at 877. We adopted much of this analysis in United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987), where we explained:
Id. at 877. We adopted much of this analysis in United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987), where we explained:
Illustrative cases under § 208(a) underscore the link between the conflict and a real, rather than speculative, interest in a particular matter. See, e.g., United States v. Selby, 557 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (employee whose husband earned commission from a software sale to the government had sufficient financial interest to sustain conviction under § 208(a) where she had actively lobbied for increased use of her husband's software); United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir.1987) (financial interest requirement of § 208(a) was met where the government employee signed invoices authorizing payment to his own company); United States v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154, 1156–57 (D.C.Cir.2001) (referral of patients to specific mental health clinic to which defendant had loaned money was sufficient under § 208(a)). The government argued that the “particular matter” underlying this Count was White Eagle's request that Greybull's husband pay off Greybull's nominee loans with the proceeds of Greybull's life insurance.
Illustrative cases under § 208(a) underscore the link between the conflict and a real, rather than speculative, interest in a particular matter. See, e.g., United States v. Selby, 557 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (employee whose husband earned commission from a software sale to the government had sufficient financial interest to sustain conviction under § 208(a) where she had actively lobbied for increased use of her husband's software); United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1987) (financial interest requirement of § 208(a) was met where the government employee signed invoices authorizing payment to his own company); United States v. Smith, 267 F.3d 1154, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referral of patients to specific mental health clinic to which defendant had loaned money was sufficient under § 208(a)). The government argued that the "particular matter" underlying this Count was White Eagle's request that Greybull's husband pay off Greybull's nominee loans with the proceeds of Greybull's life insurance.
We have sought to avoid such a result in determining whether a criminal statute permits multiple-count indictments. See United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1987) ("If every minor action that Jewell took in relation to the contract could be considered a separate `matter' under [18 U.S.C. § ] 208(a), his participation in the contract could be multiplied into endless criminal counts."). The government argues the potential for infinite counts, and consequently infinite sentences, is negated by the sentencing guidelines, which require grouping of closely related counts for purposes of sentencing. Indeed, were this a guidelines case, all thirty bank fraud counts would be grouped and the sentence would be determined by reference to the amount of the loss.
Once a juvenile has entered a plea of guilty or the proceeding has reached the stage that evidence has begun to be taken with respect to a crime or an alleged act of juvenile delinquency subsequent criminal prosecution or juvenile proceedings based upon such alleged act of delinquency shall be barred. Whether the tribal court's adjudication of appellant's case bars further federal proceedings against her under this section is a question of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. U.S. v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987). According to appellant, § 5032 bars a subsequent federal proceeding against a juvenile after entry of a guilty plea or the taking of evidence in any court — federal, state or tribal.
U.S. v. Keen, 104 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997). The defendant cited Bell v. U.S., 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955) in his motion and during the hearing, cited the Court to U.S. v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987) and U.S. v. Hurt, 795 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1986), to support his argument that the act of transportation is the unit of conduct to be charged, not the number of undocumented aliens transported. In discussing the Mann Act, the Supreme Court in Bell held that "If Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses...".
Whether a statute specifically permits multiple counts to be charged is a matter of statutory interpretation. United States v. Jewell, 827 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1987). If the language of a penal statute is ambiguous, the courts apply the rule of lenity and resolve the issue in a defendant's favor. See State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 385, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976); State v. Mason, 31 Wn. App. 680, 686-87, 644 P.2d 710 (1982).