See, e.g., United States v. Purnell, 361 Fed.App.x 384, 385 (3d Cir.2010) (unpublished) (noting that defendant qualified for safety-valve sentence upon resentencing when he “met with law enforcement authorities following remand”); United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir.2008) (assuming district court could consider defendant's “additional safety valve proffer prior to a second resentencing,” and noting § 3553(f)(5) requires the resentencing judge to make factual findings as to whether defendant made complete and truthful proffer); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 n. 1 (5th Cir.1996) (pointing out that government did not argue newly enacted safety-valve provision could not be considered at resentencing hearing and noting “without expressing an opinion regarding whether the [safety-valve] provision should apply at a resentencing,” that district courts have found the provision applies to a resentencing on remand). But compare United States v. Giraldo, 52 Fed.Appx. 584, 586–87 (3d Cir.2002) (unpublished) (holding a safety-valve disclosure made before resentencing, and not before the initial sentencing, is untimely).

To qualify for safety-valve relief, he has the burden of establishing eligibility for such a reduction, including showing that he timely and truthfully provided the government with all relevant information and evidence concerning the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1996).

Other courts have disapproved similar attempts to shift the burden to the government. See United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir.) (finding it "anomalous to place the burden on the Government to solicit information from the defendant"), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2537 (1996); United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1996) (refusing to place on the government the burden of seeking out defendants for debriefing). The government does not bear a burden of seeking information from the defendant.

A sentencing court's factual findings pertaining to a § 5C1.2 reduction are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 133 (1997); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996). This court reviews the district court's legal interpretation of § 5C1.2 de novo.

We review a sentencing court's factual findings for clear error, but review the court's interpretation of the safety valve provisions de novo. United States v. Ramirez, 94 F.3d 1095, 1099 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996). Appellant had the burden of proving that he met all five criteria of the safety valve provisions.

The United States Sentencing Guidelines' "safety valve" provision permits a court to issue a sentence below the mandatory minimum if the defendant meets five criteria. United States v. Ridgeway, abrogated on other grounds, 321 F.3d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1996). To be eligible for the safety valve, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 requires that a defendant demonstrate: (1) he does not have more than one criminal history point; (2) he did not use violence or threats of violence or possess a weapon during the offense; (3) his offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) he was not an organizer, leader, or other major participant in the offense; and (5) that not later than the time of his sentencing hearing, he has truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence he has concerning the offense.

Thus, to "meet[]" the § 4C1.1(a) criteria and prove that he is eligible for the reduction, the defendant must show both that he does not have X and did not do Y. See USSG § 4C1.1(a); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A]s a general rule, the party seeking the adjustment in the sentence is the party that has the burden of proving the facts to support the adjustment.").

We review the district court's decision whether to apply U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 for clear error. United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996). Juarez had the burden of establishing eligibility for safety-valve relief, including the burden of showing that he truthfully provided the Government with all relevant information and evidence regarding the offense.

We review a district court's legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact as to the application of the provisions for clear error. See United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 843 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996). Reasonable factual inferences drawn by the district court in support of its findings are also reviewed for clear error.

The district court's legal interpretation of a statutory provision is reviewed de novo. United States v. Flanagan , 80 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1996). Factual findings made during sentencing, however, are reviewed for clear error.