The Sixth Circuit has rejected similar arguments, concluding that "[n]othing in § 841(b)(1)(A) indicates that a defendant's age at the time of his . . . prior conviction is relevant to the application of § 841, but to the extent that it is, age would appear to matter if it was related to the process in which a defendant's prior conviction was obtained." United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 457 (6th Cir. 2010). The defendant in Graham was convicted and sentenced as an adult for the predicate offense although he was arrested as a juvenile.
We conduct de novo review of a district court's denial of a motion for acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2010). "A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden."
However, "[a] defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden." United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). The Court's inquiry is limited to "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Overall, a criminal defendant bears a very heavy burden. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2010). Conversely, a motion for a new trial applies a broader standard.
That is, although the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment bars legislatures from imposing a "sentence for a term of years" that is "grossly disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime," Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010), we have repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to the mandatory life-without-parole provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), even when faced with sympathetic defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2019); Young, 847 F.3d at 363-64; Kelsor, 665 F.3d at 701; United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452-54 (6th Cir. 2010); cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding similar life-without-parole sentencing scheme under state law). For instance, in Graham, we affirmed a mandatory life sentence for a defendant who simply sold drugs, without directly causing any injury, and whose only two prior drug felonies were from nearly a decade prior, when the defendant was a teenager.
Harris's testimony makes things easier. He explained under oath, and in detail, how Ruffin helped to package the methamphetamine and to coordinate its shipment. If the uncorroborated testimony of a single co-conspirator can sustain a conviction if it establishes all the necessary inferences, see United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2010), surely this evidence can do the same. Harris's testimony goes to all three elements of conspiracy.
This Court reviews constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Graham II"). Neal argues his life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; specifically, Neal contends the sentence contravenes of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
Ordinarily, if the district court asks the parties whether there are any objections to the sentence which were not previously raised, as required by United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004), and the affected party does not object, then review on appeal is limited only to plain error. United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 455 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir. 2010). However, where, as here, the district court did not satisfy its duty of inquiry under Bostic by clearly asking the parties whether they had further objections to the sentence following its pronouncement, and instead merely asked in a cursory manner if there was "[a]nything further[,]" the Bostic inquiry is deficient, as the government admits.
"A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden." United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2010). When deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of the charged crimes have been established.
"'[T]he essential elements of aiding and abetting are (1) an act by the defendant that contributes to the commission of the crime, and (2) an intention to aid in the commission of the crime.'" UnitedStates v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 412 (6th Cir. 2002)). I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal