Indeed, the cases Bridges cited to support its conclusion that "the question of whether given conduct is legal is answered by looking to the laws of the jurisdiction in which that conduct was performed, i.e., the situs state[,]" 83 Hawai'i at 196, 925 P.2d at 366, did not apply an exclusionary rule analysis. See United States v. Gerena, 667 F.Supp. 911, 919 (D.Conn. 1987) (noting that with respect to state conflicts, under a conflicts of law approach, "states generally determine the legality of alleged police conduct through application of the law of the place where the conduct occurred"); Menefee v. State, 640 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982) (noting, without regard to its exclusionary rule, that "it is well established in federal and other state jurisdictions that the law of the state in which a warrantless arrest takes place determines the validity of the arrest") (citations omitted); accord State v. Cooper, 223 Kan. 175, 573 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1977). It is manifest that Hawai'i courts are bound to follow the Constitution of Hawai'i.
1987); People v. Saiken, 49 Ill.2d 504, 275 N.E.2d 381 (1971); State v. Gallegos, 255 Kan. 382, 874 P.2d 647 (1994); State v. Lucas, 372 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1985); State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246, 834 P.2d 1008 (1992); Burge v. State, 443 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Crim. App. 1969); see also United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911 (D.Conn. 1987); State v. Minter, 116 N.J. 269, 561 A.2d 570 (1989). In addition, the issue has been discussed by legal commentators.
Indeed, the cases Bridges cited to support its conclusion that "the question of whether given conduct is legal is answered by looking to the laws of the jurisdiction in which that conduct was performed, i.e., the situs state[,]" 83 Hawai‘i at 196, 925 P.2d at 366, did not apply an exclusionary rule analysis. See United States v. Gerena, 667 F.Supp. 911, 919 (D.Conn.1987) (noting that with respect to state conflicts, under a conflicts of law approach, "states generally determine the legality of alleged police conduct through application of the law of the place where the conduct occurred"); Menefee v. State, 640 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Okla.Crim.App.1982) (noting, without regard to its exclusionary rule, that "it is well established in federal and other state jurisdictions that the law of the state in which a warrantless arrest takes place determines the validity of the arrest") (citations omitted); accord State v. Cooper, 223 Kan. 175, 573 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1977). It is manifest that Hawai‘i courts are bound to follow the Constitution of Hawai‘i.
The majority trend among our sister states is "the law that controls the legality of an interception is the law of the place wherein the interception takes place."United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D. Conn. 1987) (quoting United States v. Bennett, 538 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D.P.R. 1982)); United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing Bennett), aff'd sub nom. United States v. DeMaise, 745 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985); see Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568, 571-72 (Fla. 1985) (holding that wiretap interception made in Indiana in compliance with Indiana law, but not with Florida law, was admissible in Florida court), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 241, 93 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); State v. Bridges, 83 Haw. 187, 202, 925 P.2d 357, 372 (1996) (holding that wiretap interception made in California in compliance with California law, but not with Hawaiian law, was admissible in Hawaiian court); State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 369, 592 A.2d 572, 588 (App. Div. 199 1) (holding that wiretap interception legally made in New York under New York law, but not legal under New Jersey law, was admissible in New Jersey co
However, several district courts have held that where, as here, a court in one circuit is considering the propriety of officers' actions in another circuit, the court should apply the law of the circuit where the officers' challenged conduct occurred, i.e., the "lex loci." See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, No. CRIM. 13-240, 2014 WL 6090409, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2014); United States v. Gates, No. CRIM. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285, at *7 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 2008), aff'd, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Barragan, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015-16 (S.D. Ind. 2008); United States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 48 F. App'x 739 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 225, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 914-24 (D. Conn. 1987). In choosing to follow this approach, courts have generally reasoned that officers should be able to rely on their understanding of the law as their circuit has interpreted it.
