"The trial court enjoys discretion in deciding whether a suppression motion has been timely made." United States v. Grimes, 911 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (M.D. Fla.) (citing United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 828 F.2d 679, 683 (11th Cir. 1987) and recommending that motion to suppress be determined on the merits rather than denying it as untimely), adopted by 911 F. Supp. 1485, 1487 (M.D. Fla. 1995). Although the undersigned finds some merit to the Government's position, for several reasons the undersigned recommends that Defendant Steeple be allowed to supplement his motion to suppress and that the Court decide his motion on the merits, including the arguments made in his supplemental motion.

Although this statement constitutes dictum, at least three federal courts of appeal agree in the wake of McNeil that the Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would not permit an individual to invoke the Miranda right to counsel before custodial interrogation has begun or is imminent. United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332 (7th Cir. 1994); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1122, 130 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1995); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1992); accord United States v. Grimes, 911 F. Supp. 1485 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Cullen v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D244 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 22, 1997). We agree with this interpretation of McNeil.