We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir.2006). Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident," but not to prove a defendant's character in order to show he acted in conformity with the charged offense.

The Court is not persuaded by this argument, as this could be said of all motive evidence, no matter how plausible it is. In United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit specifically addressed the prejudicial effect of evidence of financial difficulty that was admitted to establish motive. The court found no overlap between the evidence of the defendant's motive to commit fraud and his propensity to commit fraud.

Likewise, evidence of Poole's lavish lifestyle and straitened financial circumstance went directly to motive.See United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2006) (admitting evidence of financial problems to show motive). Although the testimony of Poole's friends about his "materialism" seems cumulative and less indicative of motive, we conclude that such an error, if any, in its admission was harmless.

And it is unlikely that the jury was confused, because it heard testimony that the actual bomb did not explode and the judge reminded the jury of this during the expert's testimony. See United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2006). The record also reveals that the demonstration involved a replica of the actual bomb, not, as Smith suggests in his brief, of a hypothetical pipe bomb, and we find no indication that the jury could have been confused.

The error must have a substantial effect on the defendant's rights to warrant reversal. Federal Rule of Evidence 103; United States v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2006). As for Peters' first complaint, Judge Griesbach correctly excluded the evidence.

The Court agrees. See, e.g., United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (“sorry state of [the defendant's] finances” admissible under Rule 404(b) “as evidence of his motive to embezzle”); United States v. Bergstein, 788 Fed.Appx. 742, 745-46 (2d Cir. 2019) (similar).

Instead, the Court finds that the proffered evidence is permissible to show that Mr. Duff possessed a motive to participate in the mail fraud scheme. See United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that evidence of financial troubles and debt probative to show motive to engage in fraudulent scheme). Mr. Duff also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the Government's proffer.

The bonus check could establish a financial motive for Kipnis to be loyal to his co-Defendants, rather than International. As such, it is admissible. See United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming admission of financial evidence as evidence of motive). Defendant Black's argument that Mr. Sugarman's letter is inadmissible hearsay as to him is an evidentiary issue that the Court will address at trial.