U.S. v. Hearn

10 Citing cases

  1. Hearn v. U.S.

    No. 10-3092 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010)   Cited 1 times

    The Government claimed that Hearn possessed 11 grams of crack cocaine and 15.4 grams of powder cocaine that he intended to distribute. United States v. Hearn, 534 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2008) (Hearn I), rehearing allowed, United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (Hearn II). On May 17, 2006, Hearn met with his attorney Douglas Beevers. Beevers told Hearn that, as a career offender, he faced a possible sentence of 360 months to life if he went to trial. If Hearn pleaded guilty, Beevers told him that he faced a sentence of 262-327 months imprisonment.

  2. U.S. v. Coleman

    349 F. App'x 109 (7th Cir. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    But we have conclusively held that a sentence imposed under § 4B1.1(a), the career-offender guideline, raises no Kimbrough problem, and thus a limited remand is not required. See United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494, 496-500 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Clanton, 538 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2380, 173 L.Ed.2d 1300 (2009); United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 812-13 (7th Cir. 2008). To the extent the crack/powder differential carries over into sentencing for career offenders, it is because of the statutory penalties and not, as in Kimbrough, the application of § 2D1.1.

  3. Shields v. United States

    653 F. App'x 476 (7th Cir. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    Then we held that sentencing under the career-offender guideline did not implicate Kimbrough, and we indicated that the plain error doctrine would preclude considering an unpreserved Kimbrough argument in career-offender cases. United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2008). We reversed course in the latter group of cases just one month after Shields's direct appeal, concluding in United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010), that Kimbrough does apply to a career-offender guideline calculation involving the disparity between the two forms of cocaine.

  4. U.S. v. Shields

    365 F. App'x 691 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    Yet Shields did not ask the district court to impose a below-range sentence on the basis of a perceived disparity in the career-offender imprisonment ranges for purveyors of crack and powder. In general, a district court cannot be faulted for not anticipating arguments that a defendant might have made but did not make in favor of a lower sentence, United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005), and even plain-error review would not benefit Shields, see United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2008). Because Shields never asked the district court to exercise any purported discretion to disagree with the career-offender guideline, he would not be entitled to a remand even if the district court did possess such discretion.

  5. U.S. v. Welton

    583 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2009)   Cited 31 times
    Proclaiming a prior decision was not binding where that decision "relied on a misunderstanding of our prior precedent" and a mistake in reasoning

    Moreover, in light of our decision in Harris, we granted the government's petition for rehearing in Hearn and held that a remand was not required despite the sentencing disparity for crack cocaine. United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2008). Yet, while Hearn does nothing to undercut our holding in Harris, we are aware that one of our recent decisions may appear to do so.

  6. U.S. v. Knox

    573 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2009)   Cited 41 times
    In Knox, we again examined whether defendants charged under § 846 could be treated as career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and we observed that "[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that this exercise of the Commission's authority under § 994 was valid."

    This contention was ultimately rejected because Liddell did not raise it below, and any error by the district court in failing to consider his Kimbrough challenge was not plain. Id. at 883, 885; see also United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the defendant's "more nuanced argument based on Kimbrough" under a plain-error standard of review (quoting Liddell, 543 F.3d at 883)). Liddell is difficult to reconcile with Harris, but it is not necessary to resolve the tension between these cases today because Davis and Anthony are entitled to resentencing for a reason not present in either case.

  7. Hearn v. United States

    No. 14-3183 (C.D. Ill. Jun. 24, 2014)

    The Government and Petitioner both filed petitions for rehearing. The Seventh Circuit denied Petitioner's petition and granted the Government's petition for rehearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's sentence on the ground that Petitioner was not eligible for a Kimbrough remand because he had been sentenced as a career offender. United States v. Hearn, 549 F. 3d 680 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Harris, 536 F.3d 798, 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that "a sentence entered under the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, raises no Kimbrough problem because to the extent it treats crack cocaine differently from powder cocaine, the disparity arises from a statute, not from the advisory guidelines")). Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court denied on June 15, 2009.

  8. United States v. Hearn

    06-30040 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2012)

    The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Court's judgment. See United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2008). In July 2011, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Retroactive Application of Sentencing Guidelines to Crack Cocaine Offense (d/e 93). Pursuant to Administrative Order 11-MC-2042, this Court appointed the Federal Defender to represent Defendant on his Motion.

  9. Hearn v. U.S.

    No. 10-3092 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2010)

    The Court of Appeals originally held that Hearn's sentencing court could not consider the disparity in the Sentencing Guidelines between crack and powder cocaine because Hearn was a career offender. United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit reversed that position in Corner.

  10. U.S. v. Phinney

    599 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (E.D. Wis. 2009)   Cited 12 times
    In United States v. Phinney, 599 F.Supp.2d 1037 (E.D.Wisc.2009), the Honorable Lynn Adelman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sentenced the defendant Michael Phinney after he pled guilty to possessing child pornography.

    United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). In United States v. Hearn, 549 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit stated that inRita "the Court made clear that a district court may depart from the Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with the Commission; that is, they may depart if they conclude that the Guidelines prescribe a sentence that fails to reflect Congress' purposes in creating the [Sentencing Reform Act]." And in United States v. Jones, the Second Circuit explained: