Additionally, "[s]ection 3161(8)(A) allows a court to grant continuances should that court find it is in the interests of justice to do so after weighing the best interests of the defendant and the public to a speedy trial." United States v. Horn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir. 1993). 2.

The Supreme Court has recently held that a section 3161(h)(1)(D) exclusion remains applicable “irrespective of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay in starting a trial.” United States v. Tinklenberg, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2011, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011), see also United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under Act). Thus, the district court properly excluded 30 days of the period of time for speedy trial purposes.

For good cause, the court may grant relief from the waiver.” See United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 845 (8th Cir.2002) (noting that “the failure to raise [an issue that must be asserted in a pretrial motion] in a timely pretrial motion results in ‘waiver’ of the matter”); see also United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir.1993) (noting that “motions excludable under [subparagraph (D) ] include any pretrial motion and are not limited to those motions enumerated” in Rule 12) (emphasis in original). However, this court has never characterized a pretrial-motion “waiver” as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, rather than an inadvertent forfeiture.

In United States v. Hohn, we rejected the argument that a district court must make “explicit” factual findings to support exclusions of time under the Speedy Trial Act other than under the “ends of justice” section which does require them. See 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir.1993). In Hohn, the district court had excluded time under what is now § 3161(h)(1)(D), for delay resulting from a pretrial motion, but had not made explicit factual findings to support it.

It is also not irrelevant on the issue of objective good faith that our court has upheld affidavits based on tips of drug activity which have been corroborated by police work which uncovered drug residue in a suspect's trash. United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1306 (8th Cir. 1993). There is no evidence that Budach's affidavit contained misrepresentations, and the facts which Budach omitted would only have strengthened the showing of probable cause if they had been included.

While the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue regarding whether such time is to be excludable, it has ruled that the language of 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1) creates "the presumption that the scope of the enumerated delays are not to be interpreted narrowly." United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1983). The Eighth Circuit has also held that the time between arraignment and filing motions is excludable.

See United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1987); UnitedStates v. Jodoin, 672 F.2d 232, 237-38 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (7th Cir. 1990);United States v. Lewis, 980 F.2d 555, 564 (9th Cir. 1992) It is true that other circuits have held such time to be excludable if defendant asks for time to prepare motions and some courts have specifically held that such time is not exludable. The Eighth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue, however, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that the "including but not limited to" language of section (h)(1) "creat[es] in the statute the presumption that the scope of the enumerated delays are not to be interpreted narrowly." United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301-1304 (8th Cir. 1983). The Eighth Circuit has held on several occasions that the time between arraignment and filing motions is excludable.

Henderson , supra , 476 U.S. at 327–28, 106 S.Ct. at 1875–76, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 307. Types of pretrial motions to which the federal exclusion has been deemed applicable include: (1) motions to review pretrial detention determinations, see, e.g. , United States v. Hohn , 8 F. 3d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993), opinion vacated on other grounds , 524 U.S. 236, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed. 2d 242 (1998) ; United States v. Wirsing , 867 F. 2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1989) ; (2) motions to proceed self-represented, see, e.g. , United States v. Willie , 941 F. 2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1106, 112 S.Ct. 1200, 117 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1992) ; and (3) motions by counsel to withdraw, see, e.g. , United States v. Brock , 782 F. 2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1986). Factual findings under the federal Speedy Trial Act are reviewed for "clear error," while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Hohn did not challenge the instruction in his direct appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. United States v. Hohn 8 F.3d 1301 (CA8 1993). Two years after Hohn's conviction became final, we held the term "use" in § 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm.

The Eighth Circuit has specifically held that motions for detention are included and underscored the breadth of the provision: " ‘Motions excludable under subsection (F) include any pretrial motion and are not limited to those motions enumerated’ in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2)." United States v. Moses , 15 F.3d 774, 776–77 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Hohn , 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir. 1993) ). The Sixth Circuit has also excluded motions for pretrial detention from the 30-day limit.