Opinion
CR 08-1518-PHX-JAT.
June 12, 2009
ORDER
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant David Alan Hickey (Doc. #24.) Specifically, Defendant's first argument contends that 42 U.S.C. § 16913 is an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause under Art. I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. The Government responded as though Defendant were arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. It seems to the Court that the Government's response does not respond to Defendant's actual argument. Further, some district courts have addressed similar arguments and have found § 16913 to be unconstitutional. See e.g. U.S. v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 1312, 1330-37 (S.D. Fla. 2008); U.S. v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311-14 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); U.S. v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 619-22 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) app. pending, No. 08-6004 (2d Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162-68 (D. Mont. 2008), app. pending, No. 08-30260 (9th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333-36 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
But see U.S. v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Contreras, 2008 WL 5272491 at *5 (W.D. Tex. 2008); U.S. v. Torres, 573 F. Supp. 2d 925, 938 (W.D. Tex. 2008); U.S. v. Hann, 574 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2008); U.S. v. Van Buren, 2008 WL 3414012 at *12 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); U.S. v. Trent, 568 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 (S.D. Ohio 2008); U.S. v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245-46 (D.R.I. 2008); U.S. v. Vardaro, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Mont. 2008); U.S. v. Elmer, 2008 WL 4369310 at *4 (D. Kan. 2008); U.S. v. Pena, 582 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856 (W.D. Tex. 2008); U.S. v. Hardeman, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2009); U.S. v. Dean, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1355-56 (M.D. Ala. 2009); U.S. v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 1396365 at *11-12 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
To assist the Court,
IT IS ORDERED that the Government file a supplemental brief by June 19, 2009, addressing Defendant's first argument (Doc. #24 at 2-3) regarding the constitutionality of § 16913 and why the reasoning of cases cited above that support Defendant's reasoning are either wrongly decided or distinguishable.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Defendant chooses to file a reply, the reply is due by June 26, 2009.