Opinion
CRIMINAL NO. 03-340
January 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The defendant Braheem Goldsborough, who is charged in a three count indictment with illegal possession of narcotics and a firearm, moved to suppress the gun and the drugs which were seized from the center console of a rented vehicle he had been operating which was stopped by the police on August 2, 2002. He also moved to suppress a statement made to the police while he was being transported to the police station. He contends that the search of the vehicle was illegal because there was no probable cause for the stop in the first instance and the search was not incident to a lawful arrest. He further argues that the statement must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
The government, on the other hand, contends that the police legally stopped the vehicle as the result of a traffic violation. It argues that the subsequent search of the interior of the vehicle was supported by probable cause and was incident to a lawful arrest.
After stopping a vehicle for a traffic violation, the police may detain the operator and the occupants only as long as is necessary to process the traffic violation unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal activity. United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). While conducting the car stop, "the investigative methods employed must be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verifty or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1993).
The police may search the vehicle's interior incident to and contemporaneous with the arrest of a recent occupant. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). They may search an automobile incident to an arrest without a warrant where "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In other words, probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime justifies a warrantless search of the vehicle. United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002).
Our inquiry starts with the validity of the stop by the police. We must first determine why the police stopped the car. If it was for a traffic violation, we must then examine the duration and the scope of the investigation at the scene. If the police did not exceed the limited confines of a permissible investigatory stop, we must then decide whether the search of the interior of the vehicle was justified.
At the suppression hearing, the government presented the testimony of the patrolman who stopped the defendant's vehicle and the officer who conducted the search. The defendant testified, disputing essential points of the government's witnesses. Consequently, to determine what had happened, we were required to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to evaluate the testimony as a whole.
After considering the demeanor of the witnesses and appraising their credibility, we find the testimony of the police officers unworthy of belief. It was replete with inconsistencies, evasiveness and improbabilities. Looking at not one part of the testimony but at it in its entirety, we conclude that the testimony was contrived post-arrest to justify the stopping and the searching of the vehicle.
Despite his testimony to the contrary, Patrolman Louis Silvestri did not stop the defendant's vehicle because there had been a traffic violation. Silvestri testified that he was working alone in his police car at the intersection of Elson and Worrilow Roads when he observed a Ford Taurus proceed through the intersection without stopping at a stop sign. The defendant denied disregarding the sign, claiming that he stopped before proceeding through the intersection. Hence, we were required to determine whose testimony to believe regarding the reason for the car stop.
Policeman Peyton, the mysterious third officer whom Silvestri belatedly acknowledged was in his police car, did not testify.
Even if Silvestri had observed the defendant run a stop sign, the later search of the vehicle was not justified. The police knew that the car had not been stolen and had not been involved in any crime. In fact, the lessee of the car was there and identified the defendant as a permissive user.
When Silvestri asked for the defendant's license and registration, the defendant produced a rental agreement for the car. However, he told the officer he did not have a license. Silvestri took the rental agreement and placed it on the rear of the rental car.
Patrolman Kenneth Coalson arrived on the scene in less than a minute. Coalson testified that he was standing beside the car talking to the defendant while Silvestri was checking the computer in his car several feet behind the rental vehicle. The defendant claimed that Coalson entered the interior of the rental car from the passenger side and searched it while Silvestri engaged the defendant in conversation on the driver's side. For purposes of deciding the motion, it is not necessary to determine which version happened. In either event, the search was not justified. As Coalson was standing by the rental car, Felicia Gadson, a woman who was known to both Coalson and Silvestri, informed Coalson that the car belonged to her and that the defendant was her boyfriend. Furthermore, there was no reasonable suspicion that the car contained contraband or had been involved in a crime.
Checking the police computer in his vehicle, Silvestri determined that the car had not been stolen and had not been involved in any criminal activity. However, according to Silvestri, the computer search revealed a "possible" warrant for the defendant who was in handcuffs and outside the vehicle at a safe distance from it.
Before searching the interior of the vehicle, Coalson had looked at the rental agreement, which was in Felicia Gadson's name, and determined that it was not in the name of the defendant. Coalson testified incredibly that he had read the agreement closely enough to determine that it was not in the name of the defendant but not closely enough to read the name Felicia Gadson, the woman whom he knew and who had told him that the car belonged to her.
Silvestri testified that he could not recall how the rental agreement got on the trunk of the car or whether the defendant had given it to him. The defendant unequivocally stated that he had given it to Silvestri. We find, as the defendant testified, that he gave the agreement to Silvestri when he was asked to produce the registration and Silvestri placed it on the trunk before returning to the police car.
Coalson attempted to justify the search as necessary to make sure there were no weapons in it before it was towed to the tow yard. However, there was no reason to tow the car. Coalson would not have searched the car unless it was to have been towed from the scene. In fact, the police did not intend to tow it. It would have been towed only if contraband had been found in it. In other words, the car would not have been towable if there had been only a traffic violation and the defendant, who was not the owner, was arrested while the rightful owner was there.
Given this reason for the search, we do not believe Coalson. He already knew that Felicia Gadson had claimed an interest in the car, and he had checked the rental agreement confirming that fact. He admitted that he knew Felicia Gadson was the lessee before searching it. Even if the police had decided to arrest the defendant on an outstanding warrant, a fact we do not accept, there was no need to tow the vehicle while the person entitled to take possession of it was on the scene. Coalson simply manufactured the theory that he was searching the vehicle to uncover any contraband before it was towed.
Another disturbing fact militating against the officers' credibility was the presence of a third police officer. Only on cross examination did Silvestri and Coalson admit that another policeman, Officer Peyton, was in Silvestri's police car. His name does not appear in any police report nor was he mentioned at the state court preliminary hearing. Both testifying officers denied that Peyton participated in any way in the arrest or the search. One had Peyton on the roadway while the other had him remaining in Silvestri's vehicle. Neither one admitted transporting Peyton from the scene nor could either explain how he left. Peyton did not testify at any proceeding, including the suppression hearing. Yet, the defendant claims he was frisked by Peyton who also questioned him regarding his identity. It is difficult to believe the officers' scenario that Peyton did absolutely nothing while on the scene.
It is not a single inconsistency or an isolated incredulous portion of the testimony that defies credulity. It is the totality of the government's evidence that calls into question the believability of the officers' testimony regarding the reasons for the stop and for the search as well as the sequence of events. Hence, we conclude that the reasons for the stop and the search were concocted later to justify the end result — the seizure of the gun and the drugs.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of January, 2004, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and the Motion to Suppress Statement Evidence, the government's responses to the motions, and after an evidentiary hearing, it is ORDERED that the motions are GRANTED.