In United States v. Van Fossen, 460 F.2d 38, 41 (4th Cir. 1972), we left undecided whether the defendant "possessed" certain engraving plates and photographic negatives used in counterfeiting despite the fact that his fingerprints were found on the illegal items. In other words, the fact that the defendant at one time touched the items did not necessarily mean he had ownership, dominion, or control over them. Of course, Burgos's fingerprint was not impressed on the illegal item here (the crack) but rather on that item's container, a plastic bag. Cf. United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1241 (8th Cir. 1992) (in dicta court said defendant's fingerprint on a plastic bag containing a large amount of cocaine, by itself, would not be enough to show possession of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt). As for the aiding and abetting charge, the Government's brief on appeal makes no argument on how or why the evidence was sufficient to support that charge.

Johnson contends that the government failed to introduce evidence that he ever was seen in either residence before his arrests, possessed or was seen with any of the firearms, knew any of the firearms was present, or was using them in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. To obtain a § 924(c) conviction, the government need not show a defendant's actual physical possession of the firearm, see United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1241 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), or that he brandished, displayed, or discharged it, see United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 1988). The government is not required to prove that the house in which the gun is found is the defendant's full-time residence, see United States v. Bennett, 956 F.2d 1476, 1482 (8th Cir. 1992), or that the defendant had exclusive control of and access to the premises, see Young-Bey, 893 F.2d at 181.

Possession of such a substantial quantity of crack cocaine is some evidence of an intent to distribute. See United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1241 (8th Cir. 1992) (7.41 grams of crack cocaine together with weapons and cash sufficient evidence for possession with intent to distribute). See also United States v. Knox, 888 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 1989) (14.3 grams of crack cocaine together with nearly $5,000 cash sufficient to prove intent to distribute).

The government responds that Detective Williams was only one of several surveillance officers present at the complex, and that Buchanan is mistaken in his assumption that no one could see the apartment in question simply because Williams could not. The government claims, therefore, that Buchanan is mistaken that the affidavit statements are false. This court has required a defendant to offer proof of the affiant's recklessness or deliberate falsehood before a Franks hearing is necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1992). A detective testified at the suppression hearing in the present case that he gathered the information at the apartments from agents and officers and by radio.

These allegations must be accompanied by an offer or proof. United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1242 (8th Cir. 1992). Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are not sufficient.

United States v. Crook, 936 F.2d 1012, 1014 (8 Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 974 (1991). These allegations must be accompanied by an offer or proof. United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1242 (8 Cir. 1992). Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are not sufficient.

Id. at 171. See also, United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1242 (8th Cir. 1992). "Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient."

Though the contents of the PTS Report are only admissible in limited circumstances, see supra note 1, courts have found that the identifying information a defendant provides at booking is admissible even on the issue of the defendant's guilt. U.S. v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1242 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Ramos's New York State Driver's License is the one piece of evidence supporting his assertion that he lived at the Wadsworth apartment at any time during the five and a half year delay.

To receive a Franks Hearing, a Defendant must make, by a preponderance of the evidence, a "substantial preliminary showing" of a deliberate falsehood or of a reckless disregard for the truth in the Affidavit upon which a Warrant was issued. United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1242 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S.Ct. 1981, 95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). Mere allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. Franks v. Delaware, supra 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684; United States v. Clapp, supra at 798, citing United States v. Parsons, 585 F.2d 941, 942 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979).

Under the State's theory of the case, Olsen agreed to participate in a "job" to rob or burglarize Totten in order to get Frazier to bail him out of jail; Olsen's specific statement that he tried to stab someone the night before he was arrested was admissible to rebut his defense that he believed Frazier was offering him a legitimate construction job. See, e.g., United States v. Keeper, 977 F.2d 1238, 1241 (8th Cir. 1992) (evidence of two earlier searches that revealed cocaine relevant to rebut Keeper's defenses he did not possess or intend to distribute cocaine found in bedroom of his residence and that police had targeted wrong person); State v. Wilson, 60 Wn. App. 887, 891, 808 P.2d 754 (evidence of defendant's alleged prior assaults on victim admissible not only to explain victim's delay in reporting sexual abuse but also to rebut implication that molestation did not occur), review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1010 (1991). Additionally, any reference to Olsen's drug use did not, within a reasonable probability, materially affect the outcome of the trial because Olsen admitted to his extensive drug use in his interviews to police as well as in his testimony at trial.