Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 07-120.
June 2, 2008
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Rodney Greene asks this Court to suppress papers, electronics, and a court seal taken from his apartment during a search in this case alleging mail fraud, identity theft, and forgery. Greene argues the information forming the probable cause basis for the search warrant was stale, the scope of the search exceeded the warrant, and no copy of the warrant or the inventory of seized items was left with him. The Government argues the affidavit was not stale because the investigation was ongoing and the warrant sought items expected to be saved. It further argues items purchased in other people's names and identified in the seized receipts fall within the scope of the warrant. Greene refused to sign for a copy of the warrant and inventory. I agree with the Government and will deny Greene's motion to suppress.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I use initials to protect those whose only connection to the case is the use of their names.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment "forbids . . . not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).Greene argues the seizures are void on three grounds: the warrant was stale and without particualrity, and the items seized exceeded the scope of the warrant. On a motion to suppress, the government bears the burden of showing each individual act constituting a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment was reasonable. Ritter, 416 F.3d at 261. With regard to staleness, Greene argues the gap between P.R.'s complaint to the police in August and the issuance of the warrant in November, defeats the warrant's probable cause. One aspect of probable cause is the likelihood the items sought will be found in the place to be searched. United States v. Tehfe, 722 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1983). It is not enough that the items may have been at the specified location at some time in the past, there must be probable cause to believe they are there when the warrant issues. United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553-60 (1978)).
Greene suggests this case is analogous to United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2002), in which a search for computer child pornography was conducted months after three children alleged seeing adult pornography in their coach's home. Id. at 429. The Third Circuit in Zimmerman held, without evidence of ongoing criminal activity, the good faith exception did not apply and the warrant was invalid. Id. at 437.
The Government defends the warrant as seeking documents of a sort which would be preserved and the criminal activity as one which was ongoing. The likelihood the evidence sought is still in place depends on a number of variables, such as the nature of the crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of the place to be searched. United States v. Harris, 482 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3d Cir. 1973). When an activity is of a protracted and continuous nature, "the passage of time becomes less significant." Tehfe, 722 F.2d at 1119 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)).
Although the "[a]ge of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause . . . [a]ge alone . . . does not determine staleness." United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the speed with which information supporting a warrant becomes stale varies with the nature of the crime and the type of evidence). The Third Circuit has held "the mere passage of time does not render information in an affidavit stale where: (1) the facts suggest that the activity is of a protracted and continuous nature . . . and (2) the items to be seized were created for the purpose of preservation, e.g., business records . . ." United Statues v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 391-92 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
When the information supporting a warrant suggests "repeated unlawful conduct over an extended period . . . [it] is more durable than information of discrete offenses." United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005). Where "the items to be seized are created for the purpose of preservation, as are business records, the passage of time is also less significant." United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
In this case, the affidavit reflects a measured investigation without undue delay. The facts recited in the affidavit, obtaining and using a credit card under a false name, and using that false name in a traffic stop, suggest an ongoing criminal activity of the sort conducted over a period of time using documents intended to be preserved, rather than contraband which would be disposed of quickly. Tehfe, 722 F.2d at 1119. The pornography in Zimmerman is analogous to evidence of drug dealing rather than business records. The investigation in this case sought records created to be used over a period of time, more closely resembling business records than pornography or drugs. The pace of the investigation and the nature of the documents sought render the information supporting the warrant timely and not stale. Harris, 482 F.2d at 1119.
The second prong to Greene's challenge to the warrant is that it lacked the specificity required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. To prevent the police from conducting a general, exploratory rummaging, a warrant must give a particular description of the things to be seized. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). When documents show on their face evidence of criminal activity the search and seizure of these documents does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United Sates v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 563 (3d Cir. 1994). The word "all," in and of itself, does not render a warrant a general warrant. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 1982). The warrant in this case reasonably sought all documents with other people's names and was not overbroad.
Greene's final argument is that the items seized during the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. Greene cites United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1999), in which police conducting a consensual search for an assailant seized a computer in which they found child pornography. Greene argues the electronic items were not obviously contraband and, thus, not subject to plain view analysis. United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2007).
An officer executing a search pursuant to a valid warrant may seize items in plain view which are obviously contraband. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) (holding "[t]he search was authorized by the warrant; the seizure was authorized by the `plain-view' doctrine). The warrant allowed police to seize any and all documents in other people's names. The seized documents included customer cards for the Bose sound system in the name of J.C.S. and a receipt for the Sharp television in the name of P.R. Because the search revealed receipts for the electronics purchased with other people's identification, the electronics came within the scope of the warrant or, alternatively, became obviously contraband because they were purchased fraudulently. The photographic duplicating equipment, the fax machine, the credit card swipe recorder, and the seal for the First Judicial District were in plain view and obviously contraband.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The investigation proceeded at a methodical, timely pace, leading from information to warrant. 2. The warrant was not based on stale information because the documents were more like business records designed to be retained than cash or drugs more likely to be disbursed or concealed. 3. The warrant was not overbroad when it sought any and all docuemnts in the name of P.R. and any others as well as proof of occupancy of the apartment. 4. The warrant allowed the search for all documents and papers seized. 5. The receipts in the names of other people for electronic equipment were in plain view during a legitimate search. 6. The inference the receipts were for the electronic equipment visible in the apartment is reasonable. 7. Electronic equipment purchased in other people's names is obviously contraband and may be seized. 8. The judicial seal, card reader, photographic duplicating equipment, and the fax machine were obviously contraband in plain view during a lawful search. 9. There is no reason to suppress the papers, the electronic equipment, or the hand stamp seized during the search of 1308 Willow Way, Cheltenham Township, on November 3, 2005. An appropriate order follows.