a sentence sufficient to allow for sex-offender treatmentโโeven though the district's court explanation for the basis of the variance contained โ[s]ome ambiguityโ); United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 582 (6th Cir.2007) (finding above-Guidelines sentence procedurally reasonable where district court noted โBolds' โconsistently contumacious' conduct in failing to abide by the terms of her supervised release and the โseriousness' of the [ ] supervised release violations,โ the need to deter such conduct and protect the public, and โthe need to provide Bolds and her child with necessary medical careโ); see also United States v. Mays, 435 Fed.Appx. 519, 520 (6th Cir.2011) ( per curiam ) (finding above-Guidelines sentence procedurally reasonable where district โcourt gave proper consideration to the relevant ยง 3553(a) factors, explaining that an upward variance was warranted by โthe seriousness of the offense,โ the nature of the criminal behavior ... and the ... โthreat of recidivismโ โ); United States v. Harris, 339 Fed.Appx. 533, 536 (6th Cir.2009) (finding below-Guidelines sentence procedurally reasonable but vacating on other grounds where district court's explanation, though โfar from ideal[,] ... did offer an explanation for the variance framed in terms of the ยง 3553(a) factorsโ); United States v. Clowers, 280 Fed.Appx. 496, 501 (6th Cir.2008) (finding above-Guidelines sentence procedurally reasonable where district court โdemonstrated its detailed consideration of several of the ยง 3553(a) factorsโ). It would have been preferable for the district court to have directly stated on the record that it was imposing a variance.
Unless, of course, we consider the sentence substantively unreasonable because it is too low. See, e.g., United States v. Fink, 502 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 552 U.S. 1088, 128 S.Ct. 856, 169 L.Ed.2d 708 (2008); United States v. Harris, 339 Fed.Appx. 533 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Camiscione, 207 Fed.Appx. 631 (6th Cir. 2006). As both the government and U.S. Pre-trial and Probation Services Office acknowledged, the circumstances of Lopez-Galvez's crime, as well as his background and characteristics, do not justify imposition of a statutory-maximum sentence.
Since Gall, we have reversed the district court on only one occasion. Compare United States v. Harris, 2009 WL 2222085 (6th Cir. July 27, 2009) (holding an 84-month sentence was unreasonable for possession and distribution (29,675 images) and a Guidelines range of 210-262 months) with United States v. Mikowski, 2009 WL 1546375 (6th Cir. June 3, 2009) (affirming a 192-month sentence for possession and distribution (5,140 images) and a Guidelines range of 240 months); United States v. Weller, 2009 WL 1349779 (6th Cir. May 13, 2009) (affirming a 120-sentence for possession and distribution (10,000 images) and a Guidelines range of 324-405 months); United States v. Edmiston, 324 Fed.Appx. 496 (2009) (per curiam) (affirming a 12-month sentence for possession (30 images) and a Guidelines range of 51-63 months); Prisel, 316 Fed.Appx. 377 (affirming a one-day sentence for possession (1,189 images) and a Guidelines range of 27-33 months); and Grossman, 513 F.3d 592 (affirming a 66-month sentence for possession, enticement, and distribution (600 images) and a Guidelines range of 135-168 months). Although other circuits have reversed o
Other character considerations such as employment history and family life may also be relevant to leniency. United States v. Harris , 339 F.App'x. 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2009). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned against the imposition of "divergent sentences based on characteristics that are common to similarly situated offenders."