Baltrunas makes an inadequately developed argument that his confession was tainted because his use of heroin made him constitutionally incapable of waiving his rights. In support of this proposition, the defendant cites United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988). In Kord, the defendant, Mangum, argued that his confession was tainted because he was a drug abuser.

In light of this substantial evidence that Mireles knew he was being arrested—not kidnapped—the trial court properly admitted the evidence of Mireles's flight. United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1988).

Evidence of flight is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show consciousness of guilt, as well as guilt itself. See United States v. Hunter, 145 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 67 U.S.L.W. 3238 (Oct. 5, 1998); United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 845-46 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that evidence of a defendant's refusal to furnish a writing exemplar, like flight, demonstrated consciousness of guilt and was, therefore, admissible under Rule 404(b)). By offering this evidence to establish identity and consciousness of guilt rather than to show a general bad character or a propensity to commit criminal acts, it is clear that the government met the requirements contemplated by the first prong. The third prong also need not detain us long, as Robinson's plea of guilty to the April 18 robbery satisfies its requirements.

The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and a number of other circuits, have stated that a refusal to sign a waiver form does not show that subsequent statements are involuntary. United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 375 (7th Cir.) (defendant refused to sign waiver form, saying "I never sign anything," but subsequently made oral statements to the police), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988); Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1982) (defendant refused to sign waiver form but immediately made oral statements), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983); see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 375 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 1758 n. 5 ("The Courts of Appeal have unanimously rejected the . . . argument that refusal to sign a written waiver form precludes a finding of waiver."). But see McDonald v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that, after defendant refused to sign waiver form and in the absence of words or actions implying a waiver, defendant's response to questions was involuntary and inadmissible).

[t]he probative value of flight as evidence of a defendant's guilt depends on the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.United States v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d 569 (1994); see also United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988); United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 368 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1093, 107 S.Ct. 1308, 94 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464, 471 (7th Cir. 1984); Jackson, 572 F.2d at 639. Because the probative value of flight evidence is often slight, there is a danger that a flight instruction will isolate and give undue weight to such evidence.

It is well established in this Circuit that "`evidence of flight and concealment is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, as well as guilt itself.'" United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464, 471 (7th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988). Pointer contends, however, that the standards reiterated in Kord for admitting evidence of flight were not met in this case.

The probative value of flight as evidence of a defendant's guilt depends on the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988). In this case, the degree of confidence with which the jury could have drawn these inferences is substantial.

When an authorized person certifies facts asserted in public records and reports, such as the fact that defendant was released on bond, or the fact that at arraignment the magistrate judge instructed Lechuga to appear at trial on July 5, those assertions are admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rules. In the Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1307-1308 (7th Cir. 1992), United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 815 (2d Cir. 1986), certiorari denied, 479 U.S. 855, 107 S.Ct. 192, 93 L.Ed.2d 125. The court records at issue in this case were properly received in evidence under Rule 902(4) and Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 376 (7th Cir. 1988), certiorari denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49, Oriental Health Spa v. City of Fort Wayne, 864 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1988). Admission of tape recording of arraignment and plea

United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 847 (7th Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.) ("The mere possibility of a co-defendant's testimony is insufficient grounds for a severance."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988).

We went on to point out that: "`The mere possibility of a co-defendant's testimony is insufficient grounds for a severance.' United States v. Kord, 836 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 49 (1988). `To justify severance, a defendant must provide some support, such as an affidavit or recorded testimony, that his co-defendant would testify in a manner which would exculpate him. Severance cannot be granted on the basis of a vague, unsupported assertion that a co-defendant would testify favorably in a separate proceeding.