Opinion
No. 02-20188
August 12, 2003
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant Antonio Johnson for dismissal of the indictment for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Under the Speedy Trial Act, in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, "the trial of a defendant . . . shall commence within seventy days from the filing date . . . of the indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer[,] . . . whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). In cases involving multiple defendants, the seventy day period begins to run on the first day that the last co-defendant makes an appearance before the presiding court. United States v. Jenkins. 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, while the indictment in this case was returned on May 28, 2002, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act period did not begin to run until September 11, 2002, the date on which Defendant's co-Defendant Michael Lee Bailey made his first appearance before the Court.
"[D]elay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel" is excluded from the seventy day period "if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8). For this exclusion to apply, the court must set forth on the record, either verbally or in writing, the reasons for finding that the ends of justice outweigh the interests of the defendant and the public. Id. A court may also exclude any periods of delay "resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F).
On August 23, 2002, the Court granted Defendant's motion for a continuance and specifically excluded the time period from August 23, 2002 until October 18, 2002 from the seventy day period. On September 11, 2002, Defendant filed motions to sever, to suppress eyewitness identifications, and for leave to file additional motions. Based on several requests by the Defendant to delay trial and the continuing pendency of several of Defendant's pre-trial motions, the Court also excluded the time period from October 18, 2002 until February 14, 2003 from the seventy day period. Defendant Bailey requested a continuance on January 23, 2003, leading the Court to exclude the period from January 23, 2003 through March 14, 2003 from the seventy day period.
On October 2, 2002, Defendant filed a motion for leave to file additional motions. On November 4, 2002, a hearing was held before the Magistrate Judge on Defendant's motion to suppress statements.
On February 20, 2003, Defendant filed a motion in limine, a supplemental motion to suppress, and additional motions to suppress eyewitness identifications. On February 27, 2003, the Court excluded the period from February 27, 2003 through April 18, 2003 from the seventy day period to permit a hearing on and disposition of Defendant's pending pre-trial motions and to permit a Second Superceding Indictment. At a March 27, 2003 report, the Court granted Defendant's request for a continuance in order to permit a hearing on and disposition of Defendant's pending pre-trial motions. Based on this continuance, the Court excluded the period from March 27, 2003 until June 13, 2003 from the seventy day period. Thus, every day from September 11, 2002, the date on which the seventy day period commenced, and the date of entry of this Order, June 12, 2003, is excluded from being counted in the seventy day Speedy Trial Act period pursuant to the exclusions articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) and (h)(1)(F). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish that the Speedy Trial Act has been violated, and his motion filed pursuant thereto is without merit. Accordingly, Defendant's motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.