U.S. v. GBC, L.L.C. Contractors

Full title: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA for the Use and Benefit of REBAR PLACEMENT…

Court: United States District Court, D. Alaska

Date published: Oct 24, 2004

A03-73 CV (JWS), Re: Motion at Docket 120 (D. Alaska Oct. 24, 2004)

Opinion

A03-73 CV (JWS), Re: Motion at Docket 120.

October 24, 2004

ORDER FROM CHAMBERS

JOHN SEDWICK, District Judge

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 120, Grose Brothers moves the court to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and dismiss 1) Rebar Placement Company's ("RPC") claim against Grose Brothers; 2) Grose Brothers' counterclaim against RPC; and 3) Washington International Insurance Company's ("WIIC") cross-claim against Grose Brothers. At docket 122, WIIC joins in the motion to dismiss. At docket 123, RPC opposes the motion. Oral argument has not been requested and would not assist the court.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2003, RPC filed suit against Grose Brothers, WIIC, and four sureties.¹ In RPC's first amended complaint, it claimed that the sureties violated their duties to RPC under the Miller Act.² Against Grose Brothers, RPC asserts state-law breach of contract and equity claims.³ RPC also claims that WIIC violated its duty to RPC under Alaska Statute § 08.18.071(a)(3).⁴ After RPC filed its complaint, Grose Brothers filed a counterclaim against RPC alleging that RPC breached its contract with Grose Brothers.⁵ Also, WIIC filed a cross-claim against Grose Brothers alleging that Grose Brothers breached its contract with WIIC.⁶

1 Doc. 1.

2 Doc. 35 at 13-14.

3 Id. at 8-12.

4 Id. at 12-13.

5 Doc. 41 at 5.

6 Doc. 42 at 4.

These claims are at different stages of resolution. RPC reached a settlement with the sureties, and the court approved a stipulation dismissing RPC's claims against them.⁷ Grose Brothers has answered RPC's complaint, and RPC has answered Grose Brothers' counterclaim.⁸ On its cross-claim against Grose Brothers, WIIC moved for partial summary judgment.⁹ The court granted that motion in part and denied it in part.¹⁰

7 Doc. 105.

8 Docs. 41, 44.

9 Doc. 72.

10 Doc. 100.

While this litigation was progressing, the parties engaged in discovery. Under the court's scheduling order, discovery closed on March 15, 2004.¹¹ Grose Brothers and RPC agree that further discovery is unnecessary.¹²

11 Doc. 29.

12 Doc. 120 at 9; doc. 123 at 4.

III. DISCUSSION

A district court may decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when it "has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . . ."¹³ When deciding whether to decline jurisdiction, factors that the court should consider include judicial economy; convenience and fairness to the parties; and comity toward state courts.¹⁴ If the claims over which the court had original jurisdiction are eliminated before trial, "in the usual case" the court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.¹⁵

The court has dismissed RPC's Miller Act claims, over which it had original jurisdiction,¹⁶ but RPC argues that the court should retain jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims because this case is unusual. According to RPC, this case is unusual because it has been before the court for eighteen months and discovery is complete. However, these facts do not make this case unusual. District courts have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims before them for longer than eighteen months.¹⁷ And in those cases the parties had engaged in substantial discovery.¹⁸

16 Doc. 105.

17 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissal after six years); Notrica v. Bd. of Supervisors, 925 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991) (more than four years); Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (three-and-a-half years).

18 Columbia Pictures, 944 F.2d at 1527; Notrica, 925 F.2d at 1213; Danner, 858 F.2d at 524.

As another reason not to dismiss the case, RPC argues that it would take longer to reach trial in state court than it would in this court.¹⁹ While this is a valid concern, the parties can minimize any delay by stipulating in state court that they will limit themselves to the discovery that they have already completed. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the parties' lawyers could justify the expense of repeating the discovery. Thus, such a stipulation is almost required of lawyers seeking to serve their client's interest. Given such a stipulation, it is not clear it would take the case longer to reach trial in state court.

19 Doc. 123 at 7.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, the motion at docket 120 is GRANTED.