Opinion
CV. NO. 00-00540 DAE LEK
June 3, 2002
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court finds this matter suitable for disposition without a hearing. After reviewing Defendant's Motions and the supporting and opposing memoranda, the court DENIES Defendant's Motion To Vacate Judgment and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.
BACKGROUND
On or about August 2, 2000, the United States filed the instant action seeking to: (i) reduce to judgment the outstanding federal income tax liabilities assessed against taxpayer Gilbert Goo ("Defendant"); and (ii) foreclose its tax liens against two parcels of real property, including the property at issue in the present action. On July 3, 2001, the Court entered an order granting the United States' motion for summary judgment. Judgment was entered against Defendant on July 16, 2001. On April 29, 2002, Defendant filed a motion seeking to vacate that judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The United States filed its opposition to the motion on May 13, 2002.
On February 1, 2002, the Internal Revenue Service sold the property located at 2024 Homerule St., Honolulu, Hawaii, to Dana Shelton for $440,000, and the property located at 2002 Homerule St., Honolulu, Hawaii, to Jianjie Ji for $225,000. The court filed its Order Confirming the Sale and Granting Writ of Possession for these two properties on April 29, 2002 and an Amended Order Confirming Sale and Granting Writ of Possession on May 30, 2002. Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 29, 2002 order on May 6, 2002. The United States filed their opposition on May 14, 2002.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 60(b), a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence by which due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; 3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 4) the judgment is void; or 5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) Although there is a split of authority in the circuits as to whether 60(b)(1) permits a court to reconsider errors of law, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that "errors of law are cognizable under Rule 60(b)." Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 691 F.2d 438, 441 (1982) (citing Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1966)). "Accordingly, a district court's erroneous reading of the law is a `mistake' sufficient to require reconsideration of an order."Ynigues v. Cabral, 985 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Faile v. Upjohn, 988 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1993). However, where the motion for reconsideration raises no new arguments, but instead relies on the same arguments made in the party's original opposition, the motion for reconsideration should be denied. See generally Fuller v. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that district court properly denied a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration where the motion only raised arguments previously addressed by the court); Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); see also CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 57 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 1995) ("To the extent that the post-judgment motion sought to have the district court reconsider its ruling with respect to the issues addressed in the district court's original order, it is clearly improper, because Rule 60(b) does not authorize a motion for reconsideration of a legal issue.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Glavor v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("In order for a party to demonstrate clear error, the moving party's arguments cannot be the same as those made earlier.").
The disposition of a motion for reconsideration is within the discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Plotkin v. Pacific Telephone Telegraph Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982). There is a "compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not be lightly disregarded."Rogers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Ninth Circuit has articulated two goals that must be accomplished in order for a motion for reconsideration to succeed: "First, a motion for reconsideration must demonstrate some reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision. Second, a motion for reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Stein v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 934 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Haw. 1996). To justify reconsideration, three grounds have been established: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence; and, 3) the need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice. See Great Hawaiian Financial Corp. v. Aiu, 116 F.R.D. 612, 616 (D. Haw. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1988).
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Vacate Judgment
Defendant has made no showing of any of the grounds upon which a court may relieve a party from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Defendant contends that the court lacks jurisdiction because the federal government does not possess the right to tax him. This argument is the same one Defendant made in the underlying motion and is without merit. Defendant presents no evidence of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, nor is there any proof of any misconduct on the part of the Government. There is no basis for vacating the July 16, 2001 judgment.
II. Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant makes no new arguments in his motion and does not identify any error in law or fact. Accordingly, the instant motion does not meet the standard for granting a motion to reconsider a previous order of the court. Defendant has not demonstrated any reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision and the motion does not set forth any facts or law of a "strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Stein v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 934 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 (D. Haw. 1996). To justify reconsideration, three grounds have been established: 1) an intervening change in controlling law; 2) the availability of new evidence; and, 3) the need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice. See Great Hawaiian Financial Corp. v. Aiu, 116 F.R.D. 612, 616 (D. Haw. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendant has not produced any evidence of the aforementioned grounds upon which a motion to reconsider may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of its Order Confirming Sale and Granting Writ of Possession.
United States of America vs. Gilbert Goo, Civil No. 00-00540 DAE LEK; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER OF CONFIRMATION OF SALE AND WRIT OF POSSESSION