Our conclusion that the Act serves as a legislative mandate and not as a “guidelines system[ ]” accords with that of the other courts of appeal to have considered this question. See United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir.2011); United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2008). In Pruitt, the Sixth Circuit assessed the impact of Rodriquez on North Carolina predicate convictions under ACCA, and it found “no reasonable basis on which to distinguish the North Carolina” Act from “the recidivism enhancement provision at issue in Rodriquez.”
Finally, López resorts to a last ditch effort to change our minds and sway us from existing circuit precedent by pointing us to decisions of the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits that allegedly demonstrate a rejection of the type of sentencing enhancement applied in his case. See United States v. Brooks, 751 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2011). Like most Hail Mary passes, López's falls short.
The court acknowledged two circuits had “held that in light of Carachuri–Rosendo, hypothetical aggravating factors cannot be considered when determining a defendant's maximum punishment for a prior offense.” SeeUnited States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.2011) (en banc); United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir.2011). The court, however, denied having the authority to ignore Hill because the case was not “clearly irreconcilable” on its face with Carachuri–Rosendo.
Because Mr. Hisey's past conviction had not been punishable with any prison time, possession of firearms didn't constitute a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Williams , 5 F.4th 973, 975 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a state crime is not punishable by imprisonment for over a year "when the statutory maximum sentence exceeds one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines does not"); United States v. Haltiwanger , 637 F.3d 881, 883–84 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a defendant's prior drug crime in Kansas didn't constitute a felony because his maximum sentence was limited to seven months’ imprisonment even though offenders with worse criminal histories could have been sentenced to over a year in prison). E We reject the government's counter-arguments.
. In support, Melendez-Davila points to Brooks, 751 F.3d 1204 and United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2011), which held that when determining the maximum sentence of imprisonment a defendant could have received under Kansas law, "the hypothetical possibility that some recidivist defendants could have faced a sentence of more than one year is not enough to qualify [the defendant's] conviction as a felony." Brooks, 751 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d at 884).
As germane to the instant facts in the criminal context, this court has explained the relevance of the Court's holding in Carachuri-Rosendo, stating that where a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year is directly tied to recidivism, an actual recidivist finding–rather than the mere possibility of a recidivist finding for a hypothetical defendant–must be part of a particular defendant's record of conviction in order for that conviction to qualify as a felony under § 841(b). United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2011). So, while Sorensen is correct that Carachuri-Rosendo's reasoning is applicable in the criminal context generally, it is not applicable here.
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a defendant's prior conviction was not punishable by more than one year in prison where the state did not attempt to prove aggravating factors that would increase his sentence beyond six to eight months of community punishment, and thus he was not subject to a sentencing enhancement for his federal conviction). United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the maximum sentence the defendant could have received for his prior Kansas conviction was seven months because he was not found to be a recidivist, and thus he was not subject to a sentence of more than one year in prison).
He first claimed that new "evidence" has come to light supporting his request for relief under § 2255. Specifically, movant points to the Supreme Court case of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010), and its progeny, including United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that his prior state drug offenses should not have been used to enhance his federal sentence. Movant also asserts that he is actually innocent.
SeeCarchuria-Rosendo, 130 S.Ct. at 2583(emphasis added). Although Carchuria-Rosendo involved an alien's ineligibility for cancellation of a removal ordered under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), Petitioner calls the Court's attention to United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881, 883 (8th Cir. 2011) as a case he believes is factually analogous to his own. In Haltiwanger, the Supreme Court vacated an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision and remanded it back to the Circuit for further consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo. See Haltiwanger v. United States, __U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 81 (2010).
In that case, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute drugs and (like Dozier) faced a 20-year mandatory minimum under § 841 if he had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. 637 F.3d 881, 882 (8th Cir. 2011). The defendant had a Kansas conviction for failing to affix a drug tax stamp, a crime with a 13-month statutory maximum.