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U.S. v. Giangola

No. CR 07-0706 JB (D.N.M. Jul. 24, 2008)
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U.S. v. Giangola

5 Citing cases

  1. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque

    3 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D.N.M. 2014)   Cited 9 times

    The subsequent search of Mocek was also proper. “For a search incident to an arrest to be legitimate, the following must be true: ‘(1) a legitimate basis for the arrest existed before the search, and (2) the arrest followed shortly after the search.’ ” United States v. Giangola, No. CR 07–0706 JB, 2008 WL 6020505, *17 (D.N.M. July 24, 2008) (Browning, J.)(quoting United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir.1998)).

  2. Mocek v. City of Albuquerque

    No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2013)   Cited 46 times
    Refusing to consider statements that were not "central to [the Plaintiff's] claims"

    Further, "[f]or a search incident to an arrest to be legitimate, the following must be true: '(1) a legitimate basis for the arrest existed before the search, and (2) the arrest followed shortly after the search.'" United States v. Giangola, No. CR 07-0706 JB, 2008 WL 6020505, *17 (D.N.M. July 24, 2008)(Browning, J.)(quoting United States v. Anchondo, 156 F.3d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1998)). The Court concludes that the search incident to Mocek's arrest was valid, because the AAPD officers had probable cause to arrest him, and because, as Mocek alleges, he was searched as soon as he was taken to the AAPD offices, immediately after his arrest.

  3. Tanner v. San Juan Cnty. Sheriff's Office

    864 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D.N.M. 2012)   Cited 49 times
    Following principles discussed by Sixth and Eleventh Circuits regarding officer's failure to intervene where it "seems unfair to hold a secondary officer liable for a primary officer's conduct in a circumstance where the secondary officer had no information available to him or her suggesting that the primary officer acted improperly"

    SeeN.M.S.A.1978, § 66–8–125(B) (“To arrest without warrant, the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds, based on personal investigation which may include information from eyewitnesses, to believe the person arrested has committed a crime.”). United States v. Giangola, No. 07–0706, 2008 WL 6020505, at *23 (D.N.M. July 24, 2008)(Browning, J.). Violations of state law do not support a federal cause of action for violations of the United States Constitution.

  4. Tanner v. San Juan Cnty. Sheriff's Office

    No. CIV 11-0328 JB/ACT (D.N.M. Mar. 15, 2012)

    See N.M. S.A.1978, § 66-8-125(B) ("To arrest without warrant, the arresting officer must have reasonable grounds, based on personal investigation which may include information from eyewitnesses, to believe the person arrested has committed a crime.").United States v. Giangola, No. 07-0706, 2008 WL 6020505, at *23 (D.N.M. July 24, 2008)(Browning, J.). Violations of state law do not support a federal cause of action for violations of the United States Constitution.

  5. Germany v. U.S.

    984 A.2d 1217 (D.C. 2009)   Cited 14 times
    Holding if a police officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that an individual "might be armed and dangerous," the officer may lawfully pat-down (frisk) that individual

    Courts have treated a frisk or pat-down as a precaution that logically accompanies the more intrusive step of handcuffing. See United States v. Giangola, No. CR 07-0706 JB, 2008 WL 6020505, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108747 (D.N.M. July 24, 2008) ("[T]he officers' failure to conduct any frisk or search before they attempted to handcuff [defendant] suggests that any fear that [they] had that there were weapons lacked a reasonable foundation."); Sanders, 994 F.2d at 209 (removal of handcuffs without frisking would cause perceived danger to "return in full force"); Womack, 673 A.2d at 614 n. 25 (noting that the dissenting panel member, who would have held that the handcuffing was unlawful because police had no basis to suspect that Womack was dangerous, cited the fact "that the officers did not [even] frisk Womack before handcuffing him. . . ."); see also LaFave, supra, § 9.6 (4th ed. Supp.2009-10) ("An otherwise valid frisk is not objectionable because the suspect was first placed in handcuffs. . . .").