (collecting cases). The court concludes that New Hampshire authorities acted in good faith in obtaining and executing the November 28, 2001, warrant.

The Government is correct that the critical issue is whether the Government used the fruits of a prior illegal search to obtain the search warrants, thereby tainting searches made pursuant to warrant. See United States v. Smith, 730 F.2d 1052, 1056 (6th Cir. 1984) and cases cited therein (unless tainted information was so important that probable cause did not exist without it, suppression not required); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1039 (D.Vt.), aff'd, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed.2d 106 (1982). We find that the search performed in Bermuda played no part in the magistrate's decision to issue search warrants.

The negotiated plea preserved for appellate review all questions raised in numerous pretrial motions directed principally to the evidence gathered and seized prior to the indictment. The facts which generated the constitutional claims presented on appeal are reported in United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021 (D.Vt.), aff'd 669 F.2d 46, 47 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed.2d 106 (1982). The present motion challenges the judgment of conviction on the claim that the petitioner was persuaded to plead guilty by improper motivation of his retained counsel, Clifford J. Steele, Esquire, of Atlanta, Georgia, when this attorney learned that his brother, Wayne Steele, was named on the Government's list of prospective witnesses shortly before the scheduled trial date.

Under the rationale of Franks, defendants must be permitted to challenge an affidavit on the basis of the intentional or reckless omission of material facts from the affidavit. United States v. Willis, 647 F.2d 54, 58 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1141 n. 9 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 1320, 63 L.Ed.2d 764 (1980); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1045-56 (D.Vt. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 425 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 (D.Conn. 1977); Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565 (Alaska 1980); People v. Kurland, 28 Cal.3d 376, 618 P.2d 213, 168 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 2321, 68 L.Ed.2d 844 (1981); People v. Townsend, 90 Ill. App.3d 1089, 1096, 46 Ill.Dec. 599, 604-05, 414 N.E.2d 483, 488-89 (1980); see United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1980); UnitedStates v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1979); United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 498-500 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837, 100 S.Ct. 73, 62 L.Ed.2d 48 (1979), United States v. Collins, 549 F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 2656, 53 L.Ed.2d 259 (1977); United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Burke, 490 F. Supp. 855,

On the other hand, such accuracy can serve to corroborate the informants' assertions that they witnessed legally questionable conduct, thereby substantiating the reliability of their information. United States v. Gonzalez, 555 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1043 (D.Vt. 1980). For all these reasons, I am satisfied Judge Hannigan reasonably could have determined that the affiants' information was sufficiently reliable to meet the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli formula.

I would hold that defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the closed interior space of his suitcase was invaded by the use of a trained dog to detect the presence there of a controlled substance. Use of such a dog does not enhance any of the handler's five senses in the same way that a searchlight or binoculars directly enhances the vision of the human user. I, therefore, cannot accept the analogy drawn by the majority, and in any event regard the cases relied upon as open to question in view of People v Smith ( 42 N.Y.2d 961, 962 [use of flashlight may be an "unwarranted intrusion" into protected Fourth Amendment interests]) and United States v Taborda ( 635 F.2d 131, 139); United States v Lace ( 502 F. Supp. 1021, 1041); United States v Kim ( 415 F. Supp. 1252 [telescope may not be relied upon as bringing into "plain view" items in the interior of an apartment]). In my view, the appropriate analogy is the use of a magnetometer, the metal detection device commonly employed to scan airline passengers and their luggage for weapons, which we have held to intrude on protected Fourth Amendment interests (People v Kuhn, 33 N.Y.2d 203, 209), or, arguably, to the "spike mike" and other mechanical listening devices fixed to outside walls, held in Katz v United States ( 389 U.S. 347); Clinton v Virginia ( 377 U.S. 158) and Silverman v United States ( 365 U.S. 505), to violate the Fourth Amendment (see 1 La Fave, Search Seizure, § 2.

Upon review of the record and the contentions of the parties we are of the view that all of the appellants are entitled to a judgment in their favor upon the state's claim of forfeiture and upon the state's assessment of storage charges. See U.S. v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021 (D.Vt. 1980); aff'd 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982); Bloom v. State, 283 So.2d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); and § 933.14, Fla. Stat. (1979). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with directions for entry of judgment in favor of appellants.