U.S. v. Frantz

16 Citing cases

  1. State v. Smith

    2010 Ohio 1232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)

    State v. Knox, Greene App. No. 2005-CA-74, 2006-Ohio-3039 at ¶ 11; See, also, United States v. Hernandez-Gomez (DC Nev. 2008), 2008WL1837255. [Citing Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 2007 WL 3319449 (D.N.M. 2007); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Kranz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Ohio 2001) and United States v. Caine, 517 F.Supp.2d 586, 589-590 (D.Mass. 2007)]. {¶ 30} "What is sought to be justified here is not an arrest, but a Terry stop for investigation.

  2. State v. Bright

    2010 Ohio 1111 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)

    State v. Knox, Greene App. No. 2005-CA-74, 2006-Ohio-3039 at ¶ 11; See, also, United States v. Hernandez-Gomez (DC Nev. 2008), 2008WL1837255. [Citing Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 2007 WL 3319449 (D.N.M. 2007); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Kranz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Ohio 2001) and United States v. Caine, 517 F.Supp.2d 586, 589-590 (D.Mass. 2007)]. {¶ 18} "What is sought to be justified here is not an arrest, but a Terry stop for investigation. Logically, there must be some set of circumstances short of probable cause but sufficient for reasonable suspicion which will warrant the officer in proceeding further in his or her investigation; the evidence needed for a Terry stop is by definition less than probable cause for arrest.

  3. Pulsifer v. Prince

    No. MJM-22-3080 (D. Md. May. 30, 2024)

    These rulings are supported by the fact that SFSTs “do not involve a major intrusion on liberty.” United States v. Frantz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760, 763 (S.D. Ohio 2001). Further, any such intrusion caused by a SFST “is reasonable both from the perspective of the driver and of society at large.

  4. U.S. v. Caine

    517 F. Supp. 2d 586 (D. Mass. 2007)   Cited 12 times
    Finding reasonable suspicion where the defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and she had admitted drinking earlier that night

    Although bloodshot and glassy eyes could be the result of a number of innocent causes, it was equally reasonable to suspect that Defendant's condition was caused by alcohol consumption (particularly after the Defendant admitted to drinking earlier in the night).See United States v. Frantz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760, 763 n. 3 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (". . . there was no evidence . . . that the bloodshot eyes were caused by the driver having been awake for many hours. . . . there was evidence, however, that the bloodshot eyes were caused by alcohol consumption.") Under these circumstances, Morse was justified in suspecting that the Defendant was intoxicated. The undisputed facts acquired during the stop, along with his observation of her failure to stop for a stop sign, provided the necessary reasonable suspicion.

  5. State v. Daniels

    2018 Ohio 3113 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018)

    State v. Knox, Greene App. No.2005-CA-74, 2006-Ohio-3039 at ¶ 11; See, also, United States v. Hernandez-Gomez (DC Nev.2008), 2008WL1837255. [Citing Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 2007 WL 3319449 (D.N.M.2007); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Kranz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Ohio 2001) and United States v. Caine, 517 F.Supp.2d 586, 589-590 (D.Mass.2007)]."What is sought to be justified here is not an arrest, but a Terry stop for investigation.

  6. United States v. Drew

    Case No. 18-po-6712 (D. Md. Jun. 13, 2019)

    Here, Sergeant Zielinski had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol based on his observations of (1) the defendant's speed and crossing back and forth between lanes; (2) the odor of alcohol coming from the defendant's vehicle; (3) the defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol; and (4) the defendant's slurred speech and red, bloodshot, and watery eyes. See Leon, 755 F. App'x at 794-95; Vondrak, 535 F.3d at 1207 (citing cases); Amundsen v. Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1200 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing cases); United States v. Caine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 586, 588-90 (D. Mass. 2007); United States v. Frantz, 177 F. Supp. 2d 760, 763-64 (S.D. Ohio 2001). Therefore, Sergeant Zielinski was justified in requiring the defendant to perform field sobriety tests.

  7. United States v. Westcott

    Case No. 3:06-po-97 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2013)

    Because one of the purposes of the ACA is "to provide conformity in the laws governing the federal land and the state in which that land is located, id., the state's case law interpreting the relevant criminal statute is to be given great respect. See United States v. Frantz, 177 F. Supp.2d 760, 762 (S.D. Ohio 2001). At trial, U.S. Air Force Security Forces Officer Jason Knapp testified that, in the early morning hours of November 13, 2005, he observed Westcott's vehicle go left of center for several seconds, return to the right lane, abruptly change to the left lane without signaling, and then come to a "complete stop" at a green light.

  8. U.S. v. Bourgeois

    CRIMINAL ACTION 3:06CR51TSL-JCS (S.D. Miss. Jul. 30, 2007)   Cited 3 times
    In United States v. Bourgeois, 2007 WL 2219335 (S.D. Miss. July 30, 2007), defendant Bourgeois was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R. § 4.23 by refusing a blood test after being arrested on suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol while driving on a federal enclave.

    As Bourgeois correctly points out, the purpose of the field tests is to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion that an individual is driving while impaired by alcohol. See United States v. Frantz, 177 F. Supp. 2d 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 2001) ("The purpose of the field sobriety tests is to confirm or disconfirm an initial suspicion of DUI."). Here, there are no results of such tests.

  9. State v. Reynolds

    2023 Ohio 2030 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023)

    While many circumstances, taken alone, can be consistent with a completely innocent explanation, taken together, they are sufficient to support requiring field sobriety tests. See United States v. Frantz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 2001)." Id. at ¶ 40.

  10. State v. Osborne

    2019 Ohio 3235 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)

    While many circumstances, taken alone, can be consistent with a completely innocent explanation, taken together, they are sufficient to support requiring field sobriety tests. See United States v. Frantz, 177 F.Supp.2d 760, 764 (S.D. Ohio 2001). {¶41} We conclude that the seven Evans factors stated above, together with the Officer Cook's previous experience and training regarding impaired drivers, as referenced in the record, demonstrated a justifiable reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Osborne after the initial stop to conduct field sobriety tests.