Such protection may include using some leading questions to help victims (including those who recently turned 18) maintain their composure and elicit information about the underlying events while confronting their perpetrators. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)(3) ("The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."); cf. United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) ("It is not uncommon that the precise physiological details of sexual assault must be elicited by focused questioning."). Lastly, to the extent the district court erred in allowing leading questions (again, a finding we do not make), any error was harmless because Greaux does not claim that the questions "prompted inaccurate testimony" from JFR, nor does the record support such a claim.

” United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003). Given the deferential standard afforded trial strategy and leeway provided to questioning sexual assault victims, this Court cannot conclude that the state court decision affirming the habeas court's holding that Mann failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test to be “contrary to, or involve[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).