Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2006), held that the admission of expert testimony regarding the modus operandi of child molesters, including grooming, was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 158.

A pattern of grooming behavior "designed to reduce resistance to sexual advances," including isolating a minor from a parent or guardian, is circumstantial evidence of unlawful intent for transportation that follows such conduct. United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 152 (5th Cir. 2006); see Campbell, 49 F.3d at 1083 (finding criminal intent for interstate transportation when a defendant's "act of befriending [the victim] could fairly be called recruitment" into prostitution). The Fifth Circuit has also found that intrastate sexual contact in the minor's home state before or after the interstate journey supports a finding of the requisite intent.

Hitt and Causey both appealed their convictions. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed this case and affirmed both convictions and sentences. (Record Document 208); U.S. v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2006). The issues raised by both Causey and Hitt on direct appeal were described by the Fifth Circuit as:

"Where a defendant, with knowledge of the closure of the courtroom, fails to object, that defendant waives his right to a public trial." United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted) (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 618-19, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (noting that a defendant can waive the right to a public trial); Lacaze v. United States, 391 F.2d 516, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that the court's order that the courtroom be locked during one session of the trial was not reversible error when the defendant did not object to the closure)). In Levine, the Supreme Court explained,

Applicable Law The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to “ ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 156 (5th Cir.2006) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). “ ‘The Confrontation Clause ... is satisfied where defense counsel has been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1993)).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to "'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 156 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). "'The Confrontation Clause . . . is satisfied where defense counsel has been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'"

Defendant did not show that prosecutor's question was improper). 42. United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 152 & n. 4, 158 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1198, 1198 n. 3, 1200–02 (10th Cir.2010). 43. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 636 (3rd Cir.2004) (discussing testimony by Kenneth Lanning regarding the “seduction process”); United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 583–85 (7th Cir.1999) (discussing Lanning's testimony about “sophisticated psychological techniques” child molesters use to “ ‘seduce’ their victims”).

Several other circuits have since determined that, although Levine was a Fifth Amendment case, its waiver principles apply equally in the Sixth Amendment context.See United States v. Christi , 682 F.3d 138, 143 n.1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Souter, J., sitting by designation); United States v. Rivera , 682 F.3d 1223, 1233 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Hitt , 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir. 2006). We agree.

Id. What is required is that defense counsel be "permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 156 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The district court has discretion to place reasonable limits on "a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."

A defendant may waive that right, however, by failing to object to the closing of the courtroom. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991) (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960)); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir. 2006).