U.S. v. HASS

14 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Lee

    358 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2004)   Cited 209 times
    Holding that a district court is warranted in varying or departing upward from the guidelines range based on the lack of deterrence provided by prior lenient sentences

    As we previously have pointed out, there is a significant circuit split on the issue of the breadth of the scope of a mandate for resentencing on remand. United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 752 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1999) (" Hass II"); Marmolejo II, 139 F.3d at 530. A majority of jurisdictions embrace the view that unless the appellate mandate explicitly limits the sentencing issues open for consideration on remand, the district court is free to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing and is not limited only to consideration of those issues related to the remand order.

  2. Certiorari Denied

    531 U.S. 812 (2000)   Cited 37 times
    Upholding district court's exclusion of plaintiff's statistical expert in disparate impact case

    99-1694 HASS v. UNITED STATES. C.A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 199 F.3d 749. 99-1722 THOMAS TRUCK LEASE, INC., ET AL. v. LEE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, BY AND THROUGH ITS TAX COLLECTOR, BELK. Sup.Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied.

  3. United States v. Ramirez

    979 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2020)   Cited 6 times
    In United States v. Ramirez, 979 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2020), a physician was convicted of fraudulently signing home healthcare certifications.

    United Statesv. Hass , 199 F.3d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1999). But as a general matter, "there is no abuse of discretion when a defendant has an opportunity to review the PSR and submit formal objections to it."

  4. United States v. Cabrera

    603 F. App'x 322 (5th Cir. 2015)

    The drug quantity issue was therefore beyond the scope of this court's remand order, and the district court properly declined to address it. See Griffith, 522 F.3d at 610; United States v. Haas, 199 F.3d 749, 751-53 (5th Cir. 1999). Cabrera also contends that his within-guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable because several members of a different drug conspiracy received significantly lower sentences than he did.

  5. United States v. Tuma

    738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013)   Cited 98 times
    Upholding that district court statutory maximum sentence

    We review for abuse of discretion the denial of an evidentiary hearing at sentencing. United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 751 (5th Cir.1999). We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a downward departure unless the district court's denial resulted from a mistaken belief that the Guidelines do not give it authority to depart.

  6. U.S. v. Griffith

    522 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2008)   Cited 66 times
    Holding certain arguments waived because "[n]either defendant [had] demonstrated why he was unable to appeal his issue in the initial appeal"

    In Lee, we reaffirmed "the principle that `whether a [party] waived an issue for consideration at re-sentencing [depends on] whether the party had [sufficient] incentive to raise th[at] issue in the prior proceedings.'" Lee, 358 F.3d at 324 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1999)). There is no reason to suppose Wren or Lewis had any reason to argue for a decrease in his sentence.

  7. U.S. v. Hamilton

    440 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 2006)   Cited 12 times

    Such is not the case here where any objection originally raised grounded on the Sixth Amendment was waived when Appellants abandoned the argument on initial appeal to this Court. See id. (citing, amongst others, United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1999)). Appellants' argument that to raise Apprendi at the time of sentencing or on appeal would have been futile is not availing.

  8. U.S. v. McCrimmon

    443 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2006)   Cited 73 times
    Holding that district court "may not disregard the explicit directives of" the appellate court

    '" Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990)).But cf. United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1999) ("An issue is not waived if there was no reason to raise it in the initial appeal."). IV

  9. U.S. v. Phipps

    368 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    Affirming a ยง 5K2.3 departure based on "the unrebutted statements by the victim establish[ing] that she has suffered extraordinary psychological injury"

    Therefore, contrary to the defendants' assertions, we cannot say that the Government had "ample incentive" to raise but chose to forego this issue at a prior stage of the proceedings. See id. (distinguishing United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Hass v. United States, 531 U.S. 812, 121 S.Ct. 34, 148 L.Ed.2d 14 (2000)).

  10. U.S. v. McCoy

    313 F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 2002)   Cited 20 times
    In United States v. McCoy, 313 F.3d 561, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (en banc), we remanded the merits question to the panel, rather than to the district court, in order "to consume fewer judicial resources."

    This approach requires a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis.Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d at 32-33; see also United States v. Hass, 199 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[W]hether a defendant waived an issue for consideration at resentencing is determined by whether the defendant had an incentive to raise that issue in the prior proceedings."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812, 121 S.Ct. 34, 148 L.Ed.2d 14 (2000).