U.S. v. Feemster

9 Citing cases

  1. Bell-Bey v. Roper

    499 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2007)   Cited 113 times
    Holding that petitioner's claim that state applied wrong legal standard in post-conviction proceeding is not constitutional error cognizable under § 2254

    See Rice, 546 U.S at 338; United States v. Jones, 245 F.3d 990, 993-94 (8th Cir.2001); see also Smulls v. Roper, 467 F.3d 1108, 1117 (8th Cir.2006) (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "the trial court fulfills its `duty to rule' on the Batson third-step analysis `by expressing a clear intent to uphold or reject a strike after listening to the challenge, the race-neutral explanation, and the arguments of the parties'" (quoting Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir.2006))), vacated reh'g en banc granted, No. 05-2456 (8th Cir. Feb. 2, 2007). The trial court listened to and considered Bell-Bey's argument both before and after overruling Bell-Bey's Batson challenge. Cf. United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir.1996) (concluding the trial court had adequately completed the third step of a Batson challenge by weighing the persuasiveness of the proffered nondiscriminatory rationale and by making a finding the government had not exercised a peremptory strike in a discriminatory manner). We defer to the factual findings of the trial court regarding the persuasiveness of the state attorney's nondiscriminatory rationale for striking veniremember Johnson and conclude the overruling of Bell-Bey's Batson challenge was not an unreasonable application of federal law.

  2. U.S. v. Pherigo

    327 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 2003)   Cited 110 times
    Holding that it was not error to rely on prior state felony drug conviction more than ten years old when imposing enhanced sentence following § 851 notice by government and declining to apply the rule of lenity in interpreting the statute in the absence of ambiguity

    The "`evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies `peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996). We are required to afford the district court a great amount of deference in its pretext determination.

  3. Carter v. Hopkins

    151 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 1998)   Cited 305 times
    Holding that it is inappropriate to apply. Batson's burden shifting where there has been a long delay between jury selection and the filing of the claim, a voir dire record is not available, and the petitioner did not raise a timely objection

    As in any Equal Protection case, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the defendant to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93; see also United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1091-92 (8th Cir. 1996). Although Batson was decided twenty days after the conclusion of Carter's trial, the Supreme Court has held that Batson applies "retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final" at the time of the decision.

  4. United States v. Gibson

    105 F.3d 1229 (8th Cir. 1997)   Cited 28 times
    Holding a "similarly situated" juror argument must be made at the trial level and is untimely if it is raised for the first time on appeal

    Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991); U.S. v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1996). Because the evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind lies within a trial judge's province, a district court's finding on whether a peremptory challenge was exercised for a racially discriminatory reason is reversed only if clearly erroneous.

  5. United States v. Wiggins

    104 F.3d 174 (8th Cir. 1997)   Cited 40 times
    Concluding possession of large quantity of drugs is consistent with intent to distribute

    Regarding the second juror, this court has held that "the incarceration of a close family member is a legitimate race-neutral reason justifying the use of a `peremptory strike.'" United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996). The district court's denial of Wiggins's Batson claim was not clearly erroneous.

  6. Strong v. Roper

    Case No. 4:08CV1917 JCH (E.D. Mo. Jun. 29, 2011)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that the failure to raise Batson objection does not entitle defendant to presumption of prejudice under Strickland, and that he must instead show “reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different”

    The trial court listened to and considered Strong's objections before overruling Strong's challenges. United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding the trial court had adequately completed the third step of a Batson challenge by weighing the persuasiveness of the proffered nondiscriminatory rationale and by making a finding the government had not exercised a peremptory strike in a discriminatory manner).

  7. Commonwealth v. Lopes

    SJC-11587 (Mass. Jan. 10, 2018)

    States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748-749 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988) (Batson did not "handcuff a prosecutor's legitimate exercise of peremptory strikes," which included striking "young . . . panel members"); Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 843 (1998) (challenge of young juror proper where "age is an acceptable race-neutral factor" [citation omitted]); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1991) (age was legitimate race-neutral reason for peremptorily striking juror similar in age to twenty-two year old defendant); United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1075-1076 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to recognize young adults or college students as distinctive groups for Batson purposes); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (in excluding "young adults" from jury, "no court has found a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation based on the exclusion of a certain age group from the jury"); United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) ("relative youth" qualified as "potential race-neutral factor justifying the exercise of 'peremptory' challenges"); United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("young adults do not constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an equal protection challenge to the composition of a petit jury"); United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2007) (youth acceptable race-neutral justification for exercising peremptory strike); Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1518 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Willis v. Zant, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989) ("petitioner failed to establish that young adults aged eighteen to twenty-nine constituted a cognizable group"); United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) ("'young persons' is not a cognizable class"). As a general matter, "[w]e presume that peremptory challenges are properly made, but this presumption can be rebutted by a prima facie showing of either a

  8. Commonwealth v. Lopes

    478 Mass. 593 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 46 times
    Finding prospective juror's "two significant experiences with the law provided a sufficient and obvious basis for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge"

    enied, 488 U.S. 835, 109 S.Ct. 97, 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988) ( Batson did not "handcuff a prosecutor's legitimate exercise of peremptory strikes," which included striking "young ... panel members"); Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 843, 119 S.Ct. 108, 142 L.Ed.2d 86 (1998) (challenge of young juror proper where "age is an acceptable race-neutral factor" [citation omitted] ); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1991) (age was legitimate race-neutral reason for peremptorily striking juror similar in age to twenty-two year old defendant); United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1075–1076 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to recognize young adults or college students as distinctive groups for Batson purposes); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (in excluding "young adults" from jury, "no court has found a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation based on the exclusion of a certain age group from the jury"); United States v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) ("relative youth" qualified as "potential race-neutral factor justifying the exercise of 'peremptory' challenges"); United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("young adults do not constitute a cognizable group for purposes of an equal protection challenge to the composition of a petit jury"); United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2007) (youth acceptable race-neutral justification for exercising peremptory strike); Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1518 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Willis v. Zant, 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1328, 103 L.Ed.2d 596 (1989) ("petitioner failed to establish that young adults aged eighteen to twenty-nine constituted a cognizable group"); United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974) (" 'young persons' is not a cognizable class"). As a general matter, "[w]e presume that peremptory challenges are properly made, but this pre

  9. State v. Martin

    A16-1965 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2018)

    Although neither Martin nor the state discusses any Minnesota caselaw addressing whether legal training constitutes a sufficient race-neutral explanation, the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that "prior legal training qualif[ies] as [a] potential race-neutral factor[] justifying the exercise of peremptory challenges." U.S. v. Feemster, 98 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, the race-neutral explanation "need not be persuasive or even plausible."