cers' actions in another circuit, the court should apply the law of the circuit where the officers' challenged conduct occurred, i.e., the "lex loci." See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, No. CRIM. 13-240, 2014 WL 6090409, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2014) (Sixth Circuit law applied to search and seizure that occurred in Sixth Circuit but was challenged in Third Circuit); United States v. Gates, No. CRIM. 08-42-P-H, 2008 WL 5382285, at *7 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 2008), aff'd, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (Fourth Circuit law applied to traffic stop that occurred in Fourth Circuit but was challenged in First Circuit); United States v. Barragan, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015-16 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (Ninth Circuit law applied to electronic surveillance that occurred in Ninth Circuit but was challenged in Seventh Circuit); United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 225, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (Sixth Circuit law applied to electronic surveillance that occurred in Sixth Circuit but was challenged in Second Circuit); United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 914-24 (D. Conn. 1987) (First Circuit law applied to electronic surveillance that occurred in First Circuit but was challenged in Second Circuit); see also United States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 48 F. App'x 739 (11th Cir. 2002) (adopting "lex loci" approach in cases involving conflicts among federal circuits). In choosing to follow the lex loci approach, courts have generally reasoned that officers should be able to rely on their understanding of the law as their circuit has interpreted it.
A. THE ALLEGED FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION The Fourth Amendment question entails a choice-of-law determination because the 1995 arrest took place in Maryland, a state within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Fourth Circuit, while this case is pending in a district within the Eleventh Circuit. See generally United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 927 (D. Conn. 1987) ("Like instrastate divisions, the division of the nation into circuits is an intrafederal jurisdictional scheme. To the extent that each circuit has its own body of binding precedent (uniformly regarded as binding only within defined jurisdictional limits) then, in the absence of authoritative Supreme Court disposition of the particular issue in question, differences among the circuits give rise to intrafederal disputes and thus genuine conflicts within the meaning of conflict of laws analysis, and require a choice to be made where the interests of the nonforum jurisdiction are significant.").
, numerous district courts have held that the propriety of law enforcement's conduct should be determined by the law of the circuit in which their conduct occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Warras, No. 2:13-cr-439, 2015 WL 6736981 (D. Nev. May 18, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 6755275 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2015); United States v. Kennedy, No. CRIM. 13-240, 2014 WL 6090409, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2014), aff'd, 720 Fed.Appx. 104 (3 Cir. 2017); United States v. Barragan, 589 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1015-16 (S.D. Ind. 2008); United States v. Ozuna, 129 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 48 Fed.Appx. 739 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Longo, 70 F.Supp.2d 225, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Restrepo, 890 F.Supp. 180, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Gerena, 667 F.Supp. 911, 914-24 (D. Conn. 1987). This approach, known as the lex loci approach, is based on the premise that “officers should be able to rely on their understanding of the law as their circuit has interpreted it.” United States v. Maley, Cr. No. 13-3696, 2020 WL 1041545, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 3, 2020), aff'd, 1 F.4th 816 (10th Cir. 2021).
The government is attempting to wash the taint of an unlawful confession by moving the prosecution to the ND Georgia, but the choice of law favors the Lex Loci of Idaho in the 9th circuit over the Lex Fori of ND Georgia. U.S. v. Gerena, 667 F.Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 1987)*927
When a defendant moves to suppress evidence in one circuit based on government conduct that occurred in another circuit, a federal district court "typically" applies the law of the circuit in which the allegedly unlawful act occurred. United States v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 48 F. App'x 739 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Gerena, 667 F. Supp. 911, 927 (D. Conn. 1987); see also Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1176 (2012). Here, the parties have not briefed in the impact of Seventh Circuit law on Mr. Warras' claim that he was in custody while he was interrogated in Waterford, Wisconsin. The court grants the parties leave to file simultaneous briefs on two issues: (1) whether Seventh or Ninth Circuit law controls and (2) what, if any, impact Seventh Circuit law has on the parties' respective arguments.