Hynson appealed his conviction, and we affirmed. United States v. Hynson, 451 Fed.Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential).

Hynson appealed, and we affirmed. United States v. Hynson, 451 F. App'x 91 (3d Cir. 2011) (non-precedential). In April 2009, Hynson's codefendant, Prince Isaac, filed a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Nor does the suggestion the agents might hold Apartment B constitute coercion. Cf. United States v. Hynson, 451 Fed.Appx. 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (threat of arrest insufficient to categorically render consent involuntary); see also United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 119, 122 & n.25 (5th Cir. 1997) (barring individual from hotel room not coercion). The record does not support Garner's contention; Jackson freely and voluntarily consented.

The Court in Green explained that most, if not all evidence that relates to the background of the case, that shows the relationships of the players, or that “completes the story” is admissible as intrinsic evidence. Id:, United States v. Fitzgerald, 496 Fed.Appx. 175, 2012 WL 4017807 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential); United States v. Hynson, 451 Fed.Appx. 91, 2011 WL 5519618 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential). Here, the defendant Hartley submitted false documents or false information -all within similar time frames - to three separate government agencies, including the Department of the Army, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and the Thrift Savings Plan.

This statement on the consent form sufficiently advised Hovan of his right to refuse consent. See, e.g., United States v. Hynson, 451 Fed.Appx. 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (second factor weighed in favor of voluntariness when defendant “signed the consent form which expressly notified her of the right to refuse consent”); United States v. Ramirez, 115 F.Supp.2d 401, 410 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2000) (consent was valid where “the officers failed to articulate to [the defendant] her right to refuse consent, ” but “this right was clearly presented to her on the consent form that she read and signed”); United States v. Ramsey, No. 19-268, 2020 WL 2220312, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2020) (defendant was “on notice of his right to refuse” consent because the “consent to search forms included the following straightforward statement: ‘I have been advised of my right to refuse to consent to this search. . . .'”).

The court in Green explained that most, if not all evidence that relates to the background of the case, that shows the relationships of the players or that "completes the story," is admissible as intrinsic evidence. United States v. Williams, 647 Fed.Appx. 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2016)(not precedential); United States v. Fitzgerald, 496 Fed. Appx. 175, 2012 WL 4017807 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential); United States v. Hynson, 451 Fed. Appx. 91, 2011 WL 5519618 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential).Indeed, "[t]he Court may admit evidence relating to uncharged misconduct when the evidence is intrinsic to the charges at issue."

In the form, Defendant acknowledged that she "voluntarily and without threats" gave permission for law enforcement to search her phone. See United States v. Hynson, 451 F. App'x 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2011). As with her waiver of Miranda rights, all testimony and evidence at the suppression hearing indicated that Defendant voluntarily consented to the search her vehicle and cell phone, and therefore the court will deny her motion to suppress.

"Fundamental to the concept of voluntariness is that valid consent must not be coerced." United States v. Hynson, 451 F. App'x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2011). In Hynson, the Defendant alleged that the fruits of a search should be suppressed on the ground that the consent to search given by an accomplice had been involuntary.

"Fundamental to the concept of voluntariness is that valid consent must not be coerced." United States v. Hynson, 451 F. App'x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2011). There is '"no talismanic definition of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen.'

"Fundamental to the concept of voluntariness is that valid consent must not be coerced." United States v. Hynson, 451 F. App'x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2011). There is "no talismanic definition of voluntariness, mechanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen; instead, we determine the voluntariness of consent by examining the totality of the circumstances."