Opinion
3:02 CR 081 AS
November 6, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This defendant was indicted by a grand jury in this district on August 14, 2002. On October 2, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant claims that two South Bend Police officers improperly detained him and searched his person and his vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. He claims that the improper detention and search led to the discovery of evidence that has been used in this case, and that the evidence should therefore be excluded. A suppression hearing was held on October 31, 2002, at which the government presented its evidence, including the testimony of two witnesses, and the defendant presented his evidence, also supported by the testimony of two witnesses. The parties were given until 4:00 p.m. on November 4, 2002, to file supplemental briefs. The government filed a supplemental brief, but the defendant did not. The Court has carefully considered all the evidence, including the testimony of the witnesses and the supplemental brief, and now rules as follows.
Whether the search was improper depends on what transpired when the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation. The Supreme Court uses a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, making the facts of primary importance in a Fourth Amendment challenge. See, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-111 (1997) (stating that the touchstone of the court's analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security," and citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Therefore, the Court has carefully weighed the evidence and finds the facts to be as follows.
This defendant was observed by two South Bend Police officers leaving a suspected drug trafficking location. When he failed to signal for a turn, the officers followed him. The officers observed the defendant accelerate to what appeared to be an excessive rate of speed, change lanes without signaling, and then turn again without signaling. The officers stopped the vehicle using their squad lights. The signals were tested and found to be not working. As the officers went through the process of writing a citation, they noticed the defendant making suspicious movements within the car, looking around nervously and ducking down. When they returned to the vehicle, they asked both the driver and the passenger to step outside. A quick pat down search was performed on both occupants.
At this time, one of the officers looked through the window of the vehicle and observed a gun holster partially under the driver's seat and partially in plain view. The officer opened the car door and found a handgun in the holster. When asked, the defendant admitted that he did not have a license to carry a handgun, as required in Indiana. Based on this information, the officers placed the defendant under arrest and did a more thorough search of his person incident to arrest. This search uncovered a $440 roll of cash. The vehicle was then impounded because it was blocking traffic and there was no other licensed driver. An inventory search of the vehicle was performed and one of the officers discovered a bag of crack cocaine containing individually wrapped packages, and weighing approximately 19.6 grams.
Based on these facts, the government claims, and the Court agrees, that each step the officers took was proper and supported by cases from the United States Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. First, the Court notes that if an arrest or a traffic stop is used merely as a pretext to search for evidence, that search constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996), citing United States v. Willis, 61 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). "However, our circuit's test for reviewing the lawfulness of a stop or arrest that is alleged to be pretextual has been set forth clearly in United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989). That case requires an objective analysis of the circumstances; if there was probable cause to make the stop, and if the stopping officer was acting with authority, the stop was not pretextual." Willis, 61 F.3d at 529. "[S]o long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, an arrest is constitutional." Id. citing Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041, and Quinones-Sandoval, 943 F.2d at 774. In this case, the officers observed a traffic violation and were legally permitted and objectively authorized to stop the vehicle.
Once stopped, officers may ask both the driver and passengers to exit the vehicle without any further suspicions whatever. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-111 (1997) (holding that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures); see also, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-415 (1997); and United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped the vehicle and asked the occupants to step out.
It is irrelevant what the officers subjective intention was in stopping the vehicle and asking the defendant to get out as long as the officers had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred. See, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis); see also, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996); and Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001). After the occupants are out of the car, officers may perform a limited pat down search for weapons for their own safety if they have reason to believe the individuals might be dangerous. United States v. Fryer, 974 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1992); and United States v. Brown, 273 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001). Furtive movements are sufficient to justify a pat down search for weapons, as well as to search those areas within the passenger compartment over which the motorist may gain immediate control and that may contain a weapon. Id. In this case, in addition to observing furtive movements, the officers had observed the defendant leave a suspected drug trafficking location, therefore, the officers had grounds for conducting a limited pat down search for their own protection.
Next, one of the officers observed in plain view, without opening the car door, what he knew from his experience and training to be a handgun holster. Even without this observation, the officer was entitled to conduct a limited search of the passenger compartment for weapons if he possessed a reasonable belief based on "`specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 667-8 (7th Cir. 1993), citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also, United States v. Denney, 771 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1985). The fact that the officer saw a gun holster in plain view gave further support to his suspicions that the defendant might have a weapon, justifying a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. After the weapon was retrieved and it was determined that the defendant did not have a license to carry it, the officers could arrest the defendant without violating his Fourth Amendment rights because carrying a handgun without a license is illegal in Indiana. See, Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269 1277 (1997).
Once an individual is placed under arrest, a complete search of his person is warranted incident to the arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2002); and United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the search of the defendant incident to arrest that uncovered the $440 in cash did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, once the driver was arrested, and no other licensed driver was available to move the car out of the lane of traffic, police were entitled to impound the car. An inventory search of impounded vehicles that is part of routine police procedures does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); see also, United States v. Woods, 99 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that an inventory search conducted according to standardized police policy is not invalidated just because the search may also have had an investigatory motive (citations omitted)). Therefore, because inventory searches are routinely conducted before the South Bend Police impound a vehicle, the inventory search that uncovered the drugs in the defendant's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In summary, the police acted properly at each step of the process from the initial stop to the discovery of the drugs. The officers did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they stopped his vehicle for traffic violations and ultimately arrested him for carrying a handgun without a license. Nor did the officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they impounded the vehicle and discovered drugs while performing a routine inventory of the vehicle's contents. Therefore, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress must be DENIED.