Ordinarily, we defer to the trial court in determining when leading questions are necessary, reviewing only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003). However, because no objection was made below, we review Smith's claim for plain error.

Raping minors is conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) conviction for anal and vaginal rapes). Therefore, a five-level enhancement is appropriate.

United States v. Flute, 363 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 2004). Specifically, this court repeatedly has upheld the use of leading questions to develop the testimony of sexually abused children, especially regarding precise physiological details of the sexual assaults. United States v. Grass-rope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing cases). The district court is simply "in a better position than this court to determine the emotional condition and forthrightness of the witness and the need for counsel to use leading questions to develop the witness's testimony."

We have repeatedly allowed the use of leading questions with child-witnesses in sexual abuse cases, and we do not believe that the district court ran afoul of our precedent or abused its discretion by allowing the challenged questions and testimony in the present case. See United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) ("It is not uncommon that the precise physiological details of sexual assault must be elicited by focused questioning. We have repeatedly upheld the use of leading questions to develop the testimony of sexual assault victims, particularly children."); Butler, 56 F.3d at 943 (noting that although leading questions on direct examination are generally prohibited, "[t]he child witness is a long-recognized exception to this rule").

Nevertheless, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the leading questions were necessary to clarify T.L.C.'s testimony and to establish the "precise physiological details of sexual assault," which was necessary to define the crime. United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) ("It is not uncommon that precise physiological details of sexual assault must be elicited by focused questioning."). The district court also did not abuse its discretion in overruling Wright's objections to these questions.

Additionally, we held that the use of leading questions was appropriate "to develop the testimony of sexually abused children, especially regarding precise physiological details of the sexual assaults." Id. at 822 (citing United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003)). Further, C.L.'s reluctance to discuss the events of that night does not undermine her testimony.

That is hardly surprising given Yvette's tender age, the threat that defendant made to her, and the stress of testifying in court. See McCormick On Evidence § 9 (Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020) (noting that "testifying at trial can be an intimidating experience"); Cf. United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) ("We have repeatedly upheld the use of leading questions to develop the testimony of sexual assault victims, particularly children."). Yvette's statement clearly refreshed her recollection.

. But "the matter clearly falls within the area of control by the judge over the mode and order of interrogation and presentation and accordingly is phrased in words of suggestion rather than command." United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rule 611 advisory committee's note). So, the use of leading questions is a matter left to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Nambo-Barajas, 338 F.3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 943 (8th Cir. 1995).

It is extinguished only upon the jury's determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.See United States v. Grassrope , 342 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2003) ("As any federal prosecutor ought to realize, the presumption of innocence abides with a criminal defendant throughout his trial."); Crumley , 528 F.3d at 1065 (prosecutor's remark that the presumption of innocence "can be removed by fact, by proof" was improper). Roldan-Marin, however, has not shown that the improper remarks prejudiced his rights in obtaining a fair trial.

” United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003). Given the deferential standard afforded trial strategy and leeway provided to questioning sexual assault victims, this Court cannot conclude that the state court decision affirming the habeas court's holding that Mann failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test to be “contrary to, or involve[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